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Abstract 
Humanity’s relationship with nature has, in recent years, undoubtedly been one of con-
tention and turmoil, an issue whose drama is gaining popularity in popular culture and, 
especially, film. In this dissertation I examine how these challenging human-nature rela-
tionships play out in Terrence Malick’s The New World, Werner Herzog’s Grizzly Man 
and Encounters at the End of the World, Sean Penn’s Into the Wild, and the Jon Kra-
kauer book, of the same title, upon which Penn’s film is based. As one’s views on 
nature (like all else) are mediated through language, using ecocritical principles slanted 
towards filmic, as opposed to written, texts, I provide a close examination of the ways in 
which these artists portray the relationship between language and nature, and the impact 
this has on our cultural and individual identities. I will also show how these primary 
texts make use of centuries-old Romantic aesthetics in order to humanise nature for 
moral ends. The primary texts agree that a large part of the problem in the poor relation-
ship between humanity and nature is due to inadequate metaphors with which humanity 
views the earth. Thus, each artist promotes a certain kind of anthropomorphic under-
standing of nature which he believes is pivotal in encouraging better interconnections 
between humanity and nature. As a result, I provide a critique of the kinds of metaphors 
used by each respective artist, where some metaphors of nature may support or contra-
dict a certain artist’s aims in his portrayal of human-nature relationships. 
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We do not see nature with our eyes, 
but with our understandings and our hearts (Hazlitt 249). 
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Introduction 
For what is nature? Nature is no great mother who has borne us. She is our creation. 
It is in our brain that she quickens to life. Things are because we see them, and what 
we see, and how we see it, depends on the arts that have influenced us. To look at a 
thing is very different from seeing a thing. One does not see anything until one sees 
its beauty. Then, and only then, does it come into existence (Wilde 27). 
What is Nature? 
Nature is one of the greatest living poems. It is a poem because it lends itself to multiple 
and often controversial interpretations. It is living because, as I will argue, to treat it 
otherwise would be suicidal. The manner in which humanity treats and defines this liv-
ing poem is an issue which has garnered increased attention in the last four decades in 
art, literary scholarship and science. However, humanity’s attempt to define nature has 
consistently resulted in nature’s tendency to slip away and evade definition, a reality 
which has led Raymond Williams to claim that nature “is perhaps the most complex 
word in the [English] language” (219). Indeed, the complexity of the word is showcased 
by the several problems which arise the instant we attempt to define it: Is it possible to 
come to an objective definition of nature? Is it necessary to come to an objective defini-
tion of nature? Is it possible to live in harmony with nature? What does it mean to live 
in harmony with nature? Are humans a part of, or apart from, nature? If humans inter-
fere with nature, does that mean nature can no longer be considered ‘natural’? These 
are some of the questions with which artists have grappled, especially, more recently, in 
film. Thus, it is with film’s recent interest in humanity’s relationship with nature that I 
will attempt to explore these questions by offering an ecocritical reading of Terrence 
Malick’s The New World, Werner Herzog’s documentaries Grizzly Man and Encounters 
at the End of the World, Sean Penn’s Into the Wild, and Jon Krakauer’s book, of the 
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same title, upon which Penn’s film is based. It is expected, but not any less interesting 
because of it, that these artists present widely differing readings of nature, a perpetually 
elusive concept. Malick seems to be of the opinion that it is entirely possible to live a 
life in harmony with nature, while Herzog offers an antithetical view on the matter, 
demonstrating that it is wrong and dangerous to perceive nature as a safe haven from 
human culture. It is because of this that Herzog perceives nature as harsh, unmerciful 
and ugly. While Penn and Krakauer do not view nature to be as brutal as Herzog does, 
their respective texts certainly carry this warning, and come to the conclusion that one 
cannot know all of nature all of the time, especially when attempting to do so solitarily. 
Each artist valorises and promotes a certain perception of nature, with each definition of 
nature as contentious, puzzling and problematic as the next. 
There are certainly several repercussions that arise when assigning a particular and 
idiosyncratic definition to ‘nature’, a consequence which does not escape the artists un-
der scrutiny. Thus, when providing their own definition of nature, each artist also 
illustrates what it means to ‘immerse oneself into nature’, to ‘live closer to nature’, or, 
to use a phrase which appears throughout my dissertation, ‘to establish better intercon-
nections between humanity and nature’. These are phrases which are as difficult to 
define as nature itself, mainly because they rely on a definition of nature to make sense. 
One of the findings that presents itself in analysing these texts is that part of the diffi-
culty in defining nature and all related terms comes from the fact that the definition of 
nature is culturally determined. Thus, in the process of providing a definition of nature, 
each culture does so by negotiating their placement on the nature-human continuum, if, 
indeed, we are to assume that nature and humans fall on opposite ends of the same 
scale. That we may conclude that nature is culturally determined comes mainly from the 
fact that every culture views nature in a different way. Take, for example, the Native 
American perception of nature when compared to the white American perception of na-
ture, a point on which Luther Standing Bear, a Native American, comments: 
We did not think of the great open plains, the beautiful rolling hills, and 
winding streams with tangled growth, as ‘wild.’ Only to the white man was 
nature a ‘wilderness’ and only to him was the land ‘infested’ with ‘wild’ 
animals and ‘savage’ people. To us it was tame (38). 
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Luther Standing Bear, therefore, demonstrates that the interconnections between Native 
Americans and nature were far stronger than those between white colonial Americans 
and nature. In her book What is Nature?, Kate Soper provides an extensive and full ac-
count of the history of the perception of nature in western culture. One the major 
conclusions Soper reaches upon examining the trajectory of western perceptions of na-
ture is that definitions of nature, while determined by culture, are simultaneously 
determined by changing times, as we find that while Karl Marx thought nature to be 
anything that remains untouched by human hands (Soper 18), a definition which be-
comes increasingly problematic as the earth’s last unexplored spots rapidly disappear, 
the original pre-Socratic Greek definition of nature purported nature to be everything 
that existed (Naddaf 3). Coates highlights the problems of this original Greek definition 
of nature, stating that if we are to believe it, 
then, strictly speaking, nothing can be unnatural. However, the distinction 
between the natural and the unnatural (or artificial) is invariably made and, 
while nature has no conceptual opposite, we usually think of it as human 
culture. Indeed, without a concept of culture as the works of humankind, 
there can be no concept of nature (6). 
It is Coates’s last point which illustrates the futility in any attempt to define nature ob-
jectively. However, that nature is the central theme of this work necessitates some 
definition of nature for the purposes of pragmatism. It is for this reason that I will utilise 
the definition of nature provided by Raymond Williams, who defines nature in terms 
that are broad enough to be practical. Nature, according to Williams, is “what man has 
not made, though if he made it long enough ago – a hedgerow or a desert – it will usu-
ally be included as natural” (223). Thus, as Coates does, I will view humans and nature 
as two dichotomous entities, which may seem an imprudent assumption given that 
through the evolutionary process humans have, essentially, sprung from the loins of na-
ture. However, Jonathan Bate is certain that the two entities must be considered as 
discrete, stating that “The difference [between humans and nature] is made by the very 
act of considering: to think and talk about our distinctiveness as a species is to mark our 
distinctiveness as a species” (Song of the Earth 243). 
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Many critics would disagree with this distinction between humanity and nature, 
which is most clearly seen in the substitute names critics assign to the term ‘nature’. 
David Abram, throughout his book, The Spell of the Sensuous, refers to nature as 
“more-than-human”. Critics such as Cheryll Glotfelty, Gretchen Legler and George Ses-
sions all refer to nature as “nonhuman” (xix; 72; 189). Regarding Abram’s term “more-
than-human”, what I find problematic is that in an attempt to display his respect for na-
ture, Abram’s label can perhaps be read, ironically, as either patronising or overly 
respectful, undoing any intended reverence he has for it, a point which may also be ap-
plied to spelling nature with a capital ‘N’, as in ‘Nature’, as some critics are inclined to 
do. Further, the terms “more-than-human” and “nonhuman” (intentionally) imply that 
nature is more important than humanity, or, at the very least, that nature and humanity 
are equivalents. However, there is a problem in the manner in which these labels have 
both used “human” as their root word, which only reaffirms humanity as the ontological 
yardstick against which all life is measured, thereby predicating humanity as the centre 
of the universe, undoing any intention to advocate what was oppositely intended. It is 
for these reasons that I find the terms ‘nonhuman’ and ‘more-than-human’ to be unnec-
essary complications when the terms ‘human’ and ‘nature’ will do. Now that ‘nature’ 
has been defined and labelled, it is necessary, as this dissertation’s central concern is the 
instances in which humanity and nature meet, to define those terms most central to these 
occurrences: anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. 
Buell provides a useful definition of anthropocentrism, stating that it is “The assump-
tion or view that the interests of humans are of higher priority than those of nonhumans 
[or nature]” (Environmental Criticism 134). Anthropocentrism stands in direct contrast 
to biocentrism, which Buell defines as “The view that all organisms, including humans, 
are part of a larger biotic web or network or community whose interests must constrain 
or direct or govern the human interest” (Environmental Criticism 134). The next impor-
tant term is anthropomorphism, which Buell defines as “The attribution of human 
feelings or traits to nonhuman beings or objects or natural phenomena” (Environmental 
Criticism 134). As one sometimes finds that the terms anthropocentrism and anthropo-
morphism are (incorrectly) used interchangeably, Buell provides a useful distinction 
between the two concepts: 
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Anthropomorphism implies an anthropocentric frame of reference, but the 
two do not correlate precisely. For example, a poet’s choice to personify a 
bird or tree might betoken … a projection of human desire to make nature 
sympathize with humankind; or, oppositely, it might be done in the interest 
of dramatizing the claims or plight of the natural world. Often, both motives 
are at play in, say, animal stories and animal folklore (Environmental 
Criticism 134). 
In terms of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism, I will argue that it is unavoidable 
and, rather than fighting against it (as some critics are inclined to do as I will attempt to 
show in the next chapter), may, in fact, help establish more practical interconnections 
between nature and humans. This is especially true of anthropomorphism, which, as it 
manifests itself most overtly in art, may be helpful in establishing a more accommodat-
ing and productive attitude towards nature precisely because, and not despite, that it 
allows us to translate nature into more relatable human terms. However, when an-
thropomorphising nature, it is apparent that nature may take on several human forms, 
some of which may be more helpful than others, as I will demonstrate in discussing the 
central texts of this dissertation. That is why asking the question What is nature? is the 
wrong kind of question and should rather be replaced by Who is nature? Indeed, one 
may find that no two portrayals of nature are alike when analysing each of the primary 
texts. However, before any such analysis may take place, and given that my aim is to 
use ecocriticism as a means of examining mostly filmic texts, it is important to note that 
an ecocriticism suited to the study of film remains underdeveloped. Thus, much of 
Chapter 1 will be concerned with the ways in which the utilisation of ecocriticism to 
analyse written texts may be modified to analyse filmic texts, and, in relation to this, the 
consequences of doing so, especially as it relates to anthropocentrism and anthropomor-
phism. However, before I do this it is necessary to provide a brief description of each of 
the texts I will be studying. 
Terrence Malick’s The New World takes place in Virginia in 1607 and begins as Brit-
ish sailors, led by Captain Christopher Newport, set foot on the New World in order to 
establish a colony. Captain John Smith, who begins the film imprisoned in Newport’s 
ship, is given a chance to repair his reputation by being sent to live with the Native 
Americans for the purposes of establishing political and financial links with them. 
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However, Smith is captured and almost killed by the Algonquian leader, Chief 
Powhatan, father of Pocahontas. It is Pocahontas who saves Smith’s life, and, in the af-
termath, the two fall in love. Recognising this as a betrayal of her people, Chief 
Powhatan disowns his daughter in which case the British take her in and baptise her Re-
becca. Due to the changes Pocahontas has undergone, Smith senses his relationship with 
her has changed for the worse, and, as a result, leaves Virginia and fakes his own death, 
which devastates the Algonquian Princess. Remaining in Virginia, Pocahontas then falls 
in love with John Rolfe, who owns a tobacco plantation. The couple move to England 
where they raise their son, Thomas, and Pocahontas is greeted by the English with open 
arms. Soon after her arrival, however, Pocahontas dies, at which point the film ends. 
Unlike Malick’s The New World, both of Werner Herzog’s documentaries lack any 
kind of plot, and can, therefore, be summarised even more briefly than Malick’s narra-
tive. Herzog’s Grizzly Man documents the life and death of American environmentalist 
Timothy Treadwell, who, as the film explains, spent the last thirteen summers of his life 
in Alaska in an attempt to protect its grizzly bear inhabitants, until he and his girlfriend 
at the time, Amie, die from a grizzly bear attack. Herzog mixes original film with 
Treadwell’s own documentary footage as evidence to support his argument that Tread-
well’s perception of nature was unrealistically edenic, which played a large part in 
determining Treadwell’s death at the hands of the bears he tried to protect. 
The human relationship with nature also takes centre stage in Herzog’s documentary 
Encounters at the End of the World. Herzog sets his film in Antarctica, spending some 
time in McMurdo Station, a small town comprised almost entirely of scientists and re-
searchers. However, much of the film takes place in the Antarctic wilderness where 
Herzog films the landscape in ways that accentuate its sublime qualities, while also 
gaining a sense of the ways in which these scientists and researchers interact with their 
environment. 
Lastly, there is Sean Penn’s Into the Wild and the Jon Krakauer novel upon which it 
is based, which portrays the “true” story of Chris McCandless, a young American adult 
who set out for Alaska in the early 1990s but was found dead in the Alaskan wilderness 
in 1992. The film is told in a disjointed fashion and is structured much like a classic 
American road trip narrative in which the protagonist, while journeying to discover 
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himself, meets interesting characters along the way who influence and discuss the pro-
tagonist’s motives. Both the film and the book depict McCandless’s relationship with 
his parents as broken, which both texts give as the reason for McCandless’s decision to 
destroy every trace of his identity in the human world, give up all his material posses-
sions, and trek across America to Alaska, where he eventually went to settle. Upon 
reaching Fairbanks, Alaska, however, McCandless struggled to find food, may have ac-
cidentally ingested poisonous plants, and died soon thereafter (Penn; Krakauer). 
It is clear, then, that all the texts I have selected are intent on describing attitudes to-
wards nature that the artists I have selected either share with the protagonists depicted in 
their texts, or are vehemently opposed to what they would perceive as flawed attitudes 
towards nature. In the following chapter I will be providing a description and discussion 
of the theoretical framework I will be using in reading these texts. 
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Chapter 1 
Ecocriticism: An Introduction 
Right now, as I see it, environmental criticism is in the tense but enviable position of 
being a wide-open movement still sorting out its premises and its powers (Buell 
Environmental Criticism 28). 
Defining Ecocriticism 
Ecocriticism is commonly defined as “the study of the relationship between literature 
and the physical environment” (Glotfelty xviii). As one of the newest forms of literary 
criticism to emerge at the end of the twentieth century, ecocriticism was formalised as a 
literary theory in the late 1970s amidst concerns of human-induced environmental deg-
radation, which has forced humans, especially artists, to re-evaluate their relationship 
with nature. Ecocriticism has since grown in areas previously untouched by literary the-
ory. However, despite significant development within the last thirty years, ecocriticism 
still exhibits great potential for further growth and cultivation (Harrington and 
Tallmadge xv). An example of this would be the paucity of ecocritical theory which 
considers film as a medium of study. What would ecocriticism look like if tailored to 
the representation of nature in film, as opposed to the representation of nature in written 
text? How does representing nature in film inform or modify existing ecocritical prem-
ises? Further, and what is most important regarding the core concerns of this 
dissertation, how might film influence our theorisation of anthropomorphism and an-
thropocentrism? These are some of the questions that will be considered for this 
dissertation, and this chapter more specifically. Certainly, ecocriticism has branched out 
into several factions, such as ecofeminism and deep ecology, both of which will be dis-
cussed in this chapter. However, to determine other ways in which ecocriticism may 
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develop, it is important that one is aware of ecocriticism’s origins, and that I provide an 
evaluation and critique of these origins. 
William Rueckert, the first to coin the term ‘ecocriticism’ in his essay “Literature 
and Ecology: An Experiment in Ecocriticism” (originally published in 1978), but by no 
means the first ecocritic, developed this landmark literary theory as a means to “experi-
ment with the application of ecology and ecological concepts to the study of literature” 
(107). However, Rueckert’s version of ecocriticism differs on quite a fundamental level 
when compared to how ecocriticism is currently used and understood. Rueckert seemed 
more concerned with reading texts as ecosystems, rather than reading texts about eco-
systems, which is how ecocriticism is, to a large extent, practised today. Rueckert’s 
main premise is that texts and humans create a kind of literary ecosystem, one in which 
poetry specifically acts as an infinite energy source from which culture is manifested: 
Rueckert claims that poems “help to create creativity and community, and when their 
energy is released and flows out into others, to again raise matter from lower to higher 
order” (111). 
However, Rueckert’s original conceptualisation of ecocriticism still shares common-
alities with ecocriticism in its modern form. Rueckert was able to realise the importance 
of the pressing environmental matters that were, and still are, unavoidably linked to his 
theory: “[M]an’s tragic flaw is his anthropocentric (as opposed to biocentric) vision, and 
his compulsion to conquer, humanise, domesticate, violate, and exploit every natural 
thing. The ecological nightmare … is of a monstrously overpopulated, almost com-
pletely polluted, all but totally humanised planet” (113). It is, thus, the literary 
representation of the interconnectedness between humanity and nature, and the exami-
nation of humanity’s treatment of nature, which are among the main thrusts behind 
ecocriticism, both in its early and current conceptualisations. As the Rueckert quote 
suggests, anthropocentrism should be avoided (113), but there is no clear and definite 
consensus amongst ecocritics and environmentalists as to the validity of this argument, 
with some ecocritics arguing that humans can only ever place their needs first, and oth-
ers arguing more biocentrically and stating that the importance of nature outweighs the 
importance of humanity (Buell Environmental Criticism 97-98). Thus, Rueckert laid the 
foundation for a new and relevant literary theory to which ideas and principles have 
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since been added, subtracted and modified. However, despite how contemporary formu-
lations of ecocriticism differ from Rueckert’s initial views of the term (such as present-
day ecocritics developing a literary theory to study nature, rather than using nature to 
study texts), one of the few principles that remain constant is, in relation to anthropo-
centrism and anthropomorphism, an earnest concern for the bettering of the relationship 
between humanity and nature, where human perceptions and interpretations of nature 
play a significant role in determining the success of this relationship (Kern 267). In eco-
criticism’s current guise, most present-day ecocritics use principles of ecology in order 
to examine the relationship between humanity and nature in text, a task that may be ap-
parent in the very name of the theory: ‘ecocriticism’. 
The word ‘ecocritic’ is a portmanteau derived from the unification of the words 
‘ecology’, derived from the Greek, oikos, meaning ‘household’, and ‘critic’, derived 
from the Greek, kritis, meaning ‘judge’ (Snyder 23; Howarth 69), which, as Howarth 
explains, signifies that we may think of an ecocritic as one who “‘judges the merits and 
faults of writings that depict the effects of culture upon nature, with a view toward cele-
brating nature, berating its despoilers, and reversing their harm through political 
action’” (69). Howarth’s definition of an ecocritic is nearly completely correct as it 
omits some vital information. If we are to believe Gary Snyder’s supposition that ecol-
ogy refers to “the study of biological interrelationships and the flow of energy through 
organisms and inorganic matter” (23), then an ecocritic, basing her or his theory on 
ecology, must study the textual representation of the ways nature affects culture, culture 
affects culture, and nature affects nature. Thus, Howarth’s definition of an ecocritic as 
one who studies the “effects of culture upon nature”, while true, is too narrow. Ecocriti-
cism, then, recognises the interconnections between nature and culture and the ability of 
both to influence the other and itself. To represent the interconnections between nature 
and culture otherwise would be a disservice to the multiplicitous quality of the relation-
ship between the two, an argument with which many ecocritics would agree. However, 
there are certainly some aspects of ecocriticism which make apparent the divide that 
exists in this budding literary theory, hence the existence of first-wave and second-wave 
ecocriticism. 
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First- and second-wave ecocriticism’s differing theoretical standings can be verified 
in their contrasting use of the term ‘environment’. Without acknowledging anything that 
lies outside of nature, first-wave ecocriticism takes ‘environment’ to mean only ‘natural 
environment’, which, as a result of ecocriticism’s green endeavours, means that, even 
more so than second-wave ecocriticism, first-wave ecocriticism places a greater empha-
sis on the preservation and protection of the natural environment, and achieves these 
goals particularly through political action (Howarth 69). However, second-wave eco-
criticism, in addition to observing the natural environment that has become a 
preoccupation of first-wave ecocriticism, casts its gaze on the human places that are 
comprised of concrete, tar, power stations and air-conditioning, while also taking into 
consideration the traces of nature in urban settings (Goodbody 12). Considering its po-
litical agenda, second-wave ecocriticism focuses on “displaced peoples and 
environmental racism” (Goodbody 13), which, briefly, as defined by Buell, refers to the 
“toxification of local environments and the siting of waste dumps and polluting indus-
tries that discriminate against poor and otherwise disempowered communities, 
particularly minority communities” (Buell Environmental Criticism 141-42). 
When compared to first-wave ecocriticism, second-wave ecocriticism, if read in an-
thropocentric terms, takes a balanced and more realistic approach to human-nature 
relationships by considering the symbiotic, as well as parasitic, interaction of both hu-
manity and nature, and recognises that neither of the two exist entirely independent of 
each other. Thus, first-wave ecocriticism presents itself as being anti-anthropocentric 
(or, perhaps even biocentric) by condemning any harmful human interference in the 
natural world, and prioritises the needs and protection of the natural environment over 
humans and the human environment. Whether or not it is feasible, or even possible, to 
take such an extreme biocentric approach will be examined in more detail when discuss-
ing deep ecology. 
However, one must not look at first- and second-wave ecocriticism as two diametri-
cally opposed ideologies as they do share common ground in, firstly, their concern for 
the well-being of the environment, and, secondly, from a literary perspective, for “what 
superficially seems an old-fashioned propensity for ‘realistic’ modes of representation, 
and a preoccupation with questions of factical accuracy of environmental representa-
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tion” (Buell Environmental Criticism 31). This favouring of literary biological verisi-
militude is used by many ecocritics as a means of promoting a green consciousness, 
which leads some ecocritics to believe that “ecocriticism’s progress hinges significantly 
if not crucially on its becoming more science-literate” (Buell Environmental Criticism 
14). Relatedly, in Rueckert’s 1978 essay, in which he defines the term ‘ecocriticism’, 
Rueckert asks the following: 
How does one engage in responsible creative and cooperative biospheric ac-
tion as a reader, teacher (especially this), and critic of literature? I think that 
we have to begin answering this question and that we should do what we 
have always done: turn to the poets. And then to the ecologists (113). 
Rueckert certainly recognises the importance of science in a literary theory that would 
be far less successful without it, given that ecocriticism’s goal is to critique the manner 
in which both humans and nature may live successfully in the world. Indeed, ecocriti-
cism has certainly benefited from science as science debunks destructive myths and 
overt and indisputable inaccuracies in humans’ perceptions of the interaction of human-
ity and nature, “such as that people were meant to exercise dominion over nature, or that 
nature is a passive receptacle of the fertilizing human mind” (Newman 2). However, 
Rueckert is also right in recognising that ecocriticism must first be considered a literary 
theory before it is considered a theory reliant on science, and must critique art before it 
does science. As Buell shows, “the terms of scientistic discourse have significant impli-
cations for environmental criticism of literature but do not serve as an authoritative 
model. The discourses of science and literature must be read both with and against each 
other” (Environmental Criticism 19). Thus, when Rueckert states that if ecocriticism is 
to work as a literary theory, and that we should first turn to art before science, he is not 
necessarily implying that we must prioritise art over science. While it is important that 
ecocriticism critique art before it does science (as it is first a literary theory), it must not 
value art over science, or vice versa, given that the strength of ecocriticism comes in its 
equal reliance on both. Art, then, as it is mostly in the business of anthropomorphising 
nature, and science, as it often purports to avoid any kind of anthropomorphisation of 
nature, may seem to be mutually exclusive and unable to occupy equal space in the 
same theory. However, as I will demonstrate and argue for throughout this dissertation, 
both science and art are needed in equal measure if we are to come to, firstly, success-
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fully critique texts’ anthropomorphic understanding of the interaction of humanity and 
nature, and, secondly, have a greater care for nature overall. 
Including science and art, part of that which forms the theoretical foundation of eco-
criticism is its conceptualisation of place and space. The environment is perceived and 
treated in most literature as something incidental, an obvious necessity in all narratives 
that is often taken for granted by writers and theorists alike. Eudora Welty, in her essay, 
“Place in Fiction”, draws attention to the manner in which place is neglected in litera-
ture: “Place is one of the lesser angels that watch [sic] over the racing hand of fiction, 
perhaps the one that gazes benignly enough from off to one side, while others, like 
character, plot, symbolic meaning, and so on, are doing a good deal of wing-beating 
about her chair, and feeling, who in my eyes carries the crown, soars highest of them all 
and rightly relegates place into the shade” (116). Ecocriticism aims to rectify this by 
recognising the reality of place in text. Thus, ecocritics treat place as that which we 
should critique and analyse, as opposed to regarding it in such a manner that it becomes 
forgotten in the subconscious of literature. 
Reading place in ecosystemic terms, ecocriticism emphasises that all living entities 
exist not only in a reciprocal relationship with each other, but with their nonliving envi-
ronment as well. We would be nowhere without place, and ecocriticism sets out to give 
a place to place in fiction, especially by valuing the role place has unselfishly played in 
many great works of fiction. Is it possible to appreciate The Grapes of Wrath without 
being aware of the grave emptiness of a land, the Dust Bowl, that is no longer able to 
bear the means of supporting human life, which leaves the Joad family with little choice 
except to trek across the American south (Steinbeck)? Would E. M. Forster’s A Passage 
to India be held in the same high regard had it not been for the author’s acute awareness 
and care in his descriptions of his fictional Indian city, Chandrapore, and, specifically, 
the Marabar Caves? When Adela Quested experiences her modernist existential trauma 
in the emptiness of the caves, the author elevates place in the reader’s consciousness as 
a device capable of having as much impact on the characters as the characters may have 
on each other (Forster). The issue of place also plays a significant role in Wordsworth’s 
writings on the Lake District to such a great extent that it is has allowed critics such as 
Jonathan Bate to claim that not only is Wordsworth a poet attempting to foreground his 
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environment, but that the extent to which he does this, and the ethical slant with which 
he handles the portrayal of the land, allows us to view him as “one of the begetters of 
environmentalism” (Song of the Earth 139). Hardy’s Wessex is another prime example 
of a place, complete with a map, which shows how the author is “intensely responsive 
to the natural world and human relations with that world” (Kerridge “Ecological Hardy” 
126). Wessex is quite famously featured in the novel Far From the Madding Crowd, 
where, in the novel’s preface, Hardy describes it as a “partly real, partly dream-country” 
(4), which, despite this description, is nonetheless a place which feels just as fully real-
ised as its characters. But what is place, and how does ecocriticism deal with the 
theoretical minutiae of the concept of place in literature? Many ecocritics look to Aris-
totle, one of the first theoreticians of place, to develop and expand their own 
understanding of how place affects, and is affected by, people, and how place may work 
in literature. 
Aristotle asserts that everything has a natural place, and for humans “It is clear then 
that the state [or city] is … natural … to the individual” (61). It is from this ancient 
statement that we may see how far ecocriticism’s definition of place has come. Reading 
this in terms of second-wave ecocriticism, we notice that Aristotle’s definition of place, 
and of the city specifically, is far too limited as it does not account for the porous 
makeup of the city in which, as second-wave ecocriticism claims, nature cannot always 
be escaped. Aristotle’s definition also implies a kind of separation between humanity 
and nature, a separation which Aristotle characterises as appropriate. Modern forms of 
ecocriticism, then, recognise that nature is untidy and far-reaching, and, because of this, 
humans’ relationship with nature is inevitable. It does not help in believing that there 
are sanctuaries in which humanity can escape nature as this does not assist in the devel-
opment in understanding more accurately the true characterisation of humans’ 
relationship with nature, and, more specifically, how humans are placed in nature. 
Ecocriticism recognises the gravity of place to the extent that the theorisation behind 
it forms an integral part of ecocriticism’s core. Places, from an ecocritical perspective, 
are environments to which human value has been assigned, and are, therefore, strongly 
associated, and defined, by their connection to human culture (Larsen 349). Thus, it is 
humans, by definition, that construct and define a place as a place, the consequences of 
15 
 
which explain the inevitable and heightened emotional connection humans tend to have 
with places: “a place is concrete and particular. … A place is seen, heard, smelled, 
imagined, loved, hated, feared, revered, enjoyed, or avoided” (Walter 142). While hu-
mans are the only species, by definition, that can define a place, we must not forget that 
humans also rely on the natural world to define a place. Thus, when Adela Quested, in 
Forster’s A Passage to India, encounters her existential crisis in the Marabar Caves, the 
environment is given a meaning, a definition and a characterisation which it did not 
have before. It is the natural architecture of the caves, their hollowness and emptiness 
which echoes sounds which reflect the visitor back onto herself, which allows Adela 
Quested to view the caves as something frightening (Forster). Place, therefore, does not 
lie, anthropocentrically, in the hands of humans alone, but may, at times, be reliant on 
the natural environment to assist humans in defining it. 
The definition of place possesses some premises which lie in contrast to the defini-
tion of space. Space, however, does not require place to exist (Buell Environmental 
Criticism 145). Anthropocentrically, space is an empty place. Space is place without 
any assigned human meaning (Carter, Donald and Squires xii). However, despite being 
untouched by human definition, space is able to impact on humans politically. An ex-
ample of this can be seen in the act of colonisation, as Buell shows: “In colonisation of 
the hinterlands of the US, Australia, and elsewhere, the concept of terra nullius – the 
land as ‘empty’ or pure space – was historically used as a pretext for conquest and de-
nial of aboriginal land rights” (Environmental Criticism 147), of which the same can be 
said of the historical use of the terms terra incognita and ‘virgin land’ (Buell 
Environmental Criticism 149; Kolodny 7). In other words, “What the first European set-
tlers of North America saw as primordial or ‘empty’ space, and what their descendants 
persist in thinking of as ‘wilderness,’ has been somebody’s else’s place since the first 
humans arrived millennia before – and much longer than that, if we allow nonhumans to 
count as ‘somebodies’” (Buell Environmental Criticism 67). Thus, there is a kind of se-
lective anthropocentrism at play here in which colonising humans are willing to respect 
the integrity of an environment only to justify their changing of a place’s definition. 
Similarly, one must also be made aware of the biological insensitivity that comes with 
the anthropocentric and anthropomorphic attitudes when defining an environment as a 
place or space. When humans define an environment, it is humans’ preoccupations that 
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are used to determine how an environment may be conceived as space or place. This is 
an act which some ecocritics would see as problematic, especially considering that 
within this attitude towards the environment is a disregard for the fact that the environ-
ment is also a free and self-regulating entity that is able to exist independent of human 
interference. This also happens to be one of the kinds of qualities of a text that lends it-
self to an ecocritical reading, and is a quality that is valorised by ecocritics when 
implemented by an artist. Certainly, there are other factors which determine how well a 
text lends itself to an ecocritical reading, and Buell expands upon the one just men-
tioned, and also provides three other such factors. 
Buell prefaces these qualities by stating that “broad sweep and cranky hyperfocus” 
are the twin engines driving the reasons behind his creation of this list (Environmental 
Imagination 7). Specifically, Buell’s justification of these points is based on his obser-
vation of (mostly nonfiction) texts from what he calls the “American literary 
renaissance of the mid-nineteenth century” which included authors such as Henry David 
Thoreau, James Fenimore Cooper and his daughter, Susan Fenimore Cooper, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson and Mark Twain (6). However, this does not mean that Buell does not 
recognise the occurrence of environmental texts in other parts of the world. Indeed, 
Buell’s points are, in fact, global, as he states that “In the Cold War era, ecocide was 
always a more serious threat than nuclear destruction. In literary history since World 
War II, the resurgence of environmental writing is as important as the rise of magical 
realist fiction” (7). Buell, when referring to these criteria, provides many examples from 
English Romanticism and early twentieth-century Anglo-Indian literature to illustrate 
these points (7-8). In the four qualities of what Buell calls environmental texts, which 
are texts that easily lend themselves to an ecocritical reading, the first quality is that 
“The nonhuman environment is present not merely as a framing device but as a pres-
ence that begins to suggest that human history is implicated in natural history” (7 
author’s italics). Robert Kern provides a point that is similar, but not the same, as 
Buell’s, stating that one of the primary tasks of the ecocritic is to “read in such a way as 
to amplify the reality of the environment in or of a text, even if in doing so we resist the 
tendency of the text itself (or of our own conditioning as readers) to relegate the envi-
ronment to the status of setting” (260). Thus, where Buell’s premise looks only to texts 
in which the environment is treated more than merely setting, Kern shows that elevating 
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the environment in a text is the responsibility of both author and critic alike. Thus, while 
nature is usually presented as a backdrop in most texts, and while most critics treat it as 
such, in environmental texts, and in the minds of ecocritics, nature has the power to in-
fluence the lives of characters on an individual, cultural and national level. An example 
of a text in which this occurs is Michael Ondaatje’s The English Patient. In this novel 
the control of people comes as a result of controlling the geographical qualities of the 
land as well. 
The second criterion, as stated by Buell, is that “The human interest is not under-
stood to be the only legitimate interest” (Environmental Imagination 7 author’s italics). 
Here, Buell is referring to texts in which concern and sympathy is given towards nature, 
and, in most cases, animals. It is also a view that is held by ecocritic Michael McDow-
ell, who shows that one of the ways this can be achieved in fictional texts is by, quite 
literally, the author’s assignation of voices to both the human characters and nature, and 
to allow these voices to play against each other, thereby exploring the different ways in 
which the relationship between nature and humanity may be evaluated (385-86). It is in 
this way that, by providing her equestrian protagonist with human speech, Anna Sewell 
allows Black Beauty to become as full-blooded as her human characters. In so doing, 
we are able to realise that humans share a planet with a plethora of other species at-
tempting to survive with the same tenacity as we are (Sewell).  
The third quality of an environmental text is that “Human accountability to the envi-
ronment is part of the text’s ethical orientation” (Buell Environmental Imagination 7 
author’s italics). Buell is referring to a sense of awareness on the part of the author that 
characters’ actions on the environment have moral implications, as opposed to texts 
which treat human action on the environment with ambivalence. Buell’s point may be 
illustrated by Blake in his “Auguries of Innocence” as he proclaims “A Robin Red 
Breast in a Cage / Puts all Heaven in a Rage” (5-6). 
Buell’s fourth and final criterion for an environmental text is that “Some sense of the 
environment as a process rather than as a constant or a given is at least implicit in the 
text” (Environmental Imagination 8 author’s italics). This refers to environmental texts 
which are sensitive to the environment’s dynamic persona, as it were. Thus, it treats the 
environment just as it would its human characters in terms of its growth, development 
18 
 
and responsiveness to stimuli. This is certainly the case of Cormac McCarthy’s The 
Road, in which the reader is briefly given a sense of an environment that was once able 
to comfortably sustain humanity, but has now turned into a drab and grey husk. 
Buell’s list of qualities in texts which lend themselves to an ecocritical reading is 
helpful as it provides consolidation and order, allowing discussions of such texts to be 
more productive. It is for this reason that I will make reference to this list as a basis for 
the texts I will be discussing. However, one of the dangers of constructing such a list is 
reading it prescriptively, thereby limiting the manner in which texts that do not fit these 
criteria can be read, a point recognised by Buell (Environmental Imagination 8), and 
also by Kern (260). Kern states that ecocriticism “becomes reductive when it simply 
targets the environmentally incorrect, or when it aims to evaluate texts solely on the ba-
sis of their adherence to ecologically sanctioned standards of behaviour” (260). By 
implication, Kern makes the point that we are still able to find value in texts which de-
viate from these qualities. Thus, while such a list may prove useful in my analysis, my 
aim is not merely to read my selected texts by evaluating them against this list, but to 
read them alongside this list. However, seeing that the primary texts to which I will re-
fer are mostly filmic texts, it is imperative that we understand the implications, if there 
are any, of applying these principles to other media, in this case, film. 
Ecocriticism and Film 
Ecocriticism is a theory used mostly in the analysis of written texts, be they fiction or 
non-fiction. As a result, the application of ecocriticism to other artistic media, film in 
particular, has been lacking: “Rarely has cinema in general been viewed through an 
ecocritical lens, nor has there been much evidence in the main venues of ecocriticism of 
the sustained application of ecocritical strategies to film and cinema studies” (Ivakhiv 
1). However, even though it is apparent that with critics such as Ivakhiv giving promi-
nence to the use of ecocritical principles in studying filmic texts, the range of films that 
have been selected for such an analysis has been narrow, with critics concentrating 
mostly on films that “portray nature and its defenders positively” (Ivakhiv 1). Films 
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such as Gorillas in the Mist (Apted), Never Cry Wolf (Ballard) and Erin Brockovich 
(Soderbergh) fit such a description (Ivakhiv 1). Certainly, ecocriticism praises positive 
representations of nature in written texts, but Ivakhiv shows that reading only these 
qualities in texts, written or filmic, does a disservice both to the text being studied and 
the theory used to analyse that text (7). When giving an ecocritical reading of a written 
text, one observes the manner in which the environment is portrayed, to what degree the 
characters and the author exhibit anthropocentric characteristics (and to what degree this 
may be seen as advantageous to our understanding of humans’ relationship with nature), 
how human characters act upon, and react to, the environment, how the characters and 
authors use place and space, how, and to what degree, nature is anthropomorphised, and 
so forth. These are the same qualities which ought to be observed when giving an eco-
critical reading of a film. However, we must be aware that these tropes may actualise 
themselves differently when presented in a different medium such as film. 
To begin with, it is important to understand the ontology of film, and the effects of 
seeing an image on screen, especially images of nature. Film’s moving images are com-
plex manifestations of photographic images; films, in essence, are a series of 
photographs presented in a manner in which the illusion of movement is created. Thus, 
in analysing the ontology of filmic images, it is imperative that we observe the basic 
unit of filmic images: the photograph. To begin with the obvious: a photograph is a rep-
resentation of the thing that is depicted in the photograph. A photograph is not the thing 
itself. When we look at a photograph we are seeing things not present; we see things 
that are not here now, and observe representations of images that were there then 
(Cavell 23). All of this is true for film as well. However, there is one clear difference 
between the medium of film and the medium of photography. The main factor that dis-
tinguishes film from photography is film’s illusion of a ‘moving image’, and 
photography’s lack thereof. Further, in a film, the screen acts as a barrier between the 
audience member and the world depicted on screen, to which the audience member is 
invisible (Cavell 24). Thus, as when we think of a painting, the screen acts as a frame in 
that it provides limits on the world depicted (Cavell 24). This may have interesting con-
sequences for the anthropomorphic depiction of nature on film. 
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When reading in written text about a horse, it is left to the reader to offer her own 
idea of what the horse looks like (provided no pictures accompany the text). When 
viewing a horse on screen, it is as if the horse becomes literalised for the viewer. This 
does not mean, however, that the horse depicted on screen is innocent of any kind of 
anthropomorphisation. It is apparent that the camera angle, soundtrack, the framing of 
the image, the colour palette, the movement of the camera, and so forth, are all contrib-
uting to the manner in which we view the horse, and is, therefore, not a horse divorced 
from deliberate human representation. It is a horse based on human interpretation. Thus, 
when giving an ecocritical reading of a filmic text, issues such as anthropomorphism are 
at play with consequences that must be considered in relation to the medium in which it 
is presented. Also, the appearance nature takes on film may be more potently anthropo-
centric when compared to its appearance in written text as the moving image gives one 
the impression of being more convincing and realistic. This may be because the thing 
being depicted on film is similar (in some respects) to the way in which we may view it 
in real life. The consequence of this is that the viewer may be more inclined to believe 
that she has exercised full control over nature, that she has, in some way, captured the 
essence of nature, a flawed belief given the high degree of manipulation and manage-
ment that is present in every frame of every film. Thus, issues such as anthropocentrism 
and anthropomorphism are apparent in both written and filmic texts, but mould them-
selves to the medium in which they are presented, forcing us to analyse them 
accordingly.  
If ecocriticism is to lend itself to the medium of film, another major trope that must 
be studied is the environment. Martin Lefebvre provides helpful definitions of setting 
and landscape as it pertains to film, showing, specifically, how the two differ. Land-
scape, as defined by Lefebvre, refers to an environment that is “freed from eventhood” 
(22 author’s italics). Landscape refers to an environment to which no human meaning 
has been assigned. This is much like ecocriticism’s conceptualisation of space, which 
refers to an environment humanity has not yet defined. Setting, however, especially as it 
pertains to film, refers to “the place where the action or events occur” (Lefebvre 21), 
which, as we have seen with the definition of landscape, is quite closely linked to the 
ecocritical definition of place, which, contrasted to the definition of space, is an envi-
ronment which has been given human meaning. Thus, in theorising about the 
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environment, using ecocritical principles to analyse written texts and applying these 
principles to filmic texts is not an impossible academic pursuit. Further, when discuss-
ing issues pertaining to the environment, it is apparent that when comparing both kinds 
of media one uses terms that differ only in name and not in meaning. 
In most examples of mainstream cinema, Lefebvre makes us aware, films relegate 
landscape to a backdrop to the action taking place (24). Notable exceptions to this in 
popular cinema include films such as Lawrence of Arabia (Lean), Watership Down (M. 
Rosen), WALL·E (Stanton), and Blade Runner (Scott). In Scott’s Blade Runner, particu-
larly, the director makes frequent use of lingering long-shots in which the human 
characters are dwarfed within their environment, implying, among other things, that the 
environment is unavoidably implicated in human existence, and will serve, to some de-
gree, as a determining factor in the lives of the characters who inhabit it. These 
examples, however, are not representative of the whole of mainstream cinema in which 
landscape becomes subservient to the purposes of narrative, and where no reference is 
made to the interconnected and reciprocal relationship between the two, or between 
landscape and the human and animal characters that are displayed on the screen. Allow-
ing the environment to be as equally important as the characters in the film is rarely 
seen in cinema. When this occurs, the environment moves from the background to the 
foreground, an occurrence to which Lefebvre refers as the autonomy of the landscape, 
which occurs in at least two ways in cinema (30; 51). 
The first way in which the landscape can become, as Lefebvre puts it, autonomous, 
relies on the spectator’s gaze, whereby, be it for a brief moment, the spectator recog-
nises the landscape as separate from the narrative event (Lefebvre 30). The second way 
in which a landscape can become autonomous is through the cinematographic medium, 
whereby landscapes are filmed in a manner which wilfully divorces them from the nar-
rative (Lefebvre 51). Time, it seems, is what determines the autonomy of a landscape, as 
autonomous landscapes, when represented in film, are subject to the temporality of the 
spectator’s gaze as well as the temporality of the cinematographic medium. Landscapes 
remain autonomous for as long as the spectator recognises the landscape as autonomous 
while the particular scene lasts, and for as long as the camera wishes to have the land-
scape appear autonomous. Thus, if we are to distinguish an ecocriticism of written text 
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from an ecocriticism of filmic text, especially as it pertains to the artistic representation 
of the environment, then what we find is that both favour texts in which the environ-
ment is elevated in the reader’s (or viewer’s) consciousness. 
When representing the environment on film, it appears that what concerns the eco-
critic is not only the issue of whether or not the environment is given as much 
importance as the human characters, but also the issue of the authenticity of the envi-
ronment that is being represented on film. All films, fiction or non-fiction, occur in 
some place, within some setting. Some films choose to, or are able to, use the real loca-
tion depicted in the film, such as the Amazon jungle in Werner Herzog’s Fitzcarraldo. 
However, I would imagine a director aiming to shoot her films on location would en-
counter great logistical problems if her story is set on, say Pluto, or in the human mind. 
Disregarding places that are difficult, or impossible, for a film crew to film, there are 
certainly instances, perhaps for aesthetic or economic reasons, that a director may 
choose to film, not in the actual location represented in the film’s narrative, but in a lo-
cation similar to it. Certainly, Ivakhiv states that substituting one location for another 
may elevate the place that is used in the film by providing jobs for the people who live 
there, and one may value “that particular landscape for the qualities which it may share 
with the landscape being referred to” (23 author’s italics). However, Gayton points out 
that swapping locations, which Terrence Malick did in his Days of Heaven, whereby the 
narrative’s setting, Texas, was substituted for Alberta, Canada (Morrison and Schur 60), 
reduces the non-real location being filmed to a product that can be purchased at the di-
rector’s will (8). However, while Malick may have substituted one environment for 
another, it would be difficult to accuse Malick of doing this out of any disrespect for 
either the environment in which he shot his film, or for the one in which he did not 
shoot his film but was depicted in the narrative anyway. One of the achievements of 
Malick’s film (or any other Malick film for that matter) is that he managed to give as 
much voice to the setting as he did the human characters. Gayton’s point that directors 
should use the actual location should therefore be treated as a preference rather than an 
obligation, especially if the environment being filmed is, as Ivakhiv shows “capable of 
‘transporting’ viewers in ways that other media are not, and can thereby elevate view-
ers’ appreciation for the things and activities depicted” (Ivakhiv 24), thereby reducing 
the anthropocentrisation that may be present in the film. 
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That some films are able to elevate nature and the environment may be so, but 
Ivakhiv also makes us aware how notoriously non-eco-friendly the production of films 
may be, explaining that films’ “reliance on a complex and integrated array of producers, 
artists, agents, actors, marketers, et al., an immense and sophisticated technological ap-
paratus, colossal sums of money and capital, and the consumption of tremendous 
material resources (and production of waste) is unparalleled in all the arts” (22). This 
raises the likely possibility of the counterproductivity that may accompany films with 
the most honourable eco-friendly and anti-anthropocentric intentions. One would as-
sume that a film with green intentions would exhibit a greater awareness of the 
logistical undertaking of its storytelling as it may contribute to the very ecological prob-
lems its narrative condemns, the effect of which is a polluted film disguised in green 
film’s clothing (which may not necessarily be intentional, of course). However, the es-
tablishment of organisations such as the Environmental Media Association, founded in 
the 1980s to encourage more eco-friendly means of film production in Hollywood, and 
the Shambhala Ranch, founded for the protection of animals used in Hollywood films, 
aims at creating a more eco-conscious Hollywood (Ivakhiv 23). 
Certainly, films with an increased eco-conscience may be evaluated not only in terms 
of their production value, but also in the manner in which the camera is used. Indeed, 
Ingram shows that we must be sensitive to representing nature in film as it may result in 
the domination of nature from the spectator (31-32). This may result from, either, the 
idea that the camera is inherently a domineering construct, or by the context of the film 
image (Ingram 31-32). Susan Sontag raises a similar point by explaining how the cam-
era acts as a mechanism of domination (4). Using Sontag’s argument and applying it to 
the act of filming nature, Ross shows that “camera technology can perhaps be seen as an 
embodiment of what ecologists have called the rationalist project of mastering, colonis-
ing, and dominating nature; a project whose historical development now threatens the 
global ecology with an immediacy that is all the more ironically apparent to us through 
those very ‘images of ecology’ that have become standard media atrocity fare in recent 
years” (173). Thus, Ross implies that it is particularly harmful when images of nature 
are depicted on film as it allows the viewer to read nature as a passive object of scrutiny 
that is at the mercy of the director’s camera and, subsequently, the viewer’s gaze. With 
nature cast in this light, it becomes easier for the director to read nature as she sees fit. 
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The consequence of this, in terms of anthropocentrism, and, especially, anthropomor-
phism, is that it presents a view of nature that is never innocent of interpretation and 
meaning. Nature can never, simply, be. That directors assign meaning onto nature can 
easily be seen in the fact that, for example, nearly all films about sharks depict these 
creatures as brutal monsters. 
As the above discussion suggests, reading nature anthropomorphically is a character-
istic not only of fiction films, but of documentary films as well. That most documentary 
films present footage, except footage that has clearly been re-enacted, as factual, may be 
so, but this does not exempt documentary films from manipulating images which may 
reflect the anthropocentric preoccupations of its director. Thus, when nature documenta-
ries present nature to its audience, it may become apparent that what is being depicted is 
every bit a construction as a fiction film (Armbruster 231). One can never capture the 
truth of nature. An example of the manner in which nature documentarians manipulate 
images to depict a certain kind of nature can be seen in the contrasting depictions of 
Japanese macaques in the documentaries Baraka (Fricke) and Life (Morris). In Baraka, 
the macaques are portrayed as tranquil and peaceful creatures. However, Life paints a 
different picture, revealing a complex social system based on clear and distinct hierar-
chies. Those at the top of the hierarchy wallow in the warm spring of the Japanese Alps, 
whilst those at the bottom of the hierarchy have to sit on the outskirts of the pool and 
bear the icy weather. When the outcast macaques try to enter the warmth of the pool 
that those in command are enjoying they are met with hostility and violence, which re-
affirms each member’s position on the hierarchy. 
We cannot, therefore, view nature documentaries as a means of giving their viewer 
nature in its pure form. Documentary films select and manipulate information for the 
purposes of giving a specific argument about nature driven by the choices of its director, 
a point better articulated by Michael Renov when he refers to the nature of documentary 
filmmaking: “Our attempts to ‘fix’ on celluloid what lies before the camera – ourselves 
or members of other cultures – are fragile if not altogether insincere efforts. Always is-
sues of selection intrude (which angle, take, camera stock will best serve); the results 
are indeed mediated, the result of multiple interventions that necessarily come between 
the cinematic sign (what we see on the screen) and its referent (what existed in the 
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world)” (26 author’s italics). Even more interesting is that this is a point also made by 
director Werner Herzog, a director whose documentaries Grizzly Man and Encounters 
at the End of the World, will be discussed at length in this dissertation. Herzog makes 
the following claim about the divide between fiction and documentary: “So for me, the 
boundary between fiction and ‘documentary’ simply does not exist; they are all just 
films. Both take ‘facts’, characters, stories and play with them in the same kind of way” 
(Cronin 240). Documentaries, then, are not exempt from the anthropomorphic depiction 
of nature any more than their fiction counterparts. The director’s hand, though not visi-
ble, is always active in every frame of the film, putting forth her own interpretation of 
her subject, especially when that subject is nature. However, as I will attempt to convey 
throughout this dissertation, I am not concerned about the fact that every director puts 
forth his own anthropomorphic understanding of nature as much as I am concerned 
about the type of anthropomorphism put forth by each artist. 
These general observations of the nature of an ecocriticism designed for reading film, 
heretofore known as celluloid ecocriticism, must only be taken as that: general. While 
what I have mapped out will be followed as guidelines, it must be made known that 
specific scenes in specific films may prove that these guidelines may not be generalised 
as easily as desired. Thus, no image exists in isolation, and to read an image in its en-
tirety is to be aware of the context of the image (Ingram 34). Therefore, the differences 
between ‘ecocriticism proper’ and celluloid ecocriticism lie mainly in the nature of the 
respective medium each literary theory holds under scrutiny, but both factions of eco-
criticism are interested in the same principles when studying a text: the author’s 
awareness of place and space in her text, the manner in which the relationship between 
humans and nature is depicted, and, another of this dissertation’s central concerns, the 
author’s awareness of the degree and effect of her anthropocentric portrayal of nature, 
and the kind of anthropomorphism of nature the author portrays in her text. These eco-
critical principles are applied not only in the different media for which ecocriticism is 
used, but are criticised and modified in other theory-based factions of ecocriticism as 
well. Two such theoretical factions are ecofeminism and deep ecology, two apples that 
have not fallen far from the ecocriticism tree, but far enough to be considered different – 
both from ecocriticism and from each other. 
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Ecofeminism 
With the advent of ecocriticism came its variations, one of which is ecofeminism, a lit-
erary theory which is, very roughly speaking, an amalgamation of ecocritical and 
feminist studies (Berman 259; Zapf 51-52). The term was coined in the 1970s by Fran-
çoise d’Eaubonne, and the ecofeminist movement became widely known across the 
academic world in the 1980s (Buell Environmental Criticism 139). There are two broad 
camps of ecofeminists: social ecofeminists and cultural ecofeminists: “social ecofem-
inists, who stress the cultural construction of gender, have argued that the symbolic 
coding of nature as female which pervades Western culture has reinforced the domina-
tion of both women and nature. … [C]ultural ecofeminists, who are less wary of 
essentialism, have proposed that there is an inherent, not merely historically contingent, 
caring relationship between women and nature” (Goodbody 12). Considering the key 
premises upon which cultural ecofeminism is based, I am not sure that women have a 
more caring relationship to nature than men do, a view lucidly expressed by Carol P. 
MacCormack: 
[T]he link between nature and women is not a ‘given’. Gender and its attrib-
utes are not pure biology. The meanings attributed to male and female are as 
arbitrary as are the meanings attributed to nature and culture. … [I]f men 
and women are one species and together constitute human society then, 
logically, analysis of intrinsic gender attributes must be made with reference 
to the same domain (18). 
MacCormack presents a well-argued critique of fundamental cultural ecofeminist prin-
ciples. Cultural ecofeminists perhaps forget that all of nature is connected, not only 
nature to nature, humans to humans, or even women to nature, but also men to nature. It 
is because of these reasons that I will give precedence to social ecofeminism, which will 
hereafter be referred to plainly as ‘ecofeminism’. 
Ecofeminists view nature, not as a hierarchy, but as an interconnected web, and in so 
doing celebrate diversity (King 19). This is a view of nature that is not shared by 
ecofeminists alone, but by ecocritics more generally. What sets ecofeminism apart from 
the rest of ecocriticism regarding their views on nature is that ecofeminists believe that 
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the subordination of women and nature are inextricably linked in that the oppression of 
one reinforces the oppression of the other (Gates 17; Murphy 48; Wallace and 
Armbruster 4). This leads to a kind of vicious downward spiralling of mutual subordina-
tion ignited by, firstly, harmful cultural constructs, and, secondly, multinational 
corporations, global capitalism, and constructed western dualisms instigated by patriar-
chy (Berman 261; Gaard and Murphy 2; Gates 17; Kerridge “Introduction” 6; 
Plumwood 2). Patrick D. Murphy, in his book Literature, Nature, and Other: Ecofem-
inist Critiques, takes a position with which many ecofeminists would agree by stating 
the following: “To be an ecologist, one must also be a feminist, since without address-
ing gender oppression and the patriarchal ideology that generates the sexual metaphors 
of masculine domination of nature, one cannot effectively challenge the world views 
that threaten the stable evolution of the biosphere, in which human beings participate or 
perish” (49). The problems against which ecofeminists voice their opinions are the same 
problems which are born out of a patriarchal society, and are the same problems that 
present a threat to nature. Ecofeminists claim that under patriarchy, women are disem-
powered to the extent that they must take on their husband’s name, are viewed as sex-
objects, and are treated as literal objects in the legal system (Berman 261). Further, the 
result of a patriarchal society in which members of that society live by the false con-
struct that women and nature are equated is that nature is objectified in that it is treated 
as material goods which can be sold for profit (Berman 261; Haraway 147). 
Ecofeminists will show that in an androcentric and patriarchal society, women, and, 
as a result, nature, are rendered victims precisely because of western dualistic logic in 
which men, paralleled with culture, are rational subjects, and women, paralleled with 
nature, are irrational objects (Kerridge “Introduction” 6). These dualisms essentialise 
nature into an anthropomorphically feminised construct. This results in women being 
seen as territorial objects that can be conquered, exploited and tamed, as the existence of 
women is made relevant only insofar as they may serve the masculine subject (Berman 
266; Kerridge “Introduction” 6). Reading nature through this feminised anthropomor-
phic lens is detrimental to both women and nature who are both stuck in a kind of catch 
22: women are stripped of their human identity and are treated as natural objects, and, 
because of this, the treatment of nature as an object is legitimised because of the anthro-
pomorphic reading of nature as female. Viewing the relationship between women and 
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nature in this anthropomorphic light may be seen as unhelpful and damaging in that it 
does not encourage a respectful relationship, firstly, between the human species with 
itself (especially towards its female members), and it does not encourage productive in-
terconnections between humans and nature. 
The flawed logic behind equating female humans with nature, apart from blaming 
this on dualistic thinking, may also be attributed to the (mis)use of language in the role 
it plays in formulating the constructs by which we live. Berman shows that in a patriar-
chal society these logocentric constructs are determined by men (259). In language and 
literature, ecofeminists aim to challenge the ways in which women have been repre-
sented in their relationship to nature, focusing on deconstructing the typical gendered 
metaphors that come with descriptions of nature. Drawing from this premise, Buell 
shows that “In adolescence, female protagonists become socialized away from nature, 
while the male continues to enjoy freer mobility and the option of questing and of con-
quest within nature, which is frequently and revealingly symbolised as female. Starting 
well before Thoreau, male narratives of self-reliant cabin-dwelling isolatoes are com-
mon, whereas the commonest counterpart in women’s narrative is the story of the 
‘female hermit’ who has not risen above society but fallen below it as a result of a disas-
trous love affair, usually extralegal, which has left her with a child, who usually dies” 
(Buell Environmental Imagination 46). Starting in, and as a result of, patriarchy, and 
skulking its way into literature, it is these kinds of limiting portrayals of women and na-
ture which ecofeminists challenge. It is also these kinds of portrayals of women and 
nature upon which unhelpful and damaging feminised anthropocentric metaphors of na-
ture are based. 
Berman, in “Mother Nature”, shows that the use of certain metaphors and expres-
sions such as ‘rape of the land’, ‘virgin forest’, and ‘Mother Earth’, which do little in 
sealing the fissure between humans and humans, and between humans and nature, are 
part of the cause of the mutual subordination of women and nature (261-65). This type 
of scarring language may be, as Berman suggests, the very language that is, ironically, 
used by many environmentalists who are fighting for socioecological change (266). 
Berman explores the harm inherent in the use of the ‘rape’ metaphor that accompanies 
environmental discourse by pointing out that if it is true that humans tend to actualise 
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the symbols they create and use, then “we see that the rape metaphor sets up the exploi-
tation of Nature as akin to the rape of a woman. If metaphors are not just arbitrary 
language use but a reflection of our physical, cultural and social realities which in turn 
structure our activities, the use of the rape metaphor has grave implications” (Berman 
265). Even in using such seemingly wholesome anthropomorphic readings of the planet 
as ‘Mother Earth’, according to Berman, has the same effect in that it allows us to trans-
fer the cultural baggage from the metaphor itself onto the thing for which the metaphor 
is used (263). This is particularly harmful when applied to the use of the ‘Mother na-
ture’ metaphor in the context of a patriarchal culture, as the mother is the one who 
“satisfies all our needs, takes away waste, cleans and feeds us without any cost to us. 
While it is true that we have a certain dependence on our mother, we also have many 
expectations – it is unlikely that your mother will hurt you” (Berman 263). Basing her 
argument on similar principles, Louise Westling, another prominent ecofeminist, opines 
that “as we continue to feminise nature and imagine ourselves apart from the biota, we 
will continue to enable the ‘heroic’ destruction of the planet, even as we lament the 
process and try to erase or deny our complicity in it” (265), a point which is applicable 
to human-nature relationships both in the real world and in literature. 
In challenging texts which, intentionally or not, uphold androcentric values whereby 
men are above both women and nature, ecofeminists aim to favour narratives in which 
the cultural and biological diversity that sustains life is celebrated, women’s biological 
specificity is recognised, and where women are seen, not as objects of nature, but as 
both subjects and creators of history (Libby 257). However, while I agree that viewing 
females as being inherently closer to nature should be regarded as incorrect (which is 
what I have shown with my critique of social ecofeminism at the beginning of this sec-
tion), I am also sceptical about the view that reading nature as female is necessarily 
wrong. Thus, one of my aims in this dissertation is to show that certain types of femini-
sations of nature may be helpful and productive. James Lovelock provides one such 
reading of nature as a woman. 
Lovelock’s recent popularisation of the term Gaia, from his Gaia hypothesis 
(Revenge of Gaia; Face of Gaia) has led some ecofeminists such as Berman and Mur-
phy to challenge this feminisation of nature as it goes against the ecofeminist principles 
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they champion (Berman 263; Murphy 59). However, despite some ecofeminists being 
opposed to the practice of feminising nature, especially through the use of Gaia im-
agery, some artists and critics support it. In Terrence Malick’s films, especially The New 
World, Malick presents a view of nature which is feminine, but occasionally undercuts 
this by demonstrating the retaliatory personality which nature sometimes displays. Also, 
critic Everett Gendler believes that “to reclaim the matriarchal spirit and our bond with 
the Earth Mother strikes me as necessary if we are to address at all successfully the eco-
logical crisis confronting us” (143). Bruce Allsopp argues that “it was much better to 
conceive the earth as a mother goddess than to treat our environment the way we do” 
(30). However, Murphy, who has considered both arguments by Gendler and Allsopp, 
concludes that even though the use of Gaia imagery may create environmental aware-
ness, it is not the best means of achieving respectful unity between nature and humans, 
as this ultimately perpetuates the assumed power humanity holds over nature (68). This, 
according to Murphy, unhelpfully creates infertile ground on which the bonds between 
humanity and nature may be repaired. However, in Chapter 5 of my dissertation I will 
attempt to challenge Murphy and Berman’s view that the use of the Gaia metaphor is 
damaging, showing that their reading of Hesiod’s text, upon which Lovelock’s Gaia 
metaphor is based, is too simplistic. I will also attempt to show that not only is there no 
harm in the use of this particular feminised anthropomorphisation of the planet, but that 
it is in our best interest to do so at this particular point in humanity’s fractured relation-
ship with nature. Thus, we may use metaphors such as Gaia as a means of beginning to 
repair our relationship with the planet, which is, ultimately, one of the key objectives 
that lies at the heart of ecofeminism. 
The objectives and premises upon which ecofeminism is based share many similari-
ties with ecocriticism. However, as expected, ecofeminism deviates from ecocriticism 
by developing new premises altogether. The aims of ecofeminism, though, are not as 
bold as the aims of another similar eco-based theory, deep ecology, to which I now turn. 
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Deep Ecology 
Deep ecology is a term coined by Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss in his 1973 essay 
“The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement”. Deep ecology began as 
a philosophy of life but has subsequently been adopted by ecocritics as a means of read-
ing texts as well. Despite its beginnings about five years before the advent of 
ecocriticism was formalised as a literary theory, deep ecology is generally seen as a 
kind of ecocriticism (rather than ecocriticism being seen as a kind of deep ecology). 
Deep ecology, as a literary theory, has similar premises to ecocriticism, but is different 
enough to be regarded as a separate theory. Further, deep ecology often exaggerates the 
principles it shares with ecocriticism and, as a result of these extreme positions, deep 
ecology becomes susceptible to irony, often having dire consequences for anthropocen-
trism and anthropomorphism. 
As ecocriticism does, deep ecology takes the position that all life exists as an inter-
connected web with each life form occupying a node on the web, which deep ecologists 
take as an indication that we cannot “separate humans from the natural environment” 
(Capra 20). In other words, humans are seen as mere extensions of the natural environ-
ment and there is no ontological difference between the two. In taking such an extreme 
position, this premise of deep ecology has been criticised for the harmful consequences 
that are latent within this perception of the relationship between humanity and nature. 
Thus, it is made apparent that if humans are a part nature, then any way humans choose 
to treat nature cannot be deemed unnatural, even if this behaviour is destructive, which 
precisely goes against deep ecology’s fundamental principle that nature must be pro-
tected and that humans must live in harmony with nature (Mathews 239). However, 
some deep ecologists lack an awareness of the ironies inherent in taking such an ex-
treme position. 
In an interconnected web of life in which no hierarchies exist, deep ecologists are 
also of the opinion that all life is equal, and no life is more important than another. Næss 
termed this “biospherical egalitarianism” (“Shallow and the Deep: A Summary” 151), 
which is also sometimes referred to as biological egalitarianism. The argument for bio-
logical egalitarianism is what makes the deep ecologist’s philosophy ‘deep’, as opposed 
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to ‘shallow’, and this shallowness is characterised by the “Fight against pollution and 
resource depletion”, which is mainly for “the health and affluence of people in the de-
veloped countries” (Næss “The Shallow and the Deep” 467). As a result, deep 
ecologists claim to favour biocentric rather than anthropocentric behaviour (Bennett 
177; Næss Ecosophy). The implications of living a life in which one abides by the prin-
ciples of biological egalitarianism presents an impracticality which cannot be ignored. 
Harold Fromm explains this impracticality, and, in the process, exposes the irony 
within: “[T]he authentic inaugurating act of a would-be biocentrist should properly con-
sist of suicide, since by staying alive he uses up another creature’s resources – even its 
very life. To be alive, it would seem, is to be against life, or at least everyone else’s life 
except one’s own” (Fromm 3). 
However, it may be that these criticisms of deep ecology’s belief that all life is equal 
do not stand. Some critics seem to ignore the fact that Næss, when formulating his ar-
gument for biological egalitarianism, suffixed this point with the words “in principle”, 
explaining that “any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppres-
sion” (“Shallow and the Deep: A Summary” 151). Næss also later explained that “Our 
apprehension of the actual conditions under which we live our own lives … make it 
crystal clear that we have to injure and kill, in other words actively hinder the self-
unfolding of other living beings. Equal right to unfold potentials as a principle is not a 
practical norm about equal conduct towards all life forms” (Ecosophy 167). However, 
despite the self-awareness Næss exhibits in this argument, I still find that living by bio-
logical egalitarianism “in principle” completely negates the fundamental premise upon 
which this philosophy is based, making biological egalitarianism an impossibility 
through and through. 
In speaking of the effects of the interconnectedness of all life, Næss is also of the be-
lief that humans cannot realise their full potential if their contact with nature is minimal. 
As a result, Næss favours a kind of ‘back to nature’ attitude, which does not necessarily 
mean compromising humans’ comfort of living, or one’s intellectual and technological 
advancements (Ecosophy 183). Næss explains that the effects of moving back to nature 
are at least twofold: one may develop a greater self-understanding – one may grow as a 
human, not at the expense, but as a result, of a relationship based on respectful mutual-
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ity for the natural community (Ecosophy 164); and one may acquire a greater under-
standing and maturity in how one relates to, and interacts with, nature (Ecosophy 175). 
Næss claims that not only are we from nature, but we are nature; we are mere exten-
sions of the natural community (Næss Ecosophy 165), a premise deep ecologists use to 
illustrate their belief that distancing oneself from nature may lead to a deterioration in 
one’s self-respect (Næss Ecosophy 164). 
However, some critics have faulted deep ecology for ignoring urban environments as 
a means of the development of the self (Bennett 297-98). Bennett, for one, argues that 
many of the ideologies that deep ecologists stand for, and the implementation of those 
ideologies, need not be specific to natural environments, and that by believing that one 
may acquire these qualities in a natural environment shows a kind of “wilderness fetish-
ism”, which sometimes goes too far as it manifests itself as arrogance (297). More 
importantly, though, is the belief that one cannot reach full happiness or actualisation if 
one removes oneself from nature and permanently settles in an urban environment. 
Bennett shows the harmful consequences of this deep ecological premise with which I 
agree: “And do we really want to exclude from ‘essential humanness’ the many people 
of colour and the gays and lesbians who are primarily urban dwellers in part because 
they have been chased away by the enlightened inhabitants of rural America?” (301). 
This is a point convincingly portrayed in the Australian film The Adventures of 
Priscilla, Queen of the Desert, which shows that there is no place for homosexuality in 
the Australian Outback, and that it may only thrive in the city (Elliott). Bennett also 
shows that the reverse (that rural dwellers are all enlightened people) may also not have 
much truth to it: “[A]nyone who has spent some time in the great outdoors knows that 
there are plenty of unevolved, anthropocentric, close-minded folk residing in remote 
areas” (Bennett 301). However, Bennett’s aim is not to entirely dismiss rural areas and 
embrace urban ones, as he acknowledges the impracticality and insensitivity in unyield-
ingly gravitating towards either end of the spectrum. It seems, then, that the deep 
ecologist presents a view of nature, and of what they believe humans’ relationship to 
nature ought to be, that is ideological rather than actualisable. In their tendency to take 
such extreme positions, it seems that deep ecologists also lack a degree of self-
awareness in their pursuits at harmony with nature, which is, ultimately, a lack of self-
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awareness in the constructed nature of their beliefs. This is especially evidenced in deep 
ecologists’ perceptions of the beauty and stability in nature. 
In referring to one of the first well-known deep ecologists, Aldo Leopold, who was a 
deep ecologist more than forty years before the term existed, Fromm demonstrates the 
logical flaws inherent in Leopold’s perceptions of nature, especially in Leopold’s belief 
in nature’s beauty and stability, which Fromm criticises for its narrow and uninformed 
anthropomorphism (6-7). Leopold makes the claim that “A thing is right only when it 
tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the community, and the commu-
nity includes the soil, waters, fauna, and flora, as well as people” (“Ecological 
Conscience” 345). Fromm first addresses Leopold’s belief in the stability in nature, 
claiming that nature may only be viewed as stable if one is to pursue a short-term ex-
amination of nature, as viewing nature in the long-term would certainly not lead one to 
such a conclusion (6-7). Nature is readily mutable and dynamic, and to keep nature ‘sta-
ble’ really requires human intervention (Ingram 20). Therefore, one can never truly exist 
in harmony with nature, as Leopold suggests, as perceptions of harmony are mediated 
through culture, and is reliant on human action. Further, with cultures’ reliance on lan-
guage in order to thrive, any interaction or perception of nature is necessarily, and 
anthropocentrically, mediated through language. This is an argument which can be 
made not only against the perception of stability in nature, but also against the belief in 
nature’s ‘inherent’ beauty. Nash shows that humans’ perceptions of beauty change over 
time (44-45), which is strong evidence for the claim that the qualities and values we as-
sign onto nature (be they positive or negative) are unavoidably constructed. 
Deep ecologists’ claims that nature is beautiful and stable, their claims that it is in 
humanity’s best interests to live a life in close propinquity to nature, and their champi-
oning of biological egalitarianism, are noble biocentric pursuits. However, this 
biocentrism has lead some critics, such as Luc Ferry, to accuse deep ecologists, quite 
understandably, of being far too biocentric, thereby ignoring any humanitarian issues in 
need of urgent attention, and, instead, favouring a kind of ecofascism (67). While it is 
common to argue against deep ecology’s biocentrism, other critics, such as Eric Katz, 
show that the danger in deep ecology lies, conversely, in its overt anthropocentrism (33-
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37). Katz singles out some of Arne Næss’s deep ecological principles to illustrate this 
point. 
As pointed out earlier, the reason Næss advocates a ‘back to nature’ attitude and a 
greater care for the environment is for one to achieve a greater connection with nature, 
and, primarily, to achieve a greater sense of self-understanding. Katz points out the an-
thropocentric nature of this claim: “Naess is arguing that humans ought to preserve the 
natural environment because it is in the human interest to do so – indeed, it is in the in-
dividual’s interest to preserve the natural world because it will further the interests of 
the individual. … The identification and expansion of the Self are clearly anthropocen-
tric in character, structure, and goal” (34). Katz is not alone in labelling deep ecologists 
anthropocentric. Bennett helps us realise that it is impossible to think as biocentrically 
as deep ecologists propose as humans are only able to make decisions based on human 
values, “so it makes little sense to speak of moving beyond human issues and adopting a 
biocentric viewpoint” (299). Fromm points out that even if self-professed biocentrists 
lived by a code which recognised the impossibility of extreme biocentricism, then what 
would result is a slightly anthropocentric picking and choosing of when to spare life and 
when not to, which, Fromm rightfully points out, bares little difference to how most 
people treat the environment anyway, by, say, choosing that taking medication is per-
missible, but shooting an endangered animal is not (4). 
It is clear, then, that I have used poststructuralist principles in demonstrating deep 
ecology’s unconscious reliance on language. In attempting to promote biocentric princi-
ples, poststructuralist theory has exposed deep ecology’s ultimately anthropocentric 
leanings, which suggests a kind of, as I would like to call it, inevitability of anthropo-
centrism. It is quite clear, then, that poststructuralists would disagree with the following 
claim by Næss: “The own/not-own distinction survives only in grammar, not in feeling” 
(Ecosophy 175). However, it must not go unnoticed that poststructuralism tends to over-
step the mark in that it is far too logocentric. While there is much to be valued in both 
poststructuralist and deep ecological approaches to nature, it seems that both ideologies 
have views that lack moderation, and, because of this, may be harmful to the tenuous 
connections between humans and nature. 
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Examining the effect of poststructuralism’s take on nature, Jonathan Bate makes the 
best argument against the reading of nature as text, which, as a result, may imply that 
nature only exists in the abstract, in language, or as a construct: 
‘Nature’ is a term that needs to be contested, not rejected. It is profoundly 
unhelpful to say ‘There is no nature’ at a time when our most urgent need is 
to address and redress the consequences of human civilisation’s insatiable 
desire to consume the products of the earth. … When there have been a few 
more accidents at nuclear power stations, when there are no more rainfor-
ests, and when every wilderness has been ravaged for its mineral resources, 
then let us say ‘There is no nature’ (Bate Romantic Ecology 56 author’s 
italics). 
It may be argued that Bate misses the point in that he too readily literalises a metaphori-
cal claim about the world. However, it seems he is rather pointing out the insensitivity, 
metaphorical or not, of some poststructuralists who claim that nature is merely a social 
construct that exists only in language, making claims that are dangerous, not because 
they are anthropocentric, but because they are logocentric. Some critics take the argu-
ment a little further by showing that, not only does nature exist outside of language, but 
that it is in the very nature of nature to resist the definitions, views or narratives that 
language attempts to impose onto it (Raglon and Scholtmeijer 251-52). 
Thus, due to the inevitability of anthropocentrism, to place a value judgement only 
on the act of depicting nature through the vein of anthropocentrism would prove futile. 
It is, therefore, the manner in which these depictions take place, and the context in 
which they are situated, which will drive my analysis of the works of Malick, Herzog, 
Penn and Krakauer. That is, what concerns this dissertation is the specific metaphors 
and particular language used by these artists when portraying nature. Thus, while nature 
is understood through language, it remains clear that nature exists outside of language. 
It is because of these points that the relationship between language and nature remains a 
fascinating inquiry. In the next chapter I will attempt to show that, while nature and lan-
guage presently exist as two separate and independent entities, this was not always so. 
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Chapter 2 
Nature and Language 
Words and actions are not the attributes of brute nature. They introduce us to the 
human form, of which all other organisations appear to be degradations (Emerson 
22). 
 
His whole face is contorted differently as he assumes each creature’s voice. If he were 
to speak always as frog or hawk or wolf, the muscles of his throat and jaw might 
grow to fit the sound, so intimately are the creatures and the sounds they make con-
nected, so deeply are they one (Malouf 87). 
Structuralism 
Ferdinand de Saussure, in his Course in General Linguistics, gives a description of lan-
guage as a structure in which (any) language can be broken down into component parts. 
For De Saussure, the linguistic sign is composed of two parts: the signifier (the concept 
of a thing, or the thing’s definition) and the signified (the sound-image, whose existence 
is made apparent when one mentally ‘speaks’ a word) (67). What is interesting about De 
Saussure’s structuralist claims is that the relationship between the signifier and signified 
is arbitrary, which implies, then, that the linguistic sign is arbitrary (67). Thus, the 
sounds that make up the word ‘tiger’, and the sequence they are in, hold no bearing to 
the idea of ‘tiger’. 
De Saussure explains that the arbitrary nature of the sign “dominates all the linguis-
tics of language” (68) and that “its consequences are numberless” (68), and, indeed, 
they are. One such consequence is the existence of an unbridgeable chasm that exists 
between language and nature: language did not grow out of nature and humans are the 
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lords of language. Thus, if we are to believe De Saussure’s premise that the relationship 
between the signifier and the signified could have taken on any form in any language, 
then this implies that there is no natural source of language, that nature did not prescribe 
signs to humanity. Language is not a product of the animals, plants, insects, microbes, 
oceans and stars, but a thing of human culture. It is this premise, among others, that has 
dominated linguistics in the early twentieth century, and is a premise which has signifi-
cant implications for both anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. 
Regarding anthropocentrism, another consequence of the arbitrary nature of the sign 
is that any language used to describe or explain nature (or anything else, for that matter) 
may be considered anthropocentric. Thus, if we are to take language as a product only 
of human culture, then this means that we cannot explain bees in bee-words, roses in 
rose-words, or the sun in sun-words. We can only use the language of humanity to ex-
plain, not only humanity itself, but bees, roses and the sun, as well. Ultimately, then, to 
explain nature through human language is to explain nature through human perception. 
Language is the anthropocentric tool which we use to construct the world around us. To 
speak of nature is to speak of a human understanding of the concept, which implies that 
our definition of nature can only be given in human terms. This also means that to rep-
resent nature through language is not to represent nature at all, but to represent an 
anthropomorphised version of nature. 
Recognising this law of language, Ron Fricke, in his documentary, Baraka, directs a 
film which attempts to challenge and overcome language’s anthropomorphisation of 
nature. Fricke’s documentary is made up of scenes of the natural world, some scenes of 
the human world, and some of a mixture between the two. In most documentaries, one 
has the presence of a voiceover narrator, or talking heads, commenting on what the 
viewer has just seen or heard. What makes Baraka unique is that, except for a few tribal 
chants, the film does not contain voiceover narration, interviews, or dialogue from any 
of its human subjects (Fricke). In studying the scenes composed entirely of nature, we 
notice that Fricke attempts to leave nature in its pristine state, while his camera merely 
observes its natural subjects and no human voice can be heard commenting on or ex-
plaining nature. Thus, Fricke’s distinct lack of comment on nature is Fricke’s only 
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comment on nature. Nature, then, may speak for itself and is released from the anthro-
pomorphic grip of human language. 
However, noble as his pursuits may be, Fricke has either ignored, or is ignorant of, 
the irony inherent in his pursuit. The irony here is that Fricke, in intentionally avoiding 
speaking for nature, has, through his art, done just this. Art, a human construct, is the 
lens through which humans may view the world. Viewing the world through art means 
we view the world through anthropocentric preoccupations and desires. Film is not ex-
empt from this rule. The rectangular frame of the picture indicates that information 
about the world has been selected by someone, and, consequently, everything outside of 
the frame has been consciously discarded. The audience is given a filtered and manipu-
lated world. This segments, compartmentalises and categorises the world into 
manageable portions fit for human consumption. 
Further, it must also be noted that the film, while devoid of any human language, es-
pecially on the part of its director, is not a silent film. Accompanying Fricke’s images is 
the music soundtrack. Fricke has chosen to present his images with meditative and me-
lodic music which, while subtle, is not subtle enough to suggest the absolute absence of 
a human presence. Fricke does not seem to realise, as this is not foregrounded, that he, 
like all artists, is giving an interpretation of the world that is stylised and deliberate, and 
is, to be sure, speaking for nature, rather than allowing nature to speak for itself. Any 
attempt to portray nature through artistic means, therefore, is to portray nature anthro-
pomorphically. If read in structuralist terms, this suggests a kind of separation between 
language and nature, where language, the tool of humanity, can be used only to illus-
trate a version of nature, and not nature in its true colours, implying, therefore, that 
language is a medium through which humanity may come to understand the world on 
humanity’s own terms. 
Certainly, though, while language is predominantly a human endeavour, there are in-
stances in nature in which rudimentary forms of communication through language 
occur. Take, for example, bonobos, primates that are able to “understand sentences that 
contain one verb and three noun phrases – ‘Will you carry the M&Ms to the middle test 
room?’ – but have trouble with conjoined sentences that require two separate actions. 
They have been known to spontaneously combine single words to create new words, 
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using ‘water’ and ‘bird’ as ‘waterbird’ for duck, for example” (Kenneally 33). Further, 
to remain with our bonobo example, “The fact that bonobos can acquire language skills 
equivalent to those of a 2½-year-old child shows that having a rudimentary language 
ability is not uniquely human” (Kenneally 33). However, it is only humans that have 
such a “superlative capacity for language” (Kenneally 33). No other species on earth 
uses language with such nuanced sophistication, and no other species has created a lan-
guage as complex as the hundreds humans have created (Kenneally 34). However, all 
this would not mean anything if language was not aided by human societies to flourish. 
The study of feral children exemplifies this point. Thus, that feral children, in being sur-
rounded completely by nature (in most cases), are not able to speak and understand 
language does not necessarily show that language does not come from nature, but that a 
community of communicators is needed to learn and adopt language. 
It is this relationship between language and nature as epitomised by feral children 
that has brought certain artists to explore this theme in interesting and complex ways. 
As Evernden points out: “While the idea of a naive infant may be a fiction, it is at least a 
useful one for our purposes, for it allows us to imagine the encounter of a non-
enculturated human with ‘nature.’ The point of this exercise is simply to consider what 
it must be like to encounter something without any conception of what it might be or 
mean, and perhaps even without the language that would encourage naming” (111). For 
example, in Knowledge of Angels, Jill Paton Walsh uses the feral child narrative to ex-
plore the nature of religion. After learning enough language, Amara, a feral child who 
was raised by wolves before being taken in by a group of nuns, is confronted to answer 
whether or not it is possible that there is a god, and makes the following claim: 
‘Like wolf?’ she said. ‘Wolf in sky?’ She emitted her startling, barking 
laugh. ‘Nothing in sky’ (Paton Walsh 208). 
Paton Walsh uses a feral child character to represent a kind of template of a human be-
ing who is then used to illustrate the constructed nature of religion. If a human who has 
had no contact with other human beings makes a claim that there is no god, then the 
concept ‘god’ must be constructed and unnatural, and therefore improbable. However, 
as language, or the lack thereof, is one of the defining traits of a feral child, many texts 
use this narrative to explore the relationship between nature and language for similar 
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reasons as we have seen Paton Walsh use it: to explore the human traits we take as natu-
ral, place them under a different light, and discover only their pretence of being natural. 
The Wild Boy of Aveyron, or Victor of Aveyron, is one of the more famous exam-
ples that is used to examine the relationship between nature and language. This 
particular case has been dramatised in François Truffaut’s The Wild Child. Victor was 
estimated to be twelve years of age upon first being discovered in 1797 (Candland 19). 
In Truffaut’s film, Dr Itard takes Victor under his wing and attempts to teach the child 
language. In so doing, the film shows Dr Itard using wooden blocks (each with a letter 
of the Roman alphabet printed on it) as a means of teaching Victor language. The film 
portrays it as a great success when Victor manages to spell ‘lait’ (which is the French 
for ‘milk’) by arranging, in their correct order, the four wooden blocks which make up 
the word. However, as Candland reminds us, there was a one-in-twenty-four chance of 
getting the correct order of the letters (29), in which case the film was far too optimistic 
in presenting it as a legitimate victory. One of the things we learn from Victor’s weak-
ness at acquiring language is the necessity of human contact, and the necessity of 
human contact at the age of language acquisition, if one is to gain a sense of human lan-
guage. If language was not at all an anthropocentric endeavour, then having Victor 
surrounded entirely by nature for the first few critical years of his life would have re-
sulted in his acquisition of language. However, this was not the case. 
None of my primary texts are concerned with the nature of feral children despite hav-
ing many concerns regarding the relationship between language and nature. However, 
Herzog comes closest in exploring the concept of feral children in his film The Enigma 
of Kaspar Hauser, a biographical film concerned with the life of Kaspar Hauser, a Ger-
man boy who grew up in the early 1800s, who had fleeting encounters with humans in 
his younger years as he was locked in a room for most of his early childhood. This story 
is particularly interesting as it gives us insight into the nature of a human, not only hav-
ing had little contact with humanity as he was growing up, but also having had no 
contact with nature (Herzog Kaspar Hauser). 
Despite the fact that one cannot acquire language after the age of seven years (Pinker 
294), Kaspar Hauser, when he was found (at approximately the age of sixteen years) 
was able to learn language, which provides evidence for the assumption that his interac-
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Figure 1: Herzog The Enigma of Kaspar Hauser 
tions with humans in his younger years were enough to allow him to develop a sense of 
language. It is documented that the first word Kaspar had learnt was “horse” (von 
Feuerbach 27-28). However, Kaspar’s first significant acquaintance with language, as 
also shown in Herzog’s film, was through Julius, a boy in the village in which Kaspar 
made his first contact with a large community of people (Herzog Kaspar Hauser; von 
Feuerbach 39-40). In the scene in Herzog’s film in which Julius is teaching Kaspar lan-
guage, the two are inside of Kaspar’s room, a rustic building made out of rough stone, 
with patches of hay on the floor (Kaspar Hauser). It is a room in which nature en-
croaches at the fringes, a subtle reminder of nature’s inevitability. Kaspar recites what 
he has just learnt: “Finger, thumb, arm”. After this lesson, Julius concentrates on Kas-
par’s face and points out, and names, the individual parts that make it up, namely, his 
nose, mouth and ear, while Kaspar is required to repeat the word and memorise the 
names of his parts. 
Kaspar’s first official 
introduction to language, 
then (as his brief education 
of the word “horse” at the 
beginning of the film can 
be taken as cursory), are of 
humanity, of himself. In 
the scene in which Julius 
teaches Kaspar language, 
Herzog seems to imply that language is entirely of humanity. When Kaspar learns lan-
guage, he learns a language of which nature is not a part. Language is merely reflected 
back upon humanity, and, therefore, back upon itself. Herzog further emphasises this 
point when Kaspar’s young tutor uses a mirror as a teaching aid (as seen in Figure 1). 
When the child points out the features on Kaspar’s face, he reaches for Kaspar’s ear and 
says: “Look, this is your ear” (Herzog Kaspar Hauser). Kaspar tugs at his own ear, as if 
feeling it for the first time, becoming accustomed to the connection between the thing 
and the word. The boy continues: “Look, I’ve even got a mirror! This, here, is your 
ear”. Kaspar blinks forcefully, perhaps the mirror allowing him to become accustomed 
to his existence in the world. However, what concerns me about this scene is how the 
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mirror demonstrates Herzog’s argument that there is a kind of circularity in the relation-
ship between words and the world. The origins of language, therefore, Herzog seems to 
imply, is humanity. Language comes from a human mouth and is given back to human-
ity. It is apparent, then, that Herzog uses the feral child narrative to provide evidence for 
a structuralist attitude towards the relationship between language and nature. However, 
despite the pervasiveness and legacy of De Saussure’s structuralist teachings, recent 
scholarship has offered a critique of this traditional linguistic understanding of the ways 
language and nature interact. One such critique has come from David Abram. 
Referring to the work of De Saussure, Abram challenges the perception that language 
and nature are two incongruous phenomena by showing that De Saussure’s tendency to 
“downplay the influence of mimicry, onomatopoeia, and sound symbolism within the 
life of any language [has been debunked, as] more recent research on the echoic and 
gestural significance of spoken sounds has demonstrated that a subtle sort of onomato-
poeia is constantly at work in language: certain meanings inevitably gravitate toward 
certain sounds, and vice versa” (144-45). Abram’s argument is that, contrary to what De 
Saussure may have theorised, language has its roots in nature (101), which may be evi-
denced by the presence of a “subtle sort of onomatopoeia” in all languages, meaning 
that nature’s voice is able to speak through the structure and sound of every word in 
every language. Abram explains this point further. Referring to the Semitic aleph-beth, 
Abram shows that Aleph, “the ancient Hebrew word for ‘ox’”, was written as an upside-
down ‘A’, resembling an ox’s head, and that mem, “the Hebrew word for ‘water’ … 
which later became our own letter M, was drawn as a series of waves” (Abram 101). 
Thus, if Abram’s point is to be believed, then we find that language and its implementa-
tion are not at all as anthropocentric as was once believed. Linguistically, nature is now 
a part of human culture, and the boundaries between the two are not as discrete as pre-
viously thought. Thus, in writing about nature, we also write nature. However, this is 
not to suggest that language is at the complete mercy of nature. Abram makes the tem-
pered claim that while language is not an entirely abstract anthropocentric human 
invention, it is not a phenomenon that belongs entirely to nature either. Abram shows 
that while the 
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letters of the early aleph-beth are still implicitly tied to the more-than-
human field of phenomena … these ties to other animals, to natural ele-
ments like water and waves, and even to the body itself, are far more 
tenuous than in the earlier, predominantly nonphonetic scripts. These traces 
of sensible nature linger in the new script only as vestigial holdovers from 
the old – they are no longer necessary participants in the transfer of linguis-
tic knowledge. The other animals, the plants, and the natural elements – sun, 
moon, stars, waves – are beginning to lose their own voices. In the Hebrew 
Genesis, the animals do not speak their own names to Adam; rather, they are 
given their names by this first man. Language, for the Hebrews, was becom-
ing a purely human gift, a human power (101). 
Thus, language certainly has its roots in nature, with words and letters coming di-
rectly from the earth, but through millennia of language’s evolution, it appears that 
nature’s presence in language is disappearing and humans may be using nature’s 
gift irresponsibly, which may be evidenced in the use of certain words and meta-
phors that reflect a dangerous and destructive kind of anthropomorphism. This, in 
turn, may form part of the reason for humanity’s poor standing with nature. Thus, if 
we are to believe Lakoff and Johnson’s words, that “The essence of metaphor is un-
derstanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (5), then 
perhaps it may be suggested that, given the poor relationship humanity shares with 
nature, humans, as I will argue, have not yet developed anthropomorphically re-
sponsible metaphors for nature. I will also attempt to demonstrate that while 
language has grown out of nature, it really belongs to humanity. However, there is 
still value in remembering and appreciating the origins of language: nature. Cer-
tainly, Terrence Malick, in his film, The New World, reflects this point. 
Reading Nature in Language in The New World 
Terrence Malick’s views on the relationship between language and nature have devel-
oped and changed over his first four films. In Malick’s first two films, Badlands and 
Days of Heaven, it seems that the director was of the opinion that there was a distinct 
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disconnect between language and nature. Language, then, was a human affair. However, 
as we move to Malick’s later films, especially The New World, we see that Malick has 
become much more optimistic about the relationship between the two phenomena, opin-
ing that nature’s presence can be heard in the phonetics of language and that language is 
a shared experience between humanity and nature. In examining how Malick developed 
this change of opinion, let us begin with his 1978 film, Days of Heaven. 
Writing on the films of Terrence Malick, James Morrison and Thomas Schur speak 
of Malick’s idiosyncratic use of language in his Days of Heaven and make the following 
claim: 
A typical exchange, from the section of Days of Heaven when the itinerant 
workers are considering staying on with the farmer after the season’s end, 
runs as follows: ‘Are we gonna stay?’ ‘If she wants to.’ ‘You’d rather go?’ 
‘I’d rather be the King of Siam. You put aspirin in this?’ … The camera 
pivots around the two characters as they, in turn, rotate about each other 
with every line they speak, literalizing in space the back-and-forth rhythm of 
their speech, and a quick dissolve transports us from this halting, elided in-
terval to a long, essentially wordless sequence of a kind of autumnal 
exaltation, as the migrants depart the farm. The abridgements and trunca-
tions of speech pronounce an awareness of language as symbolic action. 
Deprived of intrinsic meaning or sensory substance, words take on signifi-
cance as objects in space, transmitted from body to body, decrements of the 
silences that swallow them (81). 
That Schur and Morrison describe Malick’s use of language as “symbolic action” and 
that language is “[d]eprived of intrinsic meaning or sensory substance”, suggests a kind 
of disconnect between language and nature, and, therefore, between humanity and na-
ture. From what Morrison and Schur demonstrate here, Malick is of the opinion that not 
only is representing nature through language an anthropomorphisation of nature, but to 
do so is not to represent nature at all: the two phenomena exist in independent worlds. 
Thus, Malick shows that language is an inappropriate tool with which to capture nature, 
that there is a kind of natural resistance from nature to be confined to human language 
whereby humanity is unable to exhibit any anthropocentric authority over its natural en-
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vironment. Indeed, this is illustrated in the plague of locusts that attack the crops in 
Days of Heaven. 
Throughout Malick’s Days of Heaven the farm is shot in romantic hues at the magic 
hour, the time of day just before sunrise and just after sunset in which the landscape is 
given a mysterious glow whereby one cannot determine the environment’s natural 
source of light, which is, of course, the sun as it lies just a few moments below the hori-
zon. Thus, giving the farm an iridescent beauty, Malick seems to be making the point 
that the farm is the site at which nature and humanity exist in harmony. This perception 
of nature, however, is entirely that of the humans inhabiting the land. Indeed, while the 
workers are farming the land at the beginning of the film, huge tractors, shown as noisy 
and obtrusive constructions, dominate the land, cutting and tearing at it. In this scene the 
camera, by lowering itself to the ground, offers us the perspective of the rabbits and 
chickens. These creatures scurry away from the machines as they ravish the creatures’ 
environment. To put it in ecocritical terms, Malick shows the insensitivity of the hu-
mans treating the land as their place, ignoring that the land was nature’s place to begin 
with. That we see the farm from the animals’ perspective suggests an awareness on Ma-
lick’s part that the beautiful images of the farm that came before are mediated through a 
particular kind of anthropomorphism which reads nature in soft and inviting hues. Thus, 
Malick’s self-awareness sheds a different light on the land. Malick challenges the an-
thropomorphic lens through which the farmers and workers view the environment by 
perhaps suggesting that humans will only believe they are in harmony with nature when 
they are in control of nature. However, this assumed control over the land does not last. 
Towards the end of the film, the farm is plagued by a swarm of locusts (Malick 
Heaven). Malick’s biblical reference seems to suggest that while the farmers perceived 
their environment as edenic, the reality is that nature, in decimating the land, proves it to 
be a rather flimsy construct. The attack is forceful and unrelenting as the labourers work 
well into the night attempting to kill the locusts by collecting them in baskets and 
throwing them into a fire. Humanity’s control over nature, therefore, symbolically rep-
resented in the farm, is shown to be utterly futile and hubristic. In one telling shot, the 
workers, with the only source of light being behind them, are photographed against a 
backdrop of a burning amber sky, therefore appearing as silhouettes. The locusts, seen 
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as black dots, dart around the human characters and increase in number of biblical pro-
portions, eventually completely obscuring the human characters’ black outlines, giving 
the impression that nature is consuming them. Thus, attempting to define nature by an-
thropomorphic means demonstrates the futility of language to control nature, and it is 
nature that seems to have the final word. 
However, as far as this particular film is concerned, we must not stray from the fact 
that Malick, in representing nature through the medium of art, is guilty of the same sins 
that he condemns. When Malick represents the locusts (especially, we must note, for the 
purposes of showing how an anthropomorphic view of nature is ultimately foolish) Ma-
lick, himself conceding to anthropomorphism, shows these insects to be a damaging and 
feared force. There is a note of doom in the music on the soundtrack as the locusts in-
vade the farm, suggesting that the perspective of the events we are given is told entirely 
from that of the human characters (and certainly not the locusts’, who are feasting ‘hap-
pily’ on their bounty). However, that there is a hint of self-awareness in this 
anthropomorphic portrayal of nature must not go unnoticed either. The locusts, both lit-
erally and narratively speaking, come out of nowhere. In deviating the plot, the locusts 
come to represent a challenge to any kind of anthropomorphic hold the human charac-
ters, and especially the director, may have had over the narrative. Thus, the human 
characters’ preoccupations become secondary and are discarded. The locusts force the 
narrative to take on an unexpected shift. Also, considering the implications of Schur and 
Morrison’s interpretation of Malick’s argument for the disconnect between language 
and nature, specifically in Days of Heaven, it seems that Malick makes the point that it 
is not only through written or spoken language, but also through filmic language, that 
this disconnect between language and nature may be witnessed. 
However, Malick, in The New World, shows a departure from the above and has be-
come more optimistic about the linguistic relationship between humanity and nature. 
Malick demonstrates this newfound optimism by showing the manner in which the Al-
gonquian characters, especially Pocahontas, utilise language. Further, Malick comes to 
illustrate that if language is able to sidestep anthropomorphism in its portrayal of nature, 
then we will be able to bring ourselves to live lives that are more respectful of nature, 
ultimately bringing humans closer to nature. Malick provides an interesting demonstra-
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tion of this premise through the courtship between John Smith and Pocahontas. Part of 
Smith and Pocahontas’s courtship is played out as they teach each other their respective 
language: Smith teaches her English, and Pocahontas teaches him Virginia Algonquian. 
As they stand amongst the wild foliage of Pocahontas’s homestead, they add, in this or-
der, the following words of each other’s language to their respective vocabularies: 
“sky”, “sun”, “water”, “wind”, “eyes”, “lips” and “ear”. Interestingly, where Herzog, in 
his Kaspar Hauser, conducts the scene in which Kaspar learns some of his first words 
by using the human body as a symbol to illustrate his point that language comes only 
from humanity, Malick, as I will show, uses the body as a symbol to demonstrate the 
opposite, that there are some instances in which one can identify the inherent harmony 
between language and nature, the body thus acting as a kind of fulcrum which balances 
the two. 
Pocahontas leads this lesson by giving Smith an Algonquian word, while she gesticu-
lates and embodies the word, prompting Smith to respond with the English alternative. 
Pocahontas begins with the Algonquian word for “sky”. However, Pocahontas does not 
merely point to the sky and call it by its Algonquian name, but opens up her arms, 
stretches them to the sky, tilts her head back, and moves her arms in synchronised cir-
cles as she says, “arahqat”. She does not merely speak the sounds which indicate what a 
sky is, but becomes the sky herself. She invites nature to dictate her behaviour. This is 
similar to the way in which she speaks-demonstrates the word “nebi”, which means 
“water”. As she speaks the word, her arms are extended in front of her body, and she 
mimics the ebb and flow of a flowing river. Until now, we realise that the words 
“arahqat” and “nebi” are, phonetically speaking, arbitrarily linked to the things to which 
they refer. Pocahontas, however, in demonstrating the words viscerally, establishes her-
self as a mediator between humanity and nature, and, therefore, becomes a symbol of 
nature. However, with the next two words Pocahontas and Smith exchange, Malick 
demonstrates that the links between language and nature are sometimes obvious, and 
therefore less arbitrary.  
When Pocahontas dictates the word for sun, “gizos”, to Smith, she brings the finger-
tips of one of her hands together, and slowly raises her hand into the air, as if mimicking 
a rising sun. Once her arm is stretched out high, she synchronises the plosive, /g/, of the 
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Figure 2: Malick The New World 
word “gizos”, with the rapid opening of her hand, as if demonstrating how the word, 
“gizos” (sun), penetrates the atmosphere just as the sharp rays of the sun do. The rela-
tionship, then, between the sign and the thing itself is shown not to be arbitrary at all, 
but as being purposeful and particular, at least in some instances. 
A similar point is dem-
onstrated when Pocahontas 
learns the English word 
“wind”. Upon saying the 
word, Pocahontas twirls 
and swirls in the ankle-
high grass, swiftly waving 
her arms around, and weaving through the grass as the wind would (as can be seen in 
Figure 2). As she does this, the sound of a gentle wind can be heard on the soundtrack, 
and the leaves of nearby trees can be seen swaying in the breeze. However, what is most 
significant about her demonstration of having learnt the word “wind” is the manner in 
which she says the word. When Pocahontas learns this word, she constantly repeats the 
word, each time emphasising its breathiness by exaggerating its characteristic flowing 
out of the mouth without interruption or obstruction. 
Malick, therefore, illustrates what Abram calls the subtle onomatopoeia of words, 
and shows that language is a result of the physical interaction of, both, the parts of one’s 
body that aid in producing spoken language (such as our lungs, voice box, throat, teeth, 
tongue and palate), and one’s surrounds. As a result, we mimic birdsong, animal growls, 
wind, and so forth, which confirms nature’s presence in language. In synchronising Po-
cahontas’s words, her body, and the environment, Malick characterises the links 
between humanity and nature as blurry and porous. Thus, Malick presents a direct cri-
tique on anthropomorphism by inverting it. When Pocahontas sways her hands in the air 
to represent the sky, or when she twirls in the grass to indicate the wind, she does not 
anthropomorphise nature, but allows nature to ‘naturalise’ her. Malick shows this to be 
one of the reasons for Pocahontas’s love, integration and interconnection with nature, 
which she achieves both linguistically and culturally. 
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Malick makes the point that Pocahontas, a Native American, is able to recognise the 
subtle onomatopoeia in the English word “wind” as she exhales forcefully, marrying 
word and concept, where John Smith is not able to recognise the same connection. In-
deed, it is Pocahontas, and the Native Americans more generally, who are seen to live in 
close harmony with nature. The English, however, upon arriving in the New World, ap-
proach nature as an irritant (as Wingfield is seen batting flies away from his face) or as 
that which should be challenged and conquered, which can be seen in Malick’s empha-
sis of the colonialists constantly chopping down trees and clearing away land for the 
purposes of establishing a colony. Thus, Malick shows that living in harmony with na-
ture is a quality dependent on recognising nature in language, an ability which, 
according to Malick, may be a product of one’s culture. 
It seems, then, that Malick has changed his premise in his later work. Where he be-
gan arguing that language and nature should be recognised as two completely separate 
and mutually exclusive phenomena, as seen in his Days of Heaven, Malick later argues 
that there certainly exists in language a kind of subtle onomatopoeia (as David Abram 
would call it). Thus, to come to recognise this intimacy between language and nature is 
to make the claim that to represent nature through language is not as anthropomorphic 
as might have been believed. Further, as Malick seems to argue, once we recognise that 
language is not as independent as we once thought, we will be able to become more 
aware that we are speaking nature, and therefore speak with nature. Thus, according to 
Malick, living in harmony with nature begins with speaking in harmony with nature. 
Distorting Nature in Herzog’s Encounters and Grizzly Man 
It is in Werner Herzog’s Encounters at the End of the World that the director takes an 
approach to language which is not seen in the other primary filmic texts. In The New 
World, Malick made the argument that there exists an overt and distinctly recognisable 
connection between language and nature which is evident in the presence of nature in 
language. In Encounters at the End of the World, however, Herzog makes a different 
kind of comment on the relationship between language and nature in which Rueckert’s 
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original description of ecology and language may prove useful in analysing Herzog’s 
thesis on the matter. 
In the film, Herzog meanders late at night across the grounds of McMurdo and walks 
into a greenhouse which Herzog describes as an “unobtrusive building”, and encounters 
computer scientist and linguist, William Jirsa. Through voiceover narration, Herzog 
summarises Jirsa’s work, explaining that, while attempting to document the dialect from 
one of the last remaining fluent speakers of the Ho-Chunk, Jirsa 
ran into new age ideologues who made insipid claims about black and white 
magic embedded in the grammar of this language. Hence, in this stupid 
trend of academia, it would be better to let the language die than to preserve 
it. He had to destroy his entire Ph.D research. 
It is this incident which calls Herzog’s attention to the concept of linguistic extinction, 
whereby the last speakers of a language die before any scientific recording or documen-
tation of that language may take place. Herzog goes so far as to compare the extinction 
of a language to the extinction of a species in the natural world: 
It occurred to me that in the time we spent with [William Jirsa] in the green-
house, possibly three or four languages had died. In our efforts to preserve 
endangered species, we seem to overlook something equally important. To 
me, it is a sign of a deeply disturbed civilisation where tree huggers and 
whale huggers in their weirdness are acceptable, while no one embraces the 
last speakers of a language. 
Herzog does not explain what it is exactly he means when he calls a civilisation “deeply 
disturbed” when it neglects “the last speakers of a language”, but we can infer from this 
the point Herzog is attempting to convey. This is a view of human culture which shares 
qualities with ecocritical principles regarding diversity. Thus, Herzog seems to say that 
the success of nature, and, now, the success of human culture, lies in the strength of the 
diversity found within it. Thus, as Rueckert does in his pioneering essay on ecocriticism 
in which he utilises ecological principles as a means of reading literature, so, too, does 
Herzog use the principles of diversity in the natural world to understand human culture 
and language. Herzog uses these principles to come to the conclusion that just as diver-
52 
sity is necessary in order to sustain a flourishing ecosystem, it is also necessary if hu-
mans are to flourish as a species. 
Another way of understanding Herzog’s statement is by using principles of deep 
ecology. I am referring to deep ecology’s favouring of biological egalitarianism, which 
states that every species has an equal right to life and an equal right to, as Næss would 
put it, unfold. Herzog, then, presents a kind of linguistic egalitarianism, meaning that all 
languages should be treated with equal respect and importance as they contribute 
equally, by definition, to the diversity of human language, and, consequently, would 
therefore have an equal right to unfold. 
However, it seems that is where the parallels with deep ecology end. This is because 
where deep ecology favours biocentrism (or at least favours a worldview that is more 
biocentric than most ecological ideologies), an ideology which states that all other spe-
cies must be placed in greater priority and importance in relation to humanity, Herzog 
states that language, and human culture more generally, is “something equally impor-
tant” to nature. This can be seen as Herzog’s attempt at a stance which is not quite 
biocentric, but, rather, anti-anthropocentric. As I have pointed out in the previous chap-
ter, I remain sceptical of the ability of humanity to take a stance that is not 
anthropocentric. However, it is in Grizzly Man that Herzog defends these points with 
more clarity, which he does, particularly, by referring to the relationship between lan-
guage and nature. 
In Grizzly Man Herzog confronts issues of structuralism, especially as it pertains to 
the manner in which nature and language interact. Abram, as previously noted, has 
shown that instances of nature are apparent in all languages, but not as overtly as they 
were at the inception of language (100-01). This implies that the structure and sound of 
words can be traced back to the soil, rocks and animals from where it came. In The New 
World, I have attempted to show how Malick uses this premise to provide evidence for a 
kind of harmony between language and nature. However, Herzog, through his portrayal 
of Timothy Treadwell, presents a counterargument to this as he shows that humans, as 
they possess full control of language, also have the power to corrupt and distort nature 
through language, making it apparent that there is a trenchant lack of harmony between 
language and nature. 
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Figure 3: Herzog Grizzly Man 
In a particular sequence 
of the film, Herzog ex-
plores the ways in which 
Treadwell misinterprets 
nature, often criticising 
Treadwell for believing 
nature to be more beautiful 
than Herzog is willing to 
accept  (Grizzly Man). In 
one particular scene (a still of which can be seen in Figure 3) we notice Treadwell ob-
serving a fox with the bottom half of its body completely missing. Leaning on his hand, 
Treadwell sits down on the ground next to the fox, gently and intermittently touching 
the fox’s dead ear. Flies buzz around the fox and begin decomposing its body. Tread-
well, narrating with a brittle and shaky voice, sometimes directs his speech to the fox as 
if expecting the fox to hear and understand him: 
Oh god. I love you. I love you and I don’t understand. It’s a painful world. 
… 
 
He wandered too far from the den, and the wolves last night, that I heard 
howling, screeching in glee and excitement – it was over the termination of 
one of the babies. Expedition 2001 has taken a sad turn, but it is a real turn, 
and I mourn the death of this gorgeous baby fox. Goodbye, little fox. 
Treadwell’s language usage is overtly anthropomorphic. Indeed, Treadwell’s utterance, 
“I don’t understand”, may be taken as an indication of his reliance on anthropomor-
phism in a situation which proves to be far too overwhelming for him. This makes it 
apparent that reading nature as a phenomenon that is sometimes harsh, unpredictable 
and mercilessly cruel, does not fit into Treadwell’s mediated view of the concept. In-
deed, Treadwell uses the words “so good” in reference to his relationship with nature, 
especially when he speaks of Timmy the fox, a name for the animal which seems to 
have been inspired by Timothy Treadwell himself, a sign of Treadwell’s tendency to 
read not only humanity, but himself, into nature. Treadwell’s language, in the scene in 
which he discovers the body of the dead fox, is fraught with emotion, which may be ob-
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served when he refers to the dead animal as a “bab[y]” and a “baby fox”. Human infants 
are only ever referred to as babies. Animals are not babies, but puppies, chicks, calves 
or kits, as is the case of foxes. Treadwell’s naming the kit a baby suggests an anthropo-
morphic partiality which foregrounds Treadwell’s inability to realise that humanity’s 
emotional and personal connection with nature is the product of humanity itself. Indeed, 
when Treadwell addresses the dead fox by saying “I love you”, Herzog uses this state-
ment as an indication that Treadwell not only uses language that is anthropomorphic 
and emotive, but also uses language that demonstrates a complete disregard for the po-
tential for words to misrepresent nature. Herzog, therefore, makes the argument that 
humans, when in control of language, are free to assign meaning onto any aspect of na-
ture, a phenomenon which is ultimately meaningless, suggesting that it is only through 
anthropomorphism that we may come to understand and define nature. 
Thus, if Herzog’s premise, that humans are in control of language, is true, then this 
implies that nature, while it has given us our language, has not prescribed to us how we 
must use our language. This only makes the disconnect between language and nature 
clearer, showing that when language is used by humans there is no reason why language 
may not be used to distort what is apparent in nature. Thus, even though Treadwell 
claims that the death of the fox makes for a “sad turn, but it is a real turn”, that nature is 
a place of “death” (as he states in his opening monologue of the film), or that it is “very 
dangerous” (as he states in his confession to Iris the fox), there remains the subtle rheto-
ric of his language, coupled with his overt teary breakdown at the sight of the dead kit 
that suggests that Treadwell, perhaps, loses sight of several other ways nature may be 
read. Thus, Treadwell’s intense reaction to the dead kit is only his response to a blinding 
construct of nature that he is unable to escape, an attitude towards nature of which 
Herzog is particularly critical. 
Before Treadwell “mourn[s]” the death of the “gorgeous baby fox”, we see Tread-
well clutching the dismembered paw of a bear cub. In a voiceover, Herzog narrates the 
following: 
Perfection belonged to the bears, but once in a while Treadwell came face to 
face with the harsh reality of wild nature. This did not fit into his sentimen-
talised view that everything out there was good, and the universe in balance 
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and in harmony. Male bears sometimes kill cubs to stop the females from 
lactating, and thus have them ready again for fornication. 
Herzog correctly identifies Treadwell as someone who misinterpreted nature, who used 
highly anthropomorphic language to describe a phenomenon, nature, which could not be 
bound by such rhetoric. However, despite Herzog leading us to this point, with which I 
agree, it seems that Herzog may be guilty of the same errors he accuses Treadwell of 
committing. 
When Treadwell claims that he does not understand the harshness of nature as he is 
caressing the ear of the half-eaten kit, Herzog interrupts Treadwell by claiming the fol-
lowing: 
Here I differ with Treadwell. He seemed to ignore the fact that in nature 
there are predators. I believe the common denominator of the universe is not 
harmony but chaos, hostility, and murder. 
The language that Herzog uses here is just as anthropomorphic as Treadwell’s. Herzog 
is correct to point out Treadwell’s tendency to read nature in highly emotive terms, but 
Herzog, as the quote shows, is guilty of the same thing. When Herzog states that it is a 
kind of violent chaos that is nature’s “common denominator”, it may be assumed that 
Herzog takes his view of nature to be an impartial blueprint of the universe. It is a term 
which suggests a view of the universe which has no bearing in human concerns or influ-
ence, and is therefore independent of any flawed anthropomorphic understanding of 
nature. However, the terms “chaos, hostility, and murder” are clearly terms which come 
from Herzog, and not necessarily from nature. 
Certainly, there are instances of killing in nature. While the documentary series, Life, 
teaches us of komodo dragons that poison their victims with saliva and wait days for 
their prey to die (Barrington), we also learn of kindness within nature and the lengths 
creatures are willing to go through to ensure the existence of a creature other than itself. 
In one instance, we witness a strawberry poison-arrow frog, no bigger than a fingernail, 
who must climb a tree, which, relative to the frog, is the size of the Empire State Build-
ing, in order to transport, one by one, its six tadpoles to their own leaf of the tree 
(Holmes). The mother poison-arrow frog does this not for itself, but for its young 
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(Holmes). It seems, then, that unlike what Herzog may believe, there are, indeed, in-
stances of good in the natural world, an issue expanded upon in great detail by Richard 
Dawkins. 
When Dawkins writes on the subject of altruism in his book The Selfish Gene, he de-
fines the term as an instance in which a living entity “behaves in such a way as to 
increase another such entity’s welfare at the expense of its own” (4). Dawkins also 
makes it clear that in talking about altruism (and selfishness) that the definitions are 
“behavioural, not subjective” (4 author’s italics). Dawkins continues: 
I am not concerned here with the psychology of motives. I am not going to 
argue about whether people who behave altruistically are ‘really’ doing it 
for secret or subconscious selfish motives. … My definition is concerned 
only with whether the effect of an act is to lower or raise the survival pros-
pects of the presumed altruist and the survival prospects of the presumed 
beneficiary (4 author’s italics). 
In observing the altruistic behaviour of vampire bats, Dawkins shows that these crea-
tures have a tendency of sharing blood with other familiar vampire bats who, for 
whatever reason, have not managed to acquire any blood and may, therefore, starve 
(232). Dawkins explains that it is in the very nature of vampire bats to share their food, 
making sacrifices so that their fellow vampire bat may be fed (232). Realising that the 
vampire bat has become the icon of death and crazed blood-thirst, Dawkins comments 
on the distorted perception of the vampire bat in popular culture: 
Vampires are great mythmakers. To devotees of Victorian Gothic they are 
dark forces that terrorise by night, sapping vital fluids, sacrificing an inno-
cent life merely to gratify a thirst. Combine this with that other Victorian 
myth, nature red in tooth and claw, and aren’t vampires the very incarnation 
of deepest fears about the world of the selfish gene? As for me, I am scepti-
cal of all myths. … But if we must have myths, the real facts about vampires 
could tell a different moral tale. To the bats themselves, not only is blood 
thicker than water. They rise above the bonds of kinship, forming their own 
lasting ties of loyal blood-brotherhood. Vampires could form the vanguard 
of a comfortable new myth, a myth of sharing, mutualistic cooperation. 
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They could herald the benignant idea that, even with selfish genes at the 
helm, nice guys can finish first (233). 
What Dawkins shows us is how easily and how inevitable it is that we slip into an an-
thropomorphic understanding of nature. That vampire bats may be viewed as both 
horrible and caring are merely two sides to the same coin. Thus, when Herzog claims 
that hostility and murder are collectively nature’s “common denominator”, the point 
must be approached with great caution. It seems that this view of nature is not a com-
mon denominator but only part of the many idiosyncratic personal and cultural 
interpretations of nature we have come to recognise. It is ironic, then, that Herzog uses 
Treadwell’s rhetoric to make the argument that nature is merciless. Perhaps nature is not 
as loving as Treadwell makes nature out to be, but it is not as ferocious as Herzog sug-
gests either. Herzog’s criticism of Treadwell’s perception of nature has allowed us to 
realise the irony in the inadequacy of language to represent its creator: nature. The point 
Herzog makes is that nature is not kind, but cruel, not heavenly, but horrible. The merits 
of this argument, however, as has been shown, are flawed. Thus, Herzog’s view of na-
ture is just as anthropomorphic as Treadwell’s, making both views equally correct (and 
incorrect), despite being polar opposites. Their views of nature seem to fall on opposite 
ends of the same anthropomorphic continuum. 
It is from this that I will conclude that when using language to describe nature, the 
only way to define nature is that it is indefinable. Thus, to place nature in the confines 
of human language is to anthropomorphise nature. It may be apparent, then, that not 
only is the anthropocentrisation of nature inevitable, but the anthropomorphisation of 
nature is so, too. Nature cannot be understood accurately using language, as language, a 
human tool, is far too susceptible to anthropomorphism. Thus, neither Herzog nor 
Treadwell can be criticised merely for anthropomorphising nature because any attempt 
to understand nature must be done through language, and any attempt to mould nature 
in the form of language is to anthropomorphise it. However, there is a danger in both 
Herzog and Treadwell’s anthropomorphised views of nature which comes in the fact 
that it lacks any kind of self-awareness. Lacking this self-awareness means that Herzog 
and Treadwell do not recognise the millions of other forms nature is able to take. The 
danger in this is that it allows nature to be read only in one way, which limits the ways 
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in which we are able to treat nature in the process. This means that our treatment of na-
ture would lack the dynamism necessary to treat a dynamic phenomenon. Penn and 
Krakauer make similar claims about McCandless regarding his tendency to veil nature 
in a particular anthropomorphic guise for the purposes of surviving nature. 
“To Call Each Thing By Its Right Name”: Into the Wild 
In Penn’s film, Into the Wild, and Jon Krakauer’s book of the same title, the director and 
author imply that our understanding of the connection between language and nature is, 
quite literally, a matter of life and death. While this is also a theme which runs through 
Herzog’s Grizzly Man, it is dealt with in more detail in Penn and Krakauer’s respective 
texts. 
Much like many of his ideas about several aspects of his life, McCandless’s views on 
the issue of language and nature are inspired by literature he has read. In this case, it is 
Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago. Among the final scenes of Penn’s film, we notice 
McCandless, in a state of frenzied hunger, desperate for food and stabbing new holes 
into his belt to accommodate his reduced body mass. While in this state of anxiety we 
witness McCandless, shot with a handheld camera, pacing up and down his bus, softly 
reading out passages from Doctor Zhivago (Penn). One of the passages reads as follows: 
“For a moment she rediscovered the purpose of her life. She was here on earth to grasp 
the meaning of its wild enchantment and to call each thing by its right name” (Pasternak 
75). The phrase “to call each thing by its right name” seems to strike at something vis-
ceral in McCandless (Penn). Immediately after the scene in which he reads from the 
book, there is a cut to a scene in which we see him, half-naked, crawling on his knees, 
identifying the flora in his environment in an attempt to call each plant by its right name 
(Penn). It is as though McCandless is attempting to bridge the divide between humanity 
and nature, or, more specifically, language and nature. McCandless is attempting to by-
pass the anthropomorphic quality of language, and, instead, use language as a tool for 
identifying and describing nature ‘correctly’. McCandless seems to assume that if he is 
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to survive, then he must translate nature’s purity, as McCandless would see it, into lan-
guage. 
After the scene in which we see McCandless frantically trying to define his environ-
ment, we notice McCandless sitting by a fire he had made in the bus’s (presumably pre-
installed) furnace, while he eats the berries, roots and shrubs he had picked during the 
day. Looking behind McCandless, the camera focuses on a written list of the plants he 
had identified in his environment, ninety in total, with the “WILD POTATO ROOT” being 
his last entry. That he has placed these items in a list speaks of McCandless’s desire to 
gain a sense of control over the wild, or, to tame the wild. The scene also speaks of 
McCandless’s desire to convert nature into something quantifiable, something that can 
be categorised, reasoned, and made sense of. This may come as a direct result of 
McCandless’s loss of control over nature referred to in the previous paragraph. Thus, 
this linguistic control that McCandless attempts to exert over nature is a desperate at-
tempt at survivalism. In trying to use language to define nature, especially for the 
purposes of survival, it seems that McCandless makes the assumption that there exists 
the potential for language to lose its anthropomorphic depiction of nature, and, in so do-
ing, eliminate the divide between language and nature. Language and nature, then, as 
McCandless sees it, certainly have the potential for a harmonious existence. However, 
Penn seems sceptical of this ability of language to accurately represent nature, and, sub-
sequently, to use this as a means of survival. 
McCandless wakes up the next morning in a confused and delirious state (Penn). He 
tries to swallow water, but seems unable to hold it down. It is clear that McCandless is 
sick. As McCandless clutches his stomach he looks across his bed and we are able to 
identify the Priscilla Russell Kari book, Tanaina Plantlore: An Ethnobotany of the 
Dena’ina Indians of Southcentral Alaska (Penn). As McCandless pages through the 
book we are given a close-up of the page in which the inedible wild sweet pea is de-
scribed (Penn; Russell). After this, there is a contrasting close-up of the edible wild 
potato (or Alaska carrot) (Penn). Turning back to the page in which the wild sweet pea 
is featured, McCandless reads the description of the inedible plant, and we are able to 
read that the wild sweet pea possesses “lateral veins” and is “poisonous”. Indeed, when 
McCandless picks a sample of the plant from a bag, he observes that the wild sweet pea 
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has said lateral veins. As McCandless picks another plant sample from his bag, this 
time, we assume, a leaf of the wild potato, the words “plants resemble each other” may 
be read as it pans across the screen. The suggestion that Penn is attempting to make 
here, of course, is that McCandless mistook the inedible and fatal wild sweet pea for the 
edible wild potato. This mistake eventually leads to McCandless’s death. Penn’s tone is 
cautionary as he shows that language cannot represent nature with accuracy – a point I 
have made before. Penn introduces survivalism as a means of demonstrating the grave 
consequences in believing that nature can be accurately represented in language. Thus, 
Penn seems to be making the point that language alone cannot be used, firstly, as an 
adequate and accurate representation of nature, and, secondly, as a means of surviving 
in nature. 
Penn’s argument is a bold one. However, it is an argument which, perhaps, is based 
on premises that take too much artistic freedom as it strays too far from the facts that 
Krakauer, in his novel, makes plain. Referencing Kari’s book, Krakauer establishes a 
few statements regarding the plants which led to McCandless’s death: “Kari’s book 
warns that because wild sweet pea is so difficult to distinguish from wild potato and ‘is 
reported to be poisonous, care should be taken to identify them accurately before at-
tempting to use the wild potato as food.’ Accounts of individuals being poisoned from 
eating H. mackenzii [wild sweet pea] are nonexistent in modern medical literature, but 
the aboriginal inhabitants of the North have apparently known for millennia that wild 
sweet pea is toxic and remain extremely careful not to confuse H. alpinum [wild potato] 
with H. mackenzii” (190). It is from these facts that Krakauer concludes that McCan-
dless could not have ingested wild sweet pea, and that he must have died due to the 
ingestion of the seed pods of the wild potato, which were 
not known to be toxic – indeed, he’d been safely eating its roots for weeks. 
… A person with a better grasp of botanical principles would probably not 
have eaten them, but it was an innocent error. It was, however, sufficient to 
do him in (193). 
Krakauer prefaces his argument as speculation, but, as Krakauer also convincingly 
points out, it is certainly a much better evidenced view of what may have caused 
McCandless’s death than the more popular views of the time (of which Penn is an advo-
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cate), and was the conclusion arrived at by most journalists writing about the incident at 
the time (191). Thus, Penn’s argument does not hold the same kind of clarity of reason 
that Krakauer’s does. It is because of this flaw in Penn’s argument that I certainly can-
not be readily influenced by its implications for the relationship between language and 
nature either. In light of this information, the facts surrounding McCandless’s death, 
then, can be read in a new light. 
Thus, based on poorly evidenced facts, to be fair, Penn states that McCandless’s 
death was due to an inability of language to grasp all of nature, making the point that the 
kind of deep interconnection McCandless attempted to establish with nature was 
doomed to fail. This may be evidenced by the point that, perhaps, due to western civili-
sation’s increasing physical distance from nature it is no longer necessary for modern 
humans to remember the qualities and names of the plants and animals in the natural 
surrounds. Krakauer, however, is more optimistic on the matter. Certainly, Krakauer 
shows that McCandless’s hubristic attempts at living in complete harmony with nature 
failed because of the inability of language to define nature, but Krakauer shows that the 
most significant factors which contributed to McCandless’s death were, firstly, bad luck, 
and, secondly, that McCandless simply did not have the tools (179) and skills (180-81) 
necessary to accomplish such an extreme integration with nature. Thus, unlike Penn, 
Krakauer does not rule out the possibility that such an immersion into nature is possible. 
However, like Penn, Krakauer shows that it is certainly unwise for modern humans to 
attempt to develop such intense and overzealous interconnections with a concept to 
which humanity now struggles to relate (180). 
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Chapter 3 
Nature on Culture and Character 
Oh, yes, those trees! How terrible what they did with the trees. Because the cotton-
wood suckles like a baby. Suckles on the mother water running under the ground. A 
cottonwood will talk to the mother water and tell her what human beings are doing. 
But then these white men came and they began digging up the cottonwoods and 
moving them here and there for a terrible purpose (Marmon Silko Almanac 117). 
The British and Native American Perspective 
As was established in my introductory chapter, ‘nature’ is a term impossible to define. 
Definitions of nature, then, are purely subjective and determined by culture (Grewe-
Volpp 80), which implies that when asking for a definition of nature one should expect 
as many answers as there are cultures. Thus, with every culture attempting to define a 
concept which is, in fact, indefinable, each culture’s definition of nature is interesting 
not because it provides a definition of nature, per se, but because it provides insight into 
how each respective culture defines the interconnections between humanity and what 
they perceive as nature. It is reasonable to believe, then, that because each culture dif-
fers from the next, every culture’s definition of nature will also differ from each other in 
either type or degree. For the purposes of this chapter, I will be focussing mainly on the 
perceptions of nature that are prevalent within Americans, both Native and Anglophone, 
the two of which are juxtaposed most prominently in Terrence Malick’s The New 
World. 
Malick’s film illustrates one of the first encounters between the Europeans (specifi-
cally, the British, who will later become American settlers) and the Native Americans 
(specifically, the Algonquian). Speaking in broad terms, Malick presents the Algon-
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quian as having strong interconnections with nature, and the British not. The reasons for 
the British not having such strong interconnections with nature are severalfold. In some 
instances, this is due to the Christian beliefs upheld by the British, and in other instances 
it is due to their colonial disposition. 
The British represent an idea of the New World which is, in more ways than one, 
constructed: it is constructed in language, and it is constructed in physical space. This is 
most clearly evidenced when Captain Newport addresses his fellow settlers by stating 
that they all have a duty to “prepare a land where a man may rise to his true stature” 
(Malick The New World). The notion that the land must be “prepare[d]” suggests that 
the British perceive nature as that upon which something must be built. The British, 
then, establish an identity for themselves which they, quite literally, build onto nature. 
However, Malick shows that the British also construct their cultural identity based on 
their contestation with nature, which may be shown as Captain Newport suggests that 
the sailors are “the pioneers of the world, the advanced guards sent through the wilder-
ness to break a new path” (Malick The New World). This “break[ing]” of the wilderness 
suggests a warring sensibility in which the wilderness must be defeated for the British to 
believe themselves successful in their battle with nature. Further, that Newport believes 
that it is a “new path” that must be made shows that it is the development of the land 
which he considers constitutes this success. Indeed, as Rosen shows us, the first Euro-
pean settlers, upon arriving in the New World, believed that they “could make the land 
more productive [and, therefore,] had a superior claim to it” (D. Rosen 7). When the 
British are in battle with the Algonquian, Wingfield shouts angrily to his opposition, 
“How can you own land? This earth was made for such that shall improve it, and knows 
how to live!” (Malick The New World). Wingfield, implying that earth was created, 
which can be seen in his usage of the word “made”, believes that the earth was made 
“for” a purpose, which is to improve the land. Wingfield’s perception of the Native 
Americans is that they are living wasteful lives by not cultivating and developing the 
land that they have been ‘given’. 
The British characters construct their notions of nature based on the Christian idea of 
Eden. Indeed, Captain Newport is often heard describing the New World landscape as 
such (Malick The New World). However, since we have already established that the 
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British believe that the land must be conquered to establish successful interconnections 
between themselves and nature, it may be reasoned that the “Eden” to which the British 
refer is one in which the wilderness which surrounds them must be constructed and de-
veloped. This, in turn, demonstrates that the Britons’ ideas of the wilderness (that is, 
what would generally be considered the ‘natural’ beauty of the landscape) and Eden ex-
ist as two separate constructs in the colonial mentality. Nash explains the manner in 
which these two concepts differ: 
Eden and the wilderness are juxtaposed in such a way as to leave no doubt 
about their original relationship. ‘The land is like the garden of Eden before 
them,’ wrote the author of Joel, ‘but after them a desolate wilderness.’ And 
Isaiah contains the promise that God will comfort Zion and ‘make her wil-
derness like Eden, her desert like the garden of the Lord’ (15). 
However, that the Britons made this distinction between their constructed ideas of Eden 
and the wilderness does not necessarily imply that they considered what the wilderness 
offered was worthless. The Britons, arriving in America for the first time, anthropomor-
phically saw this bountiful New World as an opportunity for a new beginning (Kolodny 
6; Marx 1). It is through John Smith that Malick symbolically demonstrates the liberat-
ing effect the New World had on some of its first European arrivals. The first images we 
see of Smith are of him shackled in a cell of the newly arrived English ship. Later, Cap-
tain Newport, releasing Smith of his bondage, explains the importance in taking 
opportunity of the second chance he has given Smith. Smith clearly recognises the po-
tential in his new beginning in this new land: 
We shall make a new start, a fresh beginning. Here the blessings of the earth 
are bestowed upon all. None need grow poor. Here there is good ground for 
all, and no cost but one’s labour. 
That the wilderness, or natural landscape, has much to offer is a notion that is also cor-
roborated by another sailor who reports to Captain Newport about the bounty he has 
found upon arriving in America: 
65 
Captain Newport, sir, I found oysters. They’re as thick as my hands. 
They’re the size of stones, sir, and there’s fish everywhere. … We’re going 
to live like kings. 
The British, then, perceive this new land in at least two ways. They see it as a blank 
slate upon which a new identity may be constructed, and they see it as a land of great 
bounty from which they may extract as much as they want, treating the land as a bot-
tomless well. Malick, however, is critical of this kind of anthropomorphic understanding 
of the land, which he shows to be grossly utilitarian. Malick shows that the British be-
lieved nature to exist solely for the purposes of sustaining human, or, specifically, 
British, culture. It is also an attitude towards nature, Malick argues, which leads to the 
British pillaging and destroying the land. Malick contrasts these British sensibilities to-
wards nature with the Native American treatment of nature, which Malick favours. 
Days after the British 
arrive, the sound of an axe 
(as seen in Figure 4) com-
ing into forceful contact 
with a tree can be heard by 
some of the Algonquian 
who are close by to the 
British camp. The sound, as it is presented on the soundtrack, is of a distant and rhyth-
mic dull thump. As the sound continues on the soundtrack, we notice an Algonquian 
man, shot from below, with only his head and shoulders in full view, steadily rising 
with his head turned and 
facing the direction from 
which the sound comes (as 
shown in Figure 5). Malick 
shows that the Algonquian 
approach the sound and its 
referent as an alien and 
obtrusive curiosity. Tanner may assist us in gaining a better understanding in reading 
this scene: “The sign of the axe most decisively destroys the scene of nature. It is the 
Figure 5: Malick The New World 
Figure 4: Malick The New World 
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opposite of passive wonder; it posits and presupposes man against nature, a ‘mingling’ 
which is a violent attack, not a ‘merging’ of consciousness and object” (9). This is the 
kind of symbolic meaning attached to the axe as the Algonquian see it. Through impli-
cation, then, the Algonquian abide by the opposite of the meaning attached to this 
symbol. The angle from which the axe and the Algonquian man are shot, respectively, 
may also indicate where Malick’s allegiances lie. The axe is shot from above, belittling 
an object of destructive power, while the Algonquian man, because he is shot from be-
low, is empowered. Further, the direction to which the Algonquian man’s head is turned 
as he listens to the sound of the thump suggests that the sound in being emitted from the 
sinister left. This indicates Malick’s deliberate and partial imagery. Thus, the Algon-
quian, as Malick sees them, live lives in which nature is not shown any harm, whereas 
the British approach nature with a kind of malignant violence. It is the Algonquian who 
are presented as paragons of the type of interconnections between humanity and nature 
that Malick advocates. This sentiment is supported by several other scenes in the film, 
many of which revolve around the character Pocahontas. 
Indeed, in the first few scenes in which we notice Pocahontas, we see her, naked, 
swimming in water, with her body constantly obscured by the darkness of the depths, 
which prevents the viewer from noticing the point at which her body ends and nature 
begins. In numerous scenes we also notice Pocahontas climbing trees, touching large 
stalks of corn, and playing in the rain. This type of close interconnection with nature 
may be seen in other members of the Algonquian as well, as we observe them with 
snakes dangling from their earlobes, or covered in feathers and reeds. Thus, the type of 
interconnections that Malick shows the Algonquian have with nature are characterised 
by an anthropomorphism in which nature is seen as peaceful, tranquil and accommodat-
ing. When Pocahontas is playing in the grass with her brother at the beginning of the 
film, they hold up their spread-out hands above their heads, pretending to be deer, or 
when some of the tribesmen act like chickens as part of Smith’s initiation into the tribe, 
we see that the Algonquian are of the view that humanity, or at least their tribe, is a 
mere extension of nature. The Algonquian, therefore, perceive themselves to be, not 
above nature, but as existing on the same plane alongside nature. However, Malick 
takes many artistic liberties in his portrayal of the Algonquian’s close and harmonious 
relationship with nature, often sidestepping historical accuracy. 
67 
The ‘ecological Indian’ is the term often used for the depiction, or the conceptualisa-
tion, of the Native American as being in peaceful cohabitation with nature. However, 
this concept of the ecological Indian, a concept to which Malick subscribes, is, at times, 
incorrect, and, at other times, too broad. Certainly, in many respects, the Algonquian, 
and the Native American population in general, do sometimes comply with the image of 
the ecological Indian. Frank G. Speck explains this in the Algonquian’s relationship to 
animals, showing that the Algonquian of the north-east of America often perceived that 
“hunting is a holy occupation and that game animals are holy as well” (10). However, as 
Speck makes plain throughout his book, the Algonquian treatment of animals was ulti-
mately born out of self-interest. That the Native Americans held an anthropocentric 
relationship to nature is unsurprising since, as previously mentioned, an anthropocentric 
attitude towards nature is inevitable. What is perhaps surprising, however, is that, at 
times, the Native Americans’ treatment of nature was not only self-interested, but de-
structive as well. 
In his book, the Ecological Indian: Myth and History, Shepard Krech, III, makes it 
known that the Northern Algonquian were not as harmoniously connected to nature as is 
popularly thought, which Krech specifically explains by means of the beaver trade 
(179). Krech explains that before the Europeans came to the Americas, the “Northern 
Algonquins found beavers a vital source of food and clothing, and also used their 
prominent orange-enamelled incisors as cutting, gouging, and sharpening tools, and 
their scapulas (stripped of their flesh) as instruments of divination” (179). However, 
Krech makes it clear that the Algonquian, for the sake of the beaver trade in the 1600s, 
would often “kill as many animals as they could find” (200) and that the tribe, between 
the 1700s to the 1900s, had “no interest whatsoever in [conservation]” (194). This dem-
onstrates that perhaps the perception we have of Native Americans, especially the 
Algonquian of the seventeenth century, and especially in the way Malick has portrayed 
them, is inaccurate. Regarding the Native American use of fire, Krech also shows that 
the Algonquian, and the Native Americans more generally, used fire to such a large ex-
tent that 
By the time Europeans arrived, North America was a manipulated continent. 
Indians had long since altered the landscape by burning or clearing wood-
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land for farming and fuel. Despite European images of an untouched Eden, 
this nature was cultural not virgin, anthropogenic not primeval, and nowhere 
is this more evident than in the Indian uses of fire (122). 
Thus, Malick’s portrayal of the Algonquian in The New World is one that is an artistic 
construction based on a much larger popular construction. Malick’s view of the Native 
Americans as ‘noble savages’ is one not unseen in popular American culture, and may 
be witnessed in works such as Dee Brown’s Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee. Indeed, 
in the “Introduction” of Brown’s book, the author foregrounds the fact that his portrayal 
will be one in which the Native Americans are people who exhibit “gentle reasonable-
ness” (xxv). This is certainly a portrayal of Native Americans quite often seen in 
American film as well, Dances With Wolves (Costner) being a prime example. Malick is 
no exception to this Romanticisation of the indigenous. However, that Malick takes 
many artistic liberties in this portrayal is not without value. Certainly, in a time when 
humanity’s interconnections with nature seem to be weakening, perhaps it is Malick’s 
portrayal of the Algonquian’s propinquity to nature that should be encouraged. There 
are, of course, problems with the type of anthropomorphic attitude towards nature that 
the Algonquian display. One such problem is that it is a kind of anthropomorphism that 
is not self-aware. The danger in lacking self-awareness in one’s anthropomorphic un-
derstanding that nature and humanity exist in harmony, or any other kind of 
anthropomorphic understanding of nature which lacks self-awareness, for that matter, is 
that one may be susceptible to taking such a perception of nature literally. A literal un-
derstanding of this type, especially when it lacks any scientific understanding of nature, 
means that any idiosyncratic cultural interpretation of nature may not correlate with 
one’s worldview of the relationship between humanity and nature. Thus, to believe, 
quite literally, that buffaloes are ‘given’ in an infinite amount from a cave in the ground, 
and can therefore be killed with abandon (as many factions of the Algonquian believed) 
(Krech 149), is a highly anthropomorphised, and dangerously unscientific, understand-
ing of the world which may counter one’s view that one’s culture, as the Algonquian 
thought, lives in peaceful harmony with nature. This is a point upon which I expand in 
greater detail in Chapter 5. Thus, while Malick shows that the English characters’ atti-
tudes towards nature are more overtly destructive than the Algonquian characters’, 
Malick neglects to show that, at times, the Algonquian attitudes towards nature were 
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equally so for similar reasons: both views of nature, both equally anthropomorphic and 
equally anthropocentric, lacked the self-awareness that ought to accompany anthropo-
morphism to be considered productive. 
Nature and Morality 
Culture, in an attempt to use nature as a means to define itself, also uses nature to pro-
vide a sense of morality. Thus, all cultures develop an anthropomorphic understanding 
of nature in order to gain a sense of right and wrong. Cultures do this sometimes be-
cause of, and sometimes despite, nature. Both these kinds of aspects on morality define 
key features of the Anglophone American’s moral psyche throughout their history. 
As has been discussed, the British exploring the New World at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century perceived nature to be something that should be conquered and 
used for the purposes of cultural expansion, as depicted in Malick’s The New World. 
Thus, Malick’s portrayal of the British is that they perceive nature as a phenomenon that 
exists solely for the purpose of humanity, an accurate portrayal of the western sentiment 
of the time. Indeed, Francis Bacon, writing at the same time in which the film is set, 
makes the humanist claim that “Man, if we look to final causes, may be regarded as the 
centre of the world; insomuch that if man were taken away from the world, the rest 
would seem to be all astray, without aim or purpose, to be like a besom without a bind-
ing, as the saying is, and to be leading to nothing. For the whole world works together 
in the service of man; and there is nothing from which he does not derive use and fruit” 
(747). This pre-Copernican view of the relationship between humanity and nature, in 
which humanity is the point around which all else revolves, leaves little doubt of its an-
thropocentric anthropomorphisation. The type of anthropomorphism that Bacon is 
advocating, ironically, will not do any good for humanity in the long run. Using up 
every last unit of fossil fuel, and chopping down every tree, would not allow for healthy 
interconnections between humanity and nature. Bacon’s view, then, presents an attitude 
towards nature that is harmful to humans, earth and animals alike. This is a view of na-
ture that, while popular at the time, eventually mutated and changed with the American 
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Puritans several decades afterward, defining their sense of morality in relation to their 
understanding of nature in the process. 
Beginning in mid-seventeenth-century America (about two or three decades after 
Malick’s The New World is set), one finds that the New England Puritans viewed na-
ture, and, specifically, the wilderness, as a space which was not simply amoral, but 
immoral (Turner 46). The Puritans viewed the wilderness as a space in which nothing 
good existed, a space that would encourage and cultivate the evil that lay dormant in 
humans, who would run rampant if gone unchecked (Nash 86). However, it is the tran-
scendentalists who, approximately two centuries later, would stand as the ideological 
antithesis to the Puritans. 
The transcendentalists believed that one’s being was made up of two corresponding 
entities: the body, which drew one to worldly materiality, and the soul, which gave one 
the ability to go beyond, or transcend, the material, and better one’s spirituality (Nash 
85). Transcendentalists emphasised that if one was able to observe nature correctly, ac-
cording to how they defined this term, of course, then one would be able to use this 
ability to connect to a higher spiritual plane, which led the transcendentalists to believe 
that “nature was the proper source of religion” (Nash 86). Thus, one of the most famous 
transcendentalists, Ralph Waldo Emerson, would state the following: 
That which once existed in intellect as pure law, has now taken body as Na-
ture. … [W]e can use nature as a convenient standard, and the metre of our 
rise and fall. … When man curses, nature still testifies to truth and love (84). 
This is a view of nature which is predominantly found in most western cultures. Coates 
describes the manner in which people today, when they use nature to define their moral-
ity, see nature as something pure and good: “Nature is often presumed to be an objective 
reality with universal qualities unaffected by considerations of time, culture and place, 
an assumption especially evident in appeals to nature as a source of external authority 
(witness the ever popular saying ‘Nature knows best’)” (1). Chris McCandless presents 
a person highly influenced by this anthropomorphic mixing of morality and nature. In-
deed, McCandless’s journey into the wild was weighted significantly by a deep-seated 
sense of morality (Krakauer 28). Of the transcendentalists, McCandless was well-versed 
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in, and greatly influenced by, the moral teachings of Henry David Thoreau from whom 
McCandless learnt that the purist form of moral goodness may be found in nature 
(Krakauer 48). 
One of the best examples of Thoreau’s sentiments on the relationship between moral-
ity and nature are exemplified when he writes that “all good things are wild, and free” 
(Walking 35). Thoreau, like the Puritans who preceded him, uses nature as a moral 
compass, but, unlike the Puritans that preceded him, equates nature with goodness. It is 
in this quote that Thoreau also presents quite a narrow and specific understanding of 
nature and its relationship to morality. For Thoreau, it is not that all things wild and free 
are good (implying that there are other things that are not wild and free, but are good 
anyway), but that being good is equated with being wild and free. The implication of 
this, then, is that if a human were to live a life that is considered morally good, by Tho-
reau’s anthropomorphically defined standards, of course, then one must live a life 
immersed in wild nature whereby one is not restricted by rules and order. 
Chris McCandless, while greatly influenced by Thoreau’s sense of nature-based mo-
rality, also lived by perceptions of nature based on his own construction. For example, 
well into his journey into the wild, McCandless etched the following onto the inside 
wall of the magic bus in which he resided before moving further into Alaska: “‘NO 
LONGER TO BE POISONED BY CIVILIZATION HE FLEES, AND WALKS ALONE UPON THE 
LAND TO BECOME LOST IN THE WILD’” (Krakauer 162). What is interesting about this 
line is that it provides insight into McCandless’s viewing of nature not only as some-
thing which is morally pure, but that it is morally pure because it stands in opposition to 
humanity. Humanity, for McCandless, is something by which one may be “‘POI-
SONED’”. Thus, McCandless’s idea of becoming a virtuous person is determined by, 
simultaneously, immersing himself into nature and divorcing himself from society, a 
kind of anti-anthropocentrism. Further, writing in the third person, McCandless’s desire 
to escape from humanity is so extreme that he necessitates achieving this moral purity 
with escaping himself as well. 
However, the irony and flawed reasoning of the argument cannot be ignored. What I 
am referring to is the fact that McCandless uses culturally determined tools and con-
structs to come to the conclusion that culture, itself, is that which poisons the purity of 
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nature. McCandless, then, in trying to sever himself from any kind of connection to the 
human world, only replaces one anthropomorphism with another. McCandless has not 
escaped the bonds of human culture as absolutely as he has come to believe. I am not 
suggesting, however, that it is wrong of McCandless to have an anthropomorphic under-
standing of nature. What I am criticising McCandless for is his lack of awareness in the 
irony that is embedded in his constructed view of the world whereby nature is equated 
with moral goodness. It is an irony that, perhaps if McCandless was aware of it, would 
have prevented him from fatally pursuing such a construct as dogmatically as he did. 
Another criticism of McCandless’s view on the relationship between morality and na-
ture, to which I now turn, is that his particular anthropomorphic view of nature is a view 
that is far too physically reliant on nature, and not reliant enough on humanity, to be 
productive for humanity as a whole. This is certainly the point made by Penn and Kra-
kauer as well. 
Krakauer reports that the last book McCandless read was Boris Pasternak’s Doctor 
Zhivago (188). In the book McCandless marked the following passage: “And so it 
turned out that only a life similar to the life of those around us, merging with it without 
a ripple, is genuine life, and that an unshared happiness is not happiness. … And this 
was most vexing of all” (Pasternak 175). Next to this passage McCandless wrote a note 
which read: “‘HAPPINESS ONLY REAL WHEN SHARED’” (Krakauer 188). This annotation 
by McCandless is one that is emphasised in Penn’s film as well, and shows that what-
ever kind of happiness one may derive from nature (or anything else for that matter) 
must be a happiness that is accompanied by some degree of anthropocentrism as it must 
be a happiness in which others are invited to partake. Thus, McCandless comes to learn 
that in keeping nature, his personal source of happiness, to himself, he has embraced 
other species to such an extreme that he has fatally abandoned his own. McCandless’s 
annotation, then, demonstrates the necessity of anthropocentrism. Before McCandless 
annotates this note, he exhibits a type of anthropomorphism which, while it may be the 
absolute optimum for nature, is most certainly not so for humanity. It is an anthropo-
morphisation of nature which dangerously lacks any trace of anthropocentrism. 
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Exploring Nature 
The attitude that Americans and, more generally, westerners, have had with nature is 
often examined and characterised by means of observing their relationship to explora-
tion and the discovery, at least from the perspective of the explorer, of new landscapes. 
Indeed, it is in the very labelling of America as the New World which illustrates, in this 
case, the Eurocentric attitude European explorers had when first entering America, rec-
ognising that it was new for them. However, from the Native American perspective, 
America had been their home millennia before whites first set foot on their soil. The 
‘New’ in the New World, or any ‘newly explored’ land for that matter, is defined by the 
person or culture that is doing the exploring. As in Malick’s The New World it repre-
sents “a new beginning” as the aptly named Captain Newport articulates. However, 
Malick seems critical of the way the British view the New World as ‘new’ not only be-
cause it was a landscape that was discovered by another human race, but because the 
landscape can hardly be considered new from the perspective of any human culture. It is 
in Malick’s opening credit sequence in which we are presented with Malick’s argument 
that the first residents of the natural landscape of America were not the Europeans, or 
the Native Americans, but nature itself. 
In The New World’s opening credit sequence Malick presents us with a montage of 
maps of the New World. In one of the first maps we see, which takes up all of the 
screen, the camera floats above the map, which is sporadically illustrated with the usual 
symbols we come to expect of maps: green blotches which represent trees, meandering 
lines representing rivers, brown triangles which represent hills, and so forth. However, 
soon after we are presented with the map, the symbols on the map become animate; they 
begin to come alive. On the soundtrack we are able to hear birds tweeting and wind 
blowing through trees. We are also introduced to an ocean in which we notice capsized 
ships, while, on the soundtrack, we hear waves gushing onto a shore. We also notice 
that the symbols representing rivers are colourised in blue. The animated blue runs from 
each river’s source to its mouth, like blue blood coursing through the veins of the earth. 
It is in this way that Malick injects life into the map. Malick also uses the symbol of the 
map to show that in our attempt to explore the earth we can never truly come to an un-
derstanding of nature in its totality. Our anthropomorphic representation of nature, 
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especially on maps, according to Malick, means that we reduce nature into categories 
and symbols, and, in so doing, lose the detail and complexity of that which we may pur-
port to know holistically. Thus, in our attempt to explore nature for the purposes of 
coming to understand all of nature, we only underline nature’s tendency to evade sym-
bolic representation and evade being truly known. Nature, then, as Malick argues, in 
this sequence, is alive in its own right, and exists independently of any human culture. 
Similarly, Werner Herzog’s Encounters at the End of the World provides a critical 
stance on exploration. 
Herzog’s film investigates the matter of exploration and the manner in which this act 
determines a certain kind of destructive anthropomorphic relationship certain humans 
have with nature. In one scene in particular, Herzog uses old and grainy black-and-
white footage of Antarctica which displays what must have been some of the first hu-
man encounters with the continent (Encounters). We are taken into the cabin of Ernest 
Shackleton, one of the first explorers of Antarctica, while his clothes, bed and empty 
food crates are on display. During this scene, Herzog narrates the following: 
Back in the days of [Roald] Amundsen, [Robert Falcon] Scott and [Ernest] 
Shackleton, scientific exploration of Antarctica began, and this opening of 
the unknown continent is their great achievement. But one thing about the 
early explorers does not feel right. The obsession to be the first one to set 
his foot on the South Pole. It was for personal fame and the glory of the 
British Empire. … [H]uman adventure, in its original sense, lost its mean-
ing, became an issue for the Guinness Book of World Records. Scott and 
Amundsen were clearly early protagonists, and from there on it degenerated 
into absurd quests. A Frenchman crossed the Sahara Desert in his car set in 
reverse gear, and I am waiting for the first barefoot runner on the summit of 
Everest or the first one hopping into the South Pole on a pogo stick. 
Herzog believes, then, that the ties between humanity and nature are severed in the act 
of exploration. However, it is a particular kind of exploration of which Herzog is criti-
cal. It is a kind of exploration in which the explorer anthropomorphises the earth as 
something whose only purpose is to anticipate the day when a human has finally set foot 
on it. It is an anthropomorphic view of nature in which humanity uses nature as a stage 
upon which to stand for the sake of self-aggrandisement (both individually and cultur-
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ally). Herzog also touches on why some explorers may have felt the need to do this 
when he states that it was due to an “obsession to be the first”. These explorers, then, 
according to Herzog, feel the need to implicate human history in natural history, to be 
the first to redefine and rewrite space as place. They wish to become authors, and 
thereby gain authority, before and over nature. Another problem of the type of explora-
tion which Herzog condones is that it is usually practiced by explorers or adventurers 
who 
speak of their travels in such military terms. ‘We’ve conquered the summit.’ 
‘We returned victorious over Mount Everest’ (Cronin 198). 
It is in these ways that these explorers use nature in order to define themselves as above 
nature. Herzog is right, then, to show that this exploration of nature was only for the 
benefit of humanity. Further, when Herzog describes these quests as “absurd”, he im-
plies that humanity’s relationship with nature, when committing these acts, becomes so 
as well. Thus, in trying to reach Antarctica on a pogo stick, or driving across the Sahara 
in reverse gear, one anthropomorphises nature as something which is ridiculous and can 
be mocked. Nature becomes an object of ridicule, which exists for the amusement of 
humanity. 
In an interview with Paul Cronin, Herzog makes it clear that he is not against explo-
ration, per se, but only the type of exploration (which he labels “adventuring” to 
distinguish between the two types) that makes a mockery of nature for the purposes of 
“self-promotion” (198). In fact, the type of exploration that Herzog advocates, and prac-
tices, is one in which the explorer is “curious” and is “searching for new images and 
dignified places” (Cronin 198). This is the kind of exploration which stands in direct 
contrast to adventuring which attempts to ridicule and overpower nature. 
Thus, anthropomorphising nature as that which should be conquered, and over which 
human authority must be exercised, is a view of nature much like that of the New Eng-
land Puritans of the 1600s, which is a type of anthropomorphism which may prove to be 
ineffective in establishing helpful and productive ties with nature. Indeed, it is an at-
tempt to completely sever these ties. The kind of warring rhetoric advocated by this 
anthropomorphism forces humanity to think of nature as its enemy. It stands to reason 
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that it would be foolish to destroy or conquer that on which we depend for our survival. 
It is because of this that Herzog rather promotes an anthropomorphic understanding of 
nature in which nature’s integrity is maintained: “Exposing the last unknown spots of 
this earth was irreversible, but it feels sad that the South Pole or Mount Everest were not 
left in peace in their dignity. It may be a futile wish to keep a few white spots on our 
maps” (Encounters). Perhaps, then, it is a characteristic of the American, and, more 
broadly, western, psyche, to conquer nature by exploring it. This is a sentiment domi-
nant in American history both in the British ‘discovering’ America, but also white 
Americans ‘discovering’ every last corner of their own landscape, which may be seen in 
their relationship to Alaska, a land which many Americans consider their final frontier. 
It is in Penn and Krakauer’s text, however, in which Alaska, and what it has come to 
symbolise for Americans, is not shown only as a landscape that constructs cultural iden-
tity, but personal identity as well. 
Nature and Individual Identity 
Alaska, with its plentiful timber, fishing and oil reserves, is “often regarded as a land 
endowed with tremendous natural wealth, a terrain offering unlimited commercial op-
portunities” (Kollin 43), which then increases the economic significance of the land. 
Chris McCandless does not fit into this tradition of the Alaska narrative. Also, McCan-
dless does not see Alaska as a “a region whose history has yet to be written and whose 
‘virgin lands’ have yet to be explored” (Kollin 25) as is so often the perception of 
Alaska in American culture. McCandless is not an adventurer who wishes to discover 
new landscapes for national glory. Rather, as he sees Alaska in private and intimate 
terms, McCandless is an adventurer of the self who wishes to discover new facets of his 
own being. Krakauer describes the type of perception of Alaska to which McCandless 
subscribes: “Alaska has long been a magnet for dreamers and misfits, people who think 
the unsullied enormity of the Last Frontier will patch all the holes in their lives” (4). 
Thus, despite the fact that McCandless refers to his journey into Alaska as his “‘ultimate 
adventure’” (Krakauer 52), McCandless uses the identity of Alaska, and nature more 
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generally, in order to construct (and repair) his own identity. Krakauer, then, does not 
describe the ways in which McCandless defines nature, but how McCandless uses na-
ture to define himself. Penn, in his film, takes much of the same approach. 
In Penn’s film, McCandless’s exploration of the self is most clearly expressed in the 
scene in which McCandless first meets “rubber tramps” Jan and Rainey. In one particu-
lar scene, while McCandless and Rainey are sitting on a beach, McCandless confesses 
to Rainey his irrational fear of water. Concluding that he must overcome this fear, 
McCandless makes his way to the ocean. As McCandless dives into the water with 
Rainey’s wife, Jan, he can be heard on voiceover narration stating the following: “The 
sea’s only gifts are harsh blows, and occasionally the chance to feel strong. Now, I don’t 
know much about the sea, but I do know that that’s the way it is here, and I also know 
how important it is in life, not necessarily to be strong, but to feel strong, to measure 
yourself at least once, to find yourself at least once in the most ancient of human condi-
tions, facing the blind, deaf stone alone, with nothing to help you, but your hands and 
your own head”. 
One of the things that is important about McCandless’s words is his willingness to 
allow nature to define himself. In the first sentence, McCandless states that the sea gives 
“harsh blows” and “occasionally the chance to feel strong”. Nature, then, provides 
McCandless with a sense of strength and self-worth. Indeed, McCandless states that the 
sea is able to provide a means by which to “measure” himself, and what he is measuring 
himself against is “the blind, deaf stone”. McCandless, then, uses nature as a neutral 
backdrop against which he forges his identity. It must be made known, however, that 
McCandless makes a distinction by saying that nature allows one only to “feel” strong 
and not to “be” strong. I feel this is of little consequence as McCandless continues to 
use nature to define himself in some way. Further, what is interesting is that McCan-
dless constructs his identity both because of nature, and in spite of humanity. It is 
McCandless’s relationship with his parents which provides some indication of his love 
affair with nature, and how he uses nature, not only for the purposes of self-discipline, 
but also for self-repair. 
McCandless’s introduction into the world, as with most individuals, is through his 
parents. However, his relationship with his parents, as both Penn’s film and Krakauer’s 
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book show, cannot be described as being one of complete happiness. This may be due to 
McCandless’s vehement disapproval of the life lessons his parents seemed to be advo-
cating. In Penn’s film McCandless characterises his relationship with his parents by 
reciting the poem “I Go Back to May 1937” to his sister, Carine, on their way to 
McCandless’s graduation lunch with their parents: 
they are about to graduate, they are about to get married, 
they are kids, they are dumb, all they know is they are 
innocent, they would never hurt anybody. 
I want to go up to them and say Stop, 
don’t do it – she’s the wrong woman, 
he’s the wrong man, you are going to do things 
you cannot imagine you would ever do, 
you are going to do bad things to children, 
you are going to suffer in ways you have not heard of, 
you are going to want to die (Olds 10-19). 
The poem is apt in the manner in which it serves as a reflection of McCandless’s atti-
tude towards his parents. Based on his recitation of the poem, McCandless feels his 
parents to be the type to inflict “bad things” upon him. These “bad things”, as Penn’s 
film depicts, are partly characterised by McCandless’s parents’ inability to provide a 
stable and safe environment into which their son may grow. This sentiment is expressed 
overtly in a scene in which we witness McCandless role-playing a dialogue between his 
parents (Penn). McCandless recites his father talking to his mother: 
‘No, Billie. I told you once. Don’t make me tell you again. Okay? Okay? 
You hear me? You hear me, woman? You hear me, woman? Huh? You hear 
me, woman?’ 
McCandless recites his mother’s response: 
‘Sorry. Sorry, Walt. I’m sorry.’ 
It is this abusive behaviour which has characterised the McCandless household, and 
McCandless’s willingness to recite it shows that Penn is of the opinion that McCandless 
has both internalised it, and is attempting to purge himself of its pathological side ef-
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fects. Also, the Olds poem McCandless recites in the film indicates that the narrator is 
imagining a time in which her parents graduated and started their adult life together. 
McCandless is at precisely the same point in his life as the narrator’s parents, and, based 
on his recitation of the poem, he reasons that it is the point in his life at which drastic 
changes are necessary if catastrophe and unhappiness are to be avoided. McCandless 
has decided that materialism is the cause of the rupturing core around which his family 
revolves. 
In a scene in which McCandless is having lunch with his parents, after having just 
graduated, his parents suggest buying him a new car (Penn). McCandless responds: 
I don’t need a new car. I don’t want a new car. … These things, things, 
things, things. 
It is in these lines in which McCandless displays an unremitting disgust in the material 
goods that surround him, and that his parents think he needs. Further, his repetition of 
the word “things” suggests, firstly, the abundance of the materiality which surrounds 
him, and, secondly, given the word’s loose applicability to anything, also implies that 
which is not meaningful or substantial. McCandless’s antidote to this materiality, it 
seems, may be deduced from the literature which has inspired him to embark on his 
journey. 
Among the books found among McCandless’s remains was Henry David Thoreau’s 
Walden (Krakauer 67). Within the book was found the following highlighted passage: 
Rather than love, than money, than fame, give me truth. I sat at a table 
where were rich food and wine in abundance, and obsequious attendance, 
but sincerity and truth were not; and I went away hungry from the inhospi-
table board. The hospitality was as cold as the ices (Thoreau Walden and 
Other Writings 348). 
Indeed, at the beginning of Penn’s film we are told that McCandless gave all the money 
in his bank account to charity, and we also witness him burning money on the road be-
fore he makes his trek to Alaska. Material wealth, then, to McCandless, is seen as an 
evil and malign hindrance on his path to spiritual and moral enlightenment. Interest-
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ingly, when McCandless sets off for Alaska, he not only burns his money, but is shown 
cutting up any cards on which his identity is imprinted. Thus, McCandless, somewhat 
literally, loses his identity. It is to Alaska that McCandless turns to escape humanity, 
and he perceives Alaska as a canvas onto which he can paint and repair his identity. It is 
Roderick Nash who explains with greater articulation why people look to the wilderness 
as a means of healing: 
Wilderness appealed to those bored or disgusted with man and his works. It 
not only offered an escape from society but also was an ideal stage for the 
Romantic individual to exercise the cult that he frequently made of his own 
soul. The solitude and total freedom of the wilderness created a perfect set-
ting for either melancholy or exultation (47). 
Thus, like his British forefathers, McCandless uses a seemingly blank canvas as a 
means of constructing a new persona, a persona of which humanity is not a part. Timo-
thy Treadwell uses Alaska in similar ways. 
Herzog ponders at the reason why Treadwell (like McCandless) chooses to become 
lost in the wild: 
What drove Timothy into the wild? We visited his parents in Florida. Timo-
thy grew up with four siblings in Long Island in a solid middle class family 
where the father worked as the foreman of a construction team for a tele-
phone company. There must have been an urge to escape the safety of his 
protected environment (Herzog Grizzly Man). 
Treadwell’s father explains that Treadwell “change[d] his name to Treadwell to be the-
atrical, and it was a family name” (Herzog Grizzly Man). Coincidently, McCandless 
changed his name to something quite similar: Alexander Supertramp (Krakauer 22-23; 
Penn). The “Alexander” part may be inspired by one of the characters from the copious 
amount of Russian literature that McCandless has read. The “Supertramp” part is likely 
to have come from The Autobiography of a Super-Tramp, written by Welsh poet W. H. 
Davies. It is in this book in which the author provides an account of his journeys, not 
only throughout America, but across the world, living an adventurous vagrant life 
(Davies), a life which may have inspired McCandless to do the same. It seems that both 
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McCandless and Treadwell have chosen names for themselves which establish their 
deep physical connection to their environments as both their names have perambulatory 
connotations. Most importantly, though, the changing of their names signifies a need for 
a change of identity. Their newfound identities are implicated in their willingness to 
tramp and tread both into new environments and out of others. 
In the case of Treadwell, when Herzog interviews his parents, they reveal facts about 
their dead son which help us understand why he was so intent on leaving humanity, 
which Treadwell’s father supposes was due to his unsuccessful pursuits in the human 
world. Treadwell’s father explains: 
And he tested with the actors to get the bartender job on Cheers. And alleg-
edly he came in second to Woody Harrelson. How close a second? I don’t 
know. But that is what really destroyed him (Herzog Grizzly Man). 
Also, while confessing to his camera, Treadwell admits to not having much success 
with women in sexual relationships: “I always cannot understand why girls don’t wanna 
be with me for a long time, because I really have a nice personality”. In a scene that fol-
lows shortly thereafter, Treadwell can be seen confiding in Iris, a fox: 
I used to drink to the point of, erm, that I guess I was either going to die 
from it, or break free of it. … I did everything that I could to try not to 
drink, and then I did everything that I could to drink, and it was killing me, 
until I discovered this land of bears, and realised that they were in such, 
such great danger that they needed a caretaker. They needed someone to 
look after them, but not a drunk person, not a person messed up (author’s 
italics). 
In not being able to find success both in love and his career, Treadwell has not managed 
to comply with the constructs of the human world, and has, therefore, developed con-
structs for himself by which he is able to live. Thus, Treadwell turned to nature to gain a 
sense of purpose and has used nature to construct a reason for him to be alive. Tread-
well’s anthropomorphic understanding of nature, then, is that it is beautiful, but in need 
of protection, which necessitates his constructed persona as nature’s “caretaker”. Na-
ture, by Treadwell’s own initiation, has given him an identity. 
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The identities of both Chris McCandless and Timothy Treadwell are reliant on an an-
thropomorphically constructed idea of nature which, for both men, is self-serving. When 
discussing the relationship between nature and morality, I was critical of McCandless as 
he constructed his sense of morality in spite of culture and because of nature, which, 
ironically, was a sense of morality which relied on cultural constructs of nature to be 
formulated. The same is true both for Treadwell and McCandless here. They both use 
cultural constructs of nature (whereby nature is perceived as pure, spiritually fulfilling 
and enlightening) in order to formulate an identity that resists any kind of human influ-
ence. Thus, the same ironies are at play. Herzog, Krakauer and Penn, however, point to 
other criticisms regarding their respective protagonists’ interpretations of nature. 
These artists seem to criticise Treadwell and McCandless, respectively, for journey-
ing too far into the wild. They had confided in, and relied so extensively on, nature in 
constructing their lives that Herzog, Krakauer and Penn seem to say that, as a result, 
their subjects began hating humanity, which, ultimately, led to their respective deaths. 
In the case of Penn’s Into the Wild, as has been shown in the previous chapter, Penn 
makes the case that McCandless had driven himself so far from society, and so far into 
nature, that it was McCandless’s lack of knowledge of nature, which came as a result of 
his extreme immersion into nature, that resulted in his death. 
In the case of Treadwell, Herzog, when commenting on Treadwell’s documentary 
footage, makes the claim that he 
discovered a film of human ecstasies and darkest inner turmoil, as if there 
was a desire in [Treadwell] to leave the confines of his humanness and bond 
with the bears. Treadwell reached out, seeking a primordial encounter. But 
in doing so, he crossed an invisible border line (Herzog Grizzly Man). 
Indeed, Treadwell corroborates this in a letter he sent to his friend, ecologist Marnie 
Gaede, in which he states that he needed to “‘mutually mutate into a wild animal to 
handle the life I live out here’”. Thus, Treadwell’s death gives strong evidence to sug-
gest that perhaps Herzog’s criticism of Treadwell stands on good ground. Treadwell’s 
relationship with the bears, which was close both emotionally and spatially, can hardly 
be described as accidental. Even though his intention was to mutate into a bear, he, ul-
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timately, could never do this, and this kind of anti-anthropomorphism, or, perhaps, re-
verse-anthropomorphism, proved to be the reason for his downfall. 
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Chapter 4 
Romanticism 
He thought about himself, and the whole earth, 
Of man the wonderful, and of the stars, 
And how the deuce they ever could have birth; 
And then he thought of earthquakes and of wars, 
How many miles the moon might have in girth, 
Of air-balloons, and of the many bars 
To perfect knowledge of the boundless skies; 
And then he thought of Donna Julia’s eyes (Byron Canto 1, stanza 92). 
An Introduction 
Among the core characteristics of most Romantic artists, like the pastoralists who pre-
ceded them, is their affinity for employing nature as the central subject of their poetry, 
prose and paintings. While I will be drawing on the works of Ruskin, Blake, Rousseau, 
Darwin and Swift, amongst many others, to give a sense of Romanticism, it is possible 
that there may be difficulty in classifying many of these artists and thinkers as Roman-
tics in the purist sense of the term. Conversely, it would also be unwise to deny these 
artists’ and thinkers’ artistic and philosophical contributions to Romanticism as a whole, 
no matter how tangential their affiliations to the era may appear. However, what con-
cerns me most about these artists and thinkers is not their classification to Romanticism, 
per se, but their contribution to Romanticism’s use and theorisation of anthropomor-
phism. That art is a medium whereby an understanding of the universe is filtered 
through the human mind means that Romantic artists were by no means an exception in 
the practise of assigning human qualities onto nature. However, the Romantics, espe-
cially John Ruskin, displayed a great deal of sensitivity to this tendency to personify 
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nature. Ruskin was among the first of the Romantics to formalise and theorise about the 
anthropomorphisation of nature. Ruskin referred to the assignation of human qualities 
onto things clearly not human (such as natural structures, animals, manmade objects, 
and so forth) as the ‘pathetic fallacy’. However, Ruskin also recognised four different 
classifications of this fallacy, or four different types of poet who commit this fallacy: 
“the men who feel nothing, and therefore see truly; the men who feel strongly, think 
weakly, and see untruly (second order of poets); the men who feel strongly, think 
strongly, and see truly (first order of poets); and the men who, strong as human crea-
tures can be, are yet submitted to influences stronger than they, and see in a sort untruly, 
because what they see is inconceivably above them” (209). Being able to see truly or 
untruly, for Ruskin, depended on the artist’s awareness in committing this fallacy, and, 
based on Ruskin’s classification, those who make their awareness of their use of the fal-
lacy apparent make for better poets. Indeed, those artists who are unaware of their use 
of this fallacy are described by Ruskin as possessing a “morbid state of mind, and com-
paratively of a weak one” (218). This describes an artist whose emotions have gotten 
the better of her, and, as a result, produces lesser art because she is unable to see the 
truth within nature (205). It is only under these conditions where the fallacy committed 
by the poet is described as “pathetic” by Ruskin. However, as Abrams and Harpham 
warn us, “Ruskin’s contention would make just about all poets, including Shakespeare, 
‘morbid’” (242), and that the term ‘pathetic fallacy’ is now generally used “as a neutral 
name for a procedure in which human traits are ascribed to natural objects in a way that 
is less formal and more indirect than in the figure called personification” (242 author’s 
italics). Thus, contemporary critics generally ignore the morbid aspect of the pathetic 
fallacy, which is the way I intend to use it here. 
Ruskin was not the only Romantic to consider the anthropomorphic tendency of art. 
Indeed, Blake, in his poem, “A Fly”, highlights the problems of thinking of animals in 
human terms: 
Am not I 
A fly like thee? 
Or art thou not 
A man like me? (5-8) 
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In this poem Blake considers, firstly, the possibility that humans are merely extensions 
of nature, and, secondly, the possibility that nature may have more human attributes 
than previously considered, which shows Blake deliberately confusing the boundaries 
that define human and animal ontology. This issue of anthropomorphism (or, in some 
cases, as evidenced by Blake, reverse-anthropomorphism) is one of the major philoso-
phical strands which is, at least, latent in all Romantic works that ponder the 
relationship between humanity and nature. It is this relationship between these two phe-
nomena which has made itself apparent in both Romantic aesthetics and Romantic 
philosophy. 
One of the major philosophical contributors to Romanticism, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
based much of his arguments on the nature of nature, that is, to be sure, on his an-
thropomorphised understanding of nature. Rousseau, commenting on the culture of the 
time in which he was writing, made the claim that society is corrupt due to the gross 
amount of inequality that is harboured in society. Rousseau distinguishes between two 
types of inequality: “natural or Physical [inequality], [which is so termed] because it is 
established by Nature” and is brought about by the seemingly unavoidable tolls that na-
ture takes on the body through natural processes such as aging or illness (Rousseau 138) 
and “moral, or political inequality”, which describes inequality that is manmade, and 
therefore based on the conventions and constructs inherent in society (Rousseau 131). 
Writing to the King of Poland of the time, King Stanisław Laszczyński, Rousseau 
explains the genealogy of human evil, stating that evil begins with human inequality, 
and “from inequality arose riches … . From riches are born luxury and idleness; from 
luxury arose the fine Arts, and from idleness the Sciences” (45). Thus, Rousseau makes 
the claim that it is the development of science and art which stands as evidence of soci-
ety’s corrupt soul (9). It must be made known, though, that it is only a certain type of art 
and a certain type of science to which Rousseau is referring that he believes are the 
causes of a corrupt society. In reference to art, Rousseau believed that the artists of his 
time were prevented to create anything truly artistic because they were surrounded by 
corrupt morals (19). Also, science, according to Rousseau, “taken abstractly, deserves 
all our admiration. The foolish science of men deserves nothing but derision and con-
tempt” (97). This “foolish science”, as explained before, grew out of idleness, but it is 
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also science which, as it grows and spreads, makes life more convenient, and, in so do-
ing, allows people to become more idle (20). This, then, creates a kind of circle of 
immorality in which time is wasted on seemingly meaningless pursuits. 
Science as a meaningless task was a view popular at the time, as can be seen in Jona-
than Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, written just over two decades before Rousseau 
published his “First Discourse”. In the novel, Swift, who is strictly not a Romantic but 
occasionally exhibits Romantic sentiment, describes how, upon arriving in Laputa, Gul-
liver comes upon a scientist attempting to extract sunbeams from cucumbers: 
The first man I saw was of a meagre aspect, with sooty hands and face, his 
hair and beard long, ragged and singed in several places. His clothes, shirt, 
and skin were all of the same colour. He had been eight years upon a project 
for extracting sun-beams out of cucumbers, which were to be put in vials 
hermetically sealed, and let out to warm the air in raw inclement summers. 
He told me he did not doubt in eight years more he should be able to supply 
the Governor’s gardens with sunshine, at a reasonable rate; but he com-
plained that his stock was low, and entreated me to give him something as 
an encouragement to ingenuity, especially since this had been a very dear 
season for cucumbers. I made him a small present, for my lord had fur-
nished me with money on purpose, because he knew their practice of 
begging from all who go to see them (165-66). 
Satirised, this scientific experiment is presented as being utterly futile. Science is por-
trayed as an endeavour in which time and money are lost into a black hole where there 
are no returns. With “sooty hands and face”, scientists are seen as society’s dirt, just as 
Rousseau saw them. The difference between the two authors, however, lies in the tone 
of Swift’s satirical humour as opposed to Rousseau’s earnest seriousness, the signifi-
cance of which is that, for Rousseau, the ‘evil’ of science presents a more dire threat to 
humanity’s existence than Swift would suggest. However, it is both science and art, for 
Rousseau, which renders a society corrupt, and it is a corrupt society which stands in 
contrast to the moral purity of nature in which inequality does not exist (159). 
In claiming that people should live a life of less convenience and, therefore, live a 
life closer to nature, Rousseau contains his statement by making it clear that he does not 
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mean to live a life with no conveniences at all. Rousseau claims that he “[does] not sug-
gest reducing men to making do with the bare necessities” (84). It is still hard, though, 
to pinpoint exactly where a life of excessive convenience begins and ends for Rousseau. 
Regardless of this, Rousseau remains adamant that nature is humanity’s salvation, espe-
cially in its ability to curb the evils of science: “Peoples, know, then, once and for all, 
that nature wanted to preserve you from science as a mother snatches a dangerous 
weapon from the hands of her child; that all the secrets she hides from you are so many 
evils from which she protects you, and that the difficulty you have in learning is not the 
least of her favours” (14). Rousseau likens nature to a mother, which is telling of Rous-
seau’s understanding of nature, which he sees as that from which we may come to learn 
morality. Humanity, of course, is the child who lacks any moral intelligence and must 
be taught right from wrong. However, the most provocative metaphor Rousseau uses is 
his portrayal of science as a “dangerous weapon”, implying that nature (as a mother) 
“hides” evils from humanity, and in so doing “protects” humanity. This, of course, gives 
the impression that ‘nature knows best’, that humanity, given free reign, would become 
corrupt because it does not have moral knowledge, and that the secrets we would dis-
cover in the universe would lead us to become corrupt. It is not only the personification 
of nature as “mother” which shows Rousseau’s anthropomorphic view of nature, but 
also his view of nature as the source of all good moral knowledge. However, Rousseau 
unwittingly, and ironically, taints nature by assigning human qualities to it, thus taking 
away nature’s ‘purity’, which is why he valued it to begin with. 
Rousseau sees nature as a space in which no vice can ever exist. Inequality can only 
exist in the human world, where humans are flawed and have the propensity for evil. 
However, ironically, with the aid of science, we are able to notice the flaws in Rous-
seau’s argument. In his book, The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins, discussing 
selfishness, points out that, in one particular species of ant, the honey-pot ants, members 
of that species use other members of the same species, essentially, as slaves: “In the 
‘honey-pot’ ants there is a caste of workers with grotesquely swollen, food-packed ab-
domens, whose sole function in life is to hang motionless from the ceiling like bloated 
light-bulbs, being used as food stores by the other workers. In the human sense they do 
not live as individuals at all; their individuality is subjugated, apparently to the welfare 
of the community” (181). What is significant about this example is that it shows direct 
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evidence against Rousseau’s claim that nature is the site of pristine and pure morality. 
The ants “subjugate” members of their own community and so are treating them, essen-
tially, as slaves. Rousseau’s anthropomorphic reading of nature, then, proves to be very 
selective as he fallaciously generalises a very specific aspect of nature to the whole of 
nature. Further, unlike Dawkins’s reading of nature “In the human sense”, Rousseau’s 
reading of nature lacks an awareness of his anthropomorphisation of nature, which may 
have contributed to Rousseau’s inability to recognise that there is more than one way to 
read nature. Indeed, that there are several ways of interpreting nature, many of which 
are contradictory, is testament to the fact that a single person’s anthropomorphic inter-
pretation of nature says more about the interpreter than about the thing being 
interpreted. However, despite Rousseau’s flawed perception of nature, his influence on 
the Romantic psyche cannot be ignored. 
Just as Rousseau believed that nature was the greatest teacher of life and morality 
(98), so, too, did many Romantics believe the same thing. For example, Wordsworth, in 
his “Tintern Abbey”, states the following: 
well pleased to recognise 
In nature and the language of the sense 
The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse, 
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul 
Of all my moral being (Collected Poems 107-11). 
It is clear here that Wordsworth perceives nature as the source of all moral knowledge. 
It is that which is able to give him moral guidance. As a result of this stance, Words-
worth advocates living a life closer to nature, and, for Wordsworth, this meant living in 
a rural space. In his preface to his Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth argued that he had cho-
sen the “Low and rustic life” in his poetry precisely because “in that condition the 
essential passions of the heart find a better soil in which they can attain their maturity, 
are less under restraint, and speak a plainer and more emphatic language; … and, lastly, 
because in that condition the passions of men are incorporated with the beautiful and 
permanent forms of nature” (Complete Poetical Works 7). It is apparent, though, that 
not all thinkers during the Romantic era viewed nature in such warm and inviting ways. 
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In his Origin of the Species, Darwin, who has contributed greatly to the latter end of 
Romantic philosophy without himself carrying the Romantic label, manages to chal-
lenge these views of nature as a site of moral goodness. By explaining the brutal 
struggle of survival between species, Darwin, with scientific accuracy, contradicted the 
popular notion that nature was the site of all moral virtue, and, essentially, implied that 
nature could also be read to be vicious. This view of nature was shared by poets such as 
Tennyson who, in the fifty-fifth verse of his “In Memoriam”, called nature “red in tooth 
and claw” (15), and the Marquis de Sade (reiterated here by his disciple, Algernon 
Charles Swinburne) who questioned those who found nature to be the site of moral pu-
rity: “Nature averse to crime? I tell you nature lives and breathes by it; hungers at all her 
pores for bloodshed, aches in all her nerves for the help of sin, yearns with all her heart 
for the furtherance of cruelty” (158). 
It may be apparent that these anthropomorphic readings of nature, as was the case 
with Rousseau, explain, not nature, but the person attempting to describe nature. It may 
be argued, then, that in providing such readings of nature, the Romantics made an at-
tempt to explore, not nature, but the self through nature. Thus, when Wordsworth, in his 
sonnet, “XIV”, writes “With how sad steps, O Moon, thou climbest the sky, / How si-
lently, and with how wan a face!” (Poetical Works 1-2) it is apparent that the sadness is 
not the moon’s, but Wordsworth’s, who is anthropomorphising the moon as a means of 
self-exploration and self-understanding. This is a use of nature that may not be self-
aware, but Coleridge, like Ruskin, as mentioned before, is one such Romantic poet who 
was certainly conscious of the implications of his actions every time he translated nature 
into language: “In looking at objects of Nature while I am thinking, as at yonder moon 
dimglimmering thro’ the dewy window-pane, I seem rather to be seeking, as it were 
asking, a symbolical language for something within me that already and forever exists, 
than observing any thing new. Even when that latter is the case, yet still I have always 
an obscurecure feeling as if that new phenomenon were the dim Awaking of a forgotten 
or hidden Truth of my inner Nature” (Coleridge 2546 author’s italics). However, that 
the Romantics explored nature for the purposes of self-exploration should not be read as 
a cynical indication that the Romantics did not express any care for nature. This is the 
argument made by Jonathan Bate of Wordsworth, an argument that could possibly be 
generalised to many other Romantics as well. 
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Making reference to the eighth book of Wordsworth’s “The Prelude” Bate explains 
that “[Wordsworth] is not interested in the shepherd but in what the shepherd provides 
him by way of both inspiration and admonition” (Bate Romantic Ecology 30). Bate also 
points out that the point of the eighth book is that “love of nature leads to love of man-
kind” (Bate Romantic Ecology 31). It seems, then, that this utilitarian love for nature 
acts only as an anthropocentric means of developing a love for humanity. However, 
Bate defends Wordsworth by stating that the high quality of life that Wordsworth is try-
ing to achieve “is dependent on integration with, not subjugation of, nature” (Bate 
Romantic Ecology 33). This love of nature is also expressed in several instances of Ro-
mantic art. For example, William Cowper, who, in “Book VI” of “The Task”, states that 
he would not consider a friend “the man / Who needlessly sets foot upon a worm” (563-
64). Coleridge, in his “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, describes the Mariner’s kill-
ing of an albatross in value-laden anthropomorphic diction: “‘With his cruel bow he 
lay’d full low / The harmless Albatross’” (122-23). Also, in Coleridge’s “To a Young 
Ass” he expresses a sense of camaraderie with nature when, addressing the young ass, 
he exclaims “I hail thee Brother” (Poetical Works 26). Thus, that the Romantics used 
nature to explore the self may only be half the story, as in so doing the Romantics ex-
pressed a care for nature and often regarded nature’s denizens as their ontological 
equals. This is the quality that characterised many Romantic works from poet and 
painter alike, and are qualities which found their way across the Pond and have been 
adopted by many American artists, especially those working during the nineteenth cen-
tury. 
One of the great cultural imports the New World adopted from the Romantics was a 
love of nature. Certainly, much of the Americans’ love of nature came as a result of 
their need to establish a new identity as a new nation, not only independent of Europe, 
but better than Europe. As a result, records circa 1700 showed that Americans were in-
tent on using nature as a means of certifying their greatness. For example, “[Thomas] 
Jefferson, on a visit to [French naturalist Count Georges] Buffon, dismissed European 
ungulates such as reindeer as puny alongside the New World’s moose, pointing out that 
the former could easily pass under the latter’s belly” (Coates 105). Also, the Americans 
used the giant sequoias and redwoods, “the biggest faunal representatives on earth (and 
an American world exclusive)”, as indicative of their greatness as a nation (Coates 105). 
92 
However, despite the occasional belief that American nature was better than European 
nature, what remained the same was a great and sincere care for nature, which, during 
the 1800s, especially manifested itself in American literature. Indeed, even in American 
Romanticism the kinds of metaphors and meanings assigned to nature greatly resembled 
those of the European Romantics. Certainly, the relationship between nature and moral-
ity is a clear example of this. 
While specifically classified as American transcendentalists, Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and Henry David Thoreau contributed greatly to American Romanticism as well. Emer-
son and Thoreau’s understanding that nature may be equated with moral goodness has 
already been established in Chapter 3. However, the following quote by Thoreau is not 
significant solely because of its stance on the relationship between nature and morality, 
but is interesting also because of what we may come to know of Thoreau’s anthropo-
morphic understanding of the relationship between nature and art more broadly:  
May we not see God? Are we to be put off and amused in this life, as it were 
with a mere allegory? Is not Nature, rightly read, that of which she is com-
monly taken to be the symbol merely? (Concord and Merrimack 403 
author’s italics) 
Certainly, Thoreau is reading nature in moral terms, but what is equally important is that 
the above quote shows Thoreau’s wilful anthropomorphism. Thus, when Thoreau sug-
gests that nature can be “read”, or that it may be taken as a “symbol”, the author 
highlights his propensity to seeing nature as that which stands for something, as op-
posed to seeing nature in and of itself. This bears little difference to the way in which 
the European Romantics anthropomorphised nature, who, with some exceptions, also 
did so with little or no self-awareness. Reading nature in such anthropomorphic terms 
was not unique to Emerson or Thoreau, but can be found in a slew of other American 
Romantics as well. Thus, in “I Sing the Body Electric”, when Whitman writes that he 
sees his “soul reflected in Nature” (71), or when Emily Dickinson compares a mountain 
to a “Grandfather” (7) and the seasons to “children” (6) in her poem numbered 
“LXXII”, it is evident that reading nature in human terms, as is evident in European 
Romanticism, was fairly ubiquitous amongst American Romantics. Also, when compar-
ing these New World Romantics to their European cousins, it is evident that they 
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resembled each other in the type of anthropomorphisms used in their works. Thus, na-
ture was sentimentalised in similar ways. 
Like their predecessors, the American Romantics imbued nature with a sense of 
kindness, serenity, order and purpose. Certainly, poets such as Henry Wadsworth Long-
fellow occasionally showed the darkness within nature, especially in a poem such as 
“Nature” in which nature is that which “Leads us to rest” (11), but, in the same breath, 
acts as “a fond mother” (1), much in the same way that Rousseau, as described earlier, 
maternalised nature. In an equally Rousseau-like maternal and sentimentalised tone, 
there is the work of Emily Dickinson who, in her poem numbered “I”, believes nature to 
be “the gentlest mother” (1) who supplies humanity with “infinite affection / And in-
finiter care” (21-22). However, while many of these writers and poets I have linked to 
American Romanticism had some temporal overlap with their European counterparts, it 
is evident that they were writing at a time when European Romanticism was dwindling, 
that is, around the 1850s (Yorke 18). Thus, while it may be argued that the birth of Neo-
Romanticism kept the flame of Romanticism burning in Europe during the Second 
World War (Hockenhull 21), it is Romanticism ‘proper’ which was practised by Ameri-
can poets such as Robert Frost during the first half of the twentieth century. This 
endurance of the genre may be attributed to the European settlers gradually coming to 
feel at home in the American landscape. This prominence of American Romanticism 
during the beginning of the twentieth century may also have contributed greatly to 
America’s love of the natural landscape in contemporary American culture, the likes of 
which we are only beginning to see in contemporary American film. Indeed, the influ-
ence of American Romanticism, and Romanticism more generally, is evident in my 
primary filmic texts, especially in the films’ use of Romantic aesthetics, namely, the 
picturesque, the beautiful and the sublime, to which I now turn and attempt to describe. 
One of the major contributors to our understanding of the beautiful and the sublime 
is Immanuel Kant. Kant describes the beautiful thus: “The beautiful in nature is a ques-
tion of the form of the object, and this consists in limitation [and the beautiful] seems to 
be regarded as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of understanding” (Judgement 
61). The understanding, for Kant, is the part of the mind, along with the senses, which 
enables us to compare and combine concepts with each other, thereby giving rise to 
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knowledge of that object (Pure Reason 79). Thus, when Kant shows that the beautiful 
relates to the understanding, what he means is that objects that are termed beautiful are 
objects, under normal circumstances, which one may determine as being universally 
beautiful (Judgement 56-57). This implies a kind of objective aesthetic evaluation, and 
is one which differs in many ways to that of the sublime. 
It is interesting that Kant claims that the theoretical underpinnings of the sublime are 
“not nearly so important or rich in consequences as the concept of the Beautiful” 
(Judgement 63). Despite this, however, Kant infuses his conceptualisation of the sub-
lime with rich complexity. Kant shows that there are two kinds of sublime: the 
mathematical sublime and the dynamically sublime. The sublime, overall, however, can 
be found “in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by 
its presence provokes a representation of timelessness, yet with a super-added thought 
of its totality [and the sublime is] a presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason” 
(Kant Judgement 61). For Kant, then, part of understanding the sublime is also to under-
stand how it relates to reason. The mathematical sublime is characterised by reason’s 
superiority over nature, and, by extension, its superiority over the imagination 
(Judgement 66), which allows us to understand stimuli from the world through our 
senses (Pure Reason 87). Thus, when we are faced with an object so large that the 
imagination is unable to contain or understand it, it is reason, because of its ability to 
conceptualise infinity, that surpasses our senses so that we may come to understand it. 
In terms of the dynamically sublime, Kant states that instances of nature may be con-
sidered such when we are able to perceive nature as a force that “has no dominion over 
us” (Judgement 74). Kant explains that the dynamically sublime in nature comes into 
effect when nature provokes in a human subject a sense of fear without the object exhib-
iting any real reason for the human subject to fear it (Judgement 74). It is important to 
note, however, that, in relation to both the mathematical and dynamic sublime, Kant 
showed that calling an object in nature sublime was not strictly correct, as the sublime 
“does not reside in anything of nature, but only in our mind” (Judgement 77). Examples 
of objects which may be considered sublime, for Kant, are those in which we are able to 
perceive nature’s might, which include volcanoes, cliffs and hurricanes (Judgement 75). 
However, while Kant offers great insight into his ideas of the beautiful and the sublime, 
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it is Edmund Burke’s definition of the same concepts which are much more obvious in 
their description of these aesthetics. 
Burke, like Kant, defines the beautiful and the sublime in relation to the other, allow-
ing us to see these terms dialectically. For Burke, beautiful objects are those which are 
“small” (237), and, further, “beauty should be smooth and polished” (237) and should 
“shun the right line” (237). In opposition to this, some of the main proponents of the 
sublime, for Burke, are: vastness (127), infinity (129), magnitude (136) and magnifi-
cence (140). Also, astonishment is that aspect of the sublime which has the greatest 
emotional impact on the viewer (95). Referring to the spiritual aspects of the sublime, 
Burke claims that “astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are 
suspended, with some degree of horror” (95). However, this degree of horror can only 
be sustained if the object being viewed is, to a degree, obscured, by, for example, dark-
ness (145), because, according to Burke, “When we know the full extent of any danger, 
when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes” (99). It 
is also for this reason that Burke describes eternity and infinity as sublime attributes be-
cause, as Burke reasons, “perhaps there is nothing of which we really understand so 
little” (105). Burke also reasons that the sublime effect can be found mostly in wild na-
ture as it evokes a sense of danger in the observer (155-56). It is through these 
definitions of the sublime and the beautiful, of which Burke’s will take precedence in 
this chapter, that we may come to an understanding of the picturesque.  
The picturesque is an aesthetic that takes its inspiration not as much from nature as it 
does from pictures based on nature (Trott 73). As a result, the picturesque aesthetic 
“claims both to imitate, and to correct” nature (Trott 73). It is the picturesque that is 
somewhat of a hybrid between the beautiful and the sublime, and often uses landscapes 
as the subject of its image, or, more specifically, eighteenth-century gardening (Trott 
74). However, because of the “meticulously ordered gardens at Versailles, so attractive 
to the Enlightenment mind, [most Romantics] turned to the unkempt forest” (Nash 47). 
In Malick, Herzog’s and Penn’s respective films, then, it is mostly wild nature which 
these directors place under scrutiny. These artists also use typical Romantic aesthetics 
of the beautiful and sublime in their cinematography, occasionally for the purposes of 
irony, and, sometimes, to bring to our attention the current ecological crisis. 
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Figure 6: Herzog Encounters at the End of the World 
The Sublime in Herzog’s Encounters and Grizzly Man 
The sublime is the most overt Romantic trope which has dominated almost every frame 
of Herzog’s documentaries, particularly the ones discussed in this dissertation. How-
ever, it is a trope which has influenced not only his artistic choices, but his personal 
views of nature as well. Herzog’s reliance and championing of the sublime may be seen 
in the very first scene of his Encounters at the End of the World. 
Herzog’s opening narration to the film informs us that the images are of Antarctica. 
However, the images we see do not suggest this at all. The film’s first scene defamil-
iarises Antarctica. It is in this way that Herzog challenges popular images and, indeed, 
popular films, of the continent. What we typically see in filmic depictions of Antarctica 
involves vast white landscapes covered in snow, such as in the popular March of the 
Penguins (Jacquet). However, Herzog inverts his viewers’ expectations by first present-
ing Antarctica’s technicolour seascape, as opposed to its monochromatic landscape. 
Part of this defamiliarisation of Antarctica is based on our terrestrial makeup. As terres-
trial beings we often forget that life also happens elsewhere, and not just on solid 
ground. Thus, in presenting us with an image of the ocean, from within the ocean, we 
are poised for a (re)new(ed) Antarctica by going beneath its surface, as it were. 
Herzog’s opening shot 
displays an image of the 
ocean shot just below Ant-
arctica’s icy surface (as 
may be seen in Figure 6). 
However, the whitish 
brown of the ice (shot 
from underneath) gives the 
impression of clouds, the 
bluish layer just beneath this seems like the sky, and the brown at the bottom is, of 
course, earth. Thus, with the ice above our heads, as opposed to beneath our feet, we are 
presented with a defamiliarised and inverted Antarctica. 
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Herzog’s realisation of a defamiliarised continent is reliant on a centuries-old tech-
nique: the sublime. Specifically, Herzog emphasises an aspect of the sublime, the 
unknown, which comes into effect by depriving our senses. The image is dark as the 
only source of light comes from the sporadic shafts of sunlight cutting through solid 
white clouds of ice. This limits what we are able to see below the ice, creating a sense of 
mystery about this environment. The camera moves steadily through the water, some-
times stopping to focus on small but indistinguishable objects dangling from the ice 
ceiling. The camera (and, by proxy, the viewer) is searching for something. Anthropo-
morphically speaking, with this seascape offering nothing particularly unique or special 
(at least from what we can see from the selected information given to us by the camera), 
we realise that what we are searching for is nothing specific. Instead, what we are 
searching for is, essentially, what we have already found, the seascape itself. However, 
we continue observing despite this. The camera moves around this space for approxi-
mately forty seconds, and with each passing second we come to realise that this is an 
environment, a space, which does not have any trace of humanity, save for Herzog’s 
wandering camera. As was established in Chapter 1, Lefebvre would show that 
Herzog’s lingering camera transforms the environment from a setting into a landscape, 
thereby showing Herzog’s ability to display the landscape’s autonomy. It is through the 
Romantic sublime that Herzog creates this effect. 
Herzog’s panning camera also emphasises the vastness of the area. However, all we 
are able to see in the distance is a deep blackness, giving the viewer a sense of an infi-
nite seascape. This darkness carries with it a sense of mystery and wonder, but also of 
danger. We are unsure what lies within the blackness, making the unknown threatening. 
However, there is also the realisation that we are, in a way, trapped in this environment 
as well. There is the ground below us and the icy sky above, which allows us to feel as 
though our heads are narrowly missing each inverted puffy protrusion while we mean-
der about the environment. The effect this has is one which is quite oppressive and 
claustrophobic, with our only escape a seemingly infinite and foreboding dark hole, 
adding a sense of obscurity and danger. Anthropomorphically speaking, Herzog creates 
a sense that nature is harbouring a malignant force beneath its surface.  
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In the next scene, Herzog takes us out of the water and into the air. We find ourselves 
on a plane with dozens of researchers, who, as Herzog’s narration explains, are travel-
ling to Antarctica. While the camera moves about the inside of the plane, observing the 
passengers reading, working on their laptops, and, mostly, sleeping, Herzog narrates: 
“We flew into the unknown, a seemingly endless void”. Firstly, that they are flying 
“into” the unknown signifies steadfastness in their actions. They are not circumventing 
the landscape, but are submerging themselves in it, and, in a way, are willingly becom-
ing part of it. Further, that they are flying “into” the “unknown” implies an intention, at 
least unconsciously, to make it known, to discover it. However, Herzog utilises Burkean 
sublimity and, specifically, obscurity, to characterise Antarctica as a space, a “void”, in 
which there is nothing. Thus, they are flying into an “unknown” nothing. Burkean ob-
scurity, then, is still at play. The word “endless” also carries the weight of the sublime, 
indicating to the viewer a kind of infinity. Antarctica, then, permeates with an an-
thropomorphised sense of sublime danger in the mystery surrounding it. Herzog, until 
now, has given us the air and the sea of the continent, but we are still unsure of what the 
land looks like. In deliberately omitting this information from us, Herzog presents a 
landscape deeply embedded in the Romantic sublime. 
However, to turn back to the previous quote, Herzog’s use of the word “seemingly” 
is telling. This is a qualifier which signifies caution in that which follows it, forcing us 
to attend to all that comes after. The manner in which Herzog uses the qualifier, though, 
is ambiguous, and enriches the reading of the line. It could be read in at least two ways 
as it may refer either to the adjective “endless” or to the noun “void”. If we are to read it 
as qualifying the word “endless”, it suggests Herzog’s anthropomorphic understanding 
of the landscape as an infinite space. With some difference, a similar thing can be said if 
we are to read “seemingly” as qualifying “void”. That it is seemingly a void signifies 
Herzog’s willingness to recognise and foreground his anthropomorphic view of nature. 
Thus, to describe it as a void, and an infinite void at that, and as a space in which noth-
ing exists, means to describe it as a space in which nothing exists for humans, and to 
realise the rich biological diversity that is prevalent, but not always obvious, throughout 
the landscape. This marks the very few instances in which Herzog becomes aware of his 
anthropomorphic interpretation of nature. Certainly, as has been argued in Chapters 2 
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and 3, in most cases Herzog’s anthropomorphism is distinctly lacking in any kind of 
self-awareness. 
Returning to Herzog’s use of the sublime, it is evident that elements of the Romantic 
sublime are also apparent in the title, Encounters at the End of the World. Firstly, the 
title of the film signifies earth’s last outpost, so to speak, where Herzog places us at the 
planet’s precipice. We are located at the very point at which there is no more place to 
go. It is implied that what exists beyond this place is, as the previous quote has shown, 
an endless void, an eternal and infinite nothingness. However, and more importantly to 
Herzog, the phrase “end of the world” also has apocalyptic connotations, a theme which 
the film explores quite extensively, especially in its latter parts, as Herzog narrates: 
For this and many other reasons, our presence on this planet does not seem 
to be sustainable. Our technical civilization makes us particularly vulner-
able. There is talk all over the scientific community about climate change. 
Many of them agree the end of human life on this earth is assured. Human 
life is part of an endless chain of catastrophes, the demise of the dinosaurs 
being just one of these events. We seem to be next. 
The film takes us to the sublime brink of death, and, as this quote shows, makes the end 
of human life on the planet more terrifying by suggesting its meaninglessness. Thus, the 
title instils in us a sense of danger, both in its implication of a kind of vertigo as we 
stand at the point at which the ground beneath our feet is no more, and in the sense that 
all life on the planet will finally collapse. 
There is also another ambiguity latent within the title, which stems from the word 
“Encounters” (Herzog Encounters). Firstly, the word may refer to Herzog encountering 
the people in Antarctica, the place at the end of the world. His intention of doing this is 
contained in his narration in the first scene in which he states that he plans to intimately 
investigate the psyche of the characters he will meet: “Who were the people I was going 
to meet in Antarctica at the end of the world? What were their dreams?” 
However, while the title may be read as Herzog wanting to encounter human nature 
more generally, it also implies coming into contact with the land itself and the creatures 
that inhabit it. Herzog makes this point in his narration: 
100 
My questions about nature … were different. I told [The National Science 
Foundation] I kept wondering why is it that human beings put on masks or 
feathers to conceal their identity. And why do they saddle horses and feel 
the urge to chase the bad guy? And why is it that certain species of ants keep 
flocks of plant lice as slaves to milk them for droplets of sugar? I asked 
them why is it that a sophisticated animal like a chimp does not utilise infe-
rior creatures. He could straddle a goat and ride off into the sunset. 
Herzog has, therefore, been able to strike a happy medium between culture and nature. 
He seems intent on observing ants and chimps in their own environment, in their own 
place, and on their own terms. However, he also expresses interest in studying humanity 
and their relationship with nature. Herzog recognises, then, the inevitable interaction of 
humans and nature, but is also willing to recognise nature’s integrity in existing without 
the necessity of human definition. However, in Herzog’s two documentaries concerned 
in this dissertation, it is apparent that it is also the artistic representation of nature which 
interests the director. 
In Grizzly Man, we are able to see Herzog’s appreciation of original artistic represen-
tations of nature. The most telling instance of this comes across in a particular scene in 
which Herzog explains Timothy Treadwell’s passionate and methodical approach to his 
filmmaking, which, as Herzog observes, becomes an obsession, and, to a large extent, 
self-obsession, as Treadwell, in his own film, has “himself as the central character” 
(Herzog Grizzly Man). Treadwell becomes obsessed with the filmmaking process and 
recognises that, other than the bears, he is also a protagonist in his film: “There’s going 
to be a number of takes I’m going to do. … We’re going to do several takes of each 
where I’ll do it with the bandana on, maybe a bandana off, maybe two different col-
oured bandanas, some without a bandana, some with the camera being held”. In one 
particular scene in which Treadwell is fussing over the technicalities of his film, he flits 
in and out of the frame, trying to find the best entrance into the scene, which is com-
posed of thick leafy bushes. When Treadwell moves out of view, behind bushes, 
preparing for his big entrance, Herzog leaves us with the image that Treadwell has cre-
ated, an image which invites us to contemplate nature’s mystery. We are presented with 
thousands of green leaves that occupy most of the frame with only a tiny portion of sky 
visible in the top right corner of the frame. In the middle of the frame there is a barely 
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distinguishable path of rocks which Treadwell has used to move in and out of the scene. 
The scene looks chaotic with branches jutting out every which way. However, for a 
brief moment, a wind sweeps across from the right of the screen moving swiftly to the 
left, compelling every leaf of every branch of every bush to point in a singular and uni-
formed direction, giving a false impression of order in the landscape. The wind 
continues, more wildly, to jostle and jolt the bushes in unpredictable directions, counter-
ing the order which passed as quickly as it came. 
While the wind blows through the bushes, Herzog narrates: “In his action-movie 
mode, Treadwell probably did not realise that seemingly empty moments had a strange 
secret beauty. Sometimes images themselves develop their own life, their own mysteri-
ous stardom”. That Herzog describes this scene as a “seemingly empty moment” shows 
his willingness, as an artist, to view nature not merely as a backdrop for action (that is, 
as a setting), but as a subject of film which should be studied with just as much impor-
tance as the humans with which it shares the screen (that is, to observe it as a 
landscape). Indeed, it is when the scene’s only human subject, Treadwell, walks out of 
the shot that Herzog invites us to admire nature as a subject of the narrative. The “mo-
ment” is certainly empty, as Herzog has described it, in the sense that it merely involves 
Treadwell setting up a shot and passing through the set, but is only “seemingly empty” 
as nature takes centre stage showing off its “own mysterious stardom.” 
In another scene we see Treadwell sitting in a field, narrating about his experiences 
with the bears. However, Herzog is not interested in what Treadwell has to say, but is 
more interested in the surprising magic which nature brings to the last few seconds of 
the scene. As Treadwell sits in the grass, after he has finished his monologue, and waits 
for nothing in particular, a fox trots across the screen. Herzog narrates: 
Now the scene seems to be over. But as a filmmaker, sometimes things fall 
into your lap which you couldn’t expect, never even dream of. … There is 
something like an inexplicable magic of cinema. 
Herzog’s fascination with this unique unstaged moment is explained by Herzog in an 
interview with Paul Cronin: “When I look at the postcards in tourist shops and the im-
ages and advertisements that surround us in magazines, or I turn on the television, or if I 
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walk into a travel agency and see those huge posters with that same tedious image of the 
Grand Canyon on them, I truly feel there is something dangerous emerging here. Tele-
vision kills our imagination and what we end up with are worn-out images because of 
the inability of too many people to seek out fresh ones” (66). Further, when speaking 
about the beauty of the environment of Antarctica in his Encounters at the End of the 
World, Herzog claims that “For most of our time here, we had postcard-pretty weather 
conditions. This was frustrating because I loathe the sun both on my celluloid and my 
skin”. That Herzog perceives the “postcard-pretty” images as “frustrating” is testament 
to the kinds of images that Herzog wants to find in this landscape. In the beginning of 
the film, while looking at the sublime underwater images of the Ross Sea, Herzog states 
the following: “These images taken under the ice of the Ross Sea in Antarctica were the 
reason I wanted to go to this continent” (Encounters). It is the look of nature, and how 
the continent appears on film, that interests Herzog most. 
When considering that the Romantics saw sublime images as “dangerous”, it is ironic 
that Herzog claims “postcard-pretty” images as “dangerous” as well. The irony, here, 
comes from the fact that pretty images have nothing at all dangerous about what they 
are depicting. Thus, for Herzog, the kind of danger that these images bring holds politi-
cal weight. However, Herzog’s extensive use of sublime imagery does not necessarily 
imply a love for nature in the same manner in which the Romantics demonstrated a love 
for nature. Indeed, Herzog claims that he should not be considered a Romantic at all 
(Cronin 135-36), and, certainly, his attack on Treadwell’s over-sentimentalisation of 
nature is testament to this point. However, it is clear that Herzog, despite his refusal at 
being labelled a Romantic, certainly appropriates Romanticism’s aesthetic, especially 
that of the sublime, a point made also by Prager (99). However, in being against Ro-
mantic sentiment, but endorsing Romantic aesthetic, Herzog seeks out unusual and 
sublime imagery for entirely different reasons to that of the Romantics. 
Returning to Herzog’s comment on his dislike for beautiful images, in his interview 
with Paul Cronin Herzog likens the effect of these images to the “over-crowding of the 
planet” or “being without memory” (66). Thus, where the Romantics used their artistic 
medium to instil in humanity a greater appreciation for nature, Herzog seeks unique im-
ages (especially sublime ones), not only to propel the artistic medium, but also for the 
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purposes of ensuring humanity’s existence alongside nature. Certainly, with the begin-
ning of Industrialisation, the Romantics had similar sentiments but to a lesser degree, 
only because the decimation of nature was not yet as much a reality as it is now in the 
time in which Herzog directs. Herzog, then, uses the sublime to a greater effect because 
of the urgency of the changing climate. Thus, while it is true that Herzog unknowingly 
anthropomorphises his sublime images in a kind of, at least as Herzog would see it, vi-
cious warning against the dangers of sentimentalising nature, this does not mean that his 
anthropomorphic images are without value. To dismiss Herzog’s use of the sublime 
solely on the grounds of it lacking, for the most part, a sense of self-awareness in its ad-
herence to anthropomorphism would be to lose sight of the fact that Herzog is 
ultimately doing it for the benefit of human-nature relationships. However, whether or 
not Herzog’s use of these particular metaphors for the planet are the best kinds to use 
for this purpose will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
Redefining the Sublime: The New World 
In The New World Terrence Malick is able to redefine the Romantic sublime, and, in so 
doing, manages to redefine a particular kind of anthropomorphic perception of nature. 
Malick utilises sublime imagery predominantly in the final scenes of his film, but instils 
in these images a different meaning to what we have traditionally come to expect from 
sublime images, such as the suggestion of danger or the overwhelming sense of trepida-
tion anticipated from images suggesting death. In the film’s final scene we are presented 
with the death of Pocahontas (or, at that stage of the film, Rebecca). However, the man-
ner in which Malick films the death mimics the Romantic sublime aesthetically, but not 
tonally. 
The scene in which Pocahontas dies begins as Pocahontas is playing a game of hide-
and-seek with her son, Thomas. Mother and child are shot against a backdrop of the 
green hedges of their vast garden; we notice that it is Pocahontas’s turn to seek. How-
ever, Malick manages to make a skilful and subtle change in the game in a scene in 
which it is Thomas’s turn to look for his mother, whom we see hiding from her son. In 
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Figure 7: Three combined stills from Malick’s The New World 
one particular moment of 
this scene, we notice that 
Pocahontas, shot from the 
waist up, is standing in the 
foreground with her back 
to a hedge, smiling as she 
anticipates her son. At the 
same time, we see Thomas 
cautiously walking along 
the long hedge, unknow-
ingly approaching his 
mother (a moment which 
is pieced together in Fig-
ure 7). As soon as 
Pocahontas goes off-
screen, Malick cuts to a 
shaky close-up of Thomas, 
impatiently playing with 
his long sleeves, who be-
gins to call out for his mother, “Mamma!”. As the child continues his search, John 
Rolfe, Pocahontas’s husband, begins to narrate: 
Thirteenth of April, 1616. Dear son, I write this so that some day in the fu-
ture you might understand the circumstance which will be but a far memory 
to you. Your dear mother, Rebecca, fell ill in our outward passage at 
Gravesend. She gently reminded me that all must die. 
Thus, Malick draws parallels between Pocahontas’s death and the game of hide-and-
seek she plays with her son. Death, therefore, is made to seem trivial and ordinary, a 
simple matter which is seamlessly woven into life’s ordinary incidents. 
Further, at the beginning of the scene of Pocahontas’s death, we hear, on the sound-
track, Richard Wagner’s “Vorspiel” to Das Rheingold. The track begins with a low and 
foreboding drone (Wagner). As the track progresses, however, violins gently pierce this 
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deep monotony, softly easing into the presence of the track. By the end of the track, the 
string instruments have taken near-complete control, the monotonous drone only being 
heard in the background, as if the string instruments are using the drone as a pedestal 
upon which to stand. The sound that is created is one that seems chaotic, mad, and fren-
zied, as the string instruments create a sense of euphoria. Since this elated music occurs 
as we witness Pocahontas’s death, the music, then, also acts like the game of hide-and-
seek in that it disarms the severity of the death. Malick seems to portray death not at all 
in its usual guise: sinister, ominous and gloomy. Instead, Malick seems to imbue death 
with a sense of jubilation and excitement.  
After we are made aware of Pocahontas’s death, we are presented with images of Po-
cahontas playing on the bank of a river. Thus, we are given the impression of a spirit at 
play. Pocahontas, shot with a handheld camera, caresses the knots of a tree, and spins 
around as her green dress fans out around her legs. She runs along the river, performing 
cartwheels, constantly moving in and out of the camera’s frame which cannot always 
seem to fully capture her, and tries to keep up with her bursting vitality, which only 
seems to underline the reality of her death. We are also presented with a montage of 
natural images: a bird, shot from below, flying high up in the air; a still river, shot from 
on top of the water, looking onto the bank in the distance; close-ups of a wild stream 
with water gushing over rocky protrusions; the camera moving forward, looking up into 
sun, which is directly overhead, as it cuts through the spaces between a forest’s leaves. 
The images are beautiful and filled with movement. If the camera is not moving, track-
ing these natural subjects, then it is still, capturing the wild movement of its natural 
subject. These images serve to glorify and praise nature. However, regarding the images 
of Pocahontas’s death, and the montage that follows, Malick manages to challenge the 
traditional use of death in the Romantic sublime. 
Romantic artists would often imbue their sublime images with the suggestion of 
death as their human subject faces the danger of nature. Indeed, this is one of the ways 
in which one may read Caspar David Friedrich’s 1817-1818 painting, “Wanderer Above 
the Sea of Fog” (shown in Figure 8). In this painting we observe the human subject at 
the centre of the image with his back facing the viewer as he stares across a foggy 
mountaintop, himself precariously perched on jagged rocks (Friedrich). The subject 
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Figure 8: Friedrich “Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog” 
stands confidently upon the 
rocks, and unwaveringly 
faces the prospect of death. 
However, Malick ap-
proaches death not as 
something foreboding, but 
as an occurrence filled with 
uncontainable delight. 
Death is not something to 
be feared, but something 
which should be embraced, 
perhaps even enjoyed. It is 
in the scene in which we 
are presented with a mon-
tage of nature that Malick 
reworks and challenges 
typical Romantic aesthetics 
(The New World). Malick 
manages to present his au-
dience with images that are, in Romantic terms, beautiful, but undercuts these beautiful 
images with sublime subject matter: death. This reworking of the sublime may also be 
witnessed in the film’s final shot (The New World). 
At the end of this montage of movement in nature, Malick presents the viewer with a 
deceptively still image of large and tall trees. These trees are shot from below with the 
camera positioned at the 
base of the tree, giving one 
the impression that he is 
looking up at the great and 
imposing structure, feeling 
dwarfed in its presence (as 
seen in Figure 9). That the Figure 9: Malick The New World 
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tree is shot from below triangulates the structure, giving the impression that it is sturdy 
and immovable. As a result, the entire structure fills up the screen, the trunk of the tree 
closest to the screen taking up about a quarter of the image (and is placed right at the 
centre of the image), with its canopy, and the leafy canopy of its neighbouring trees, 
taking up much of what is left of the image. This image is sublime in that it takes up all 
of one’s vision (and, therefore, all of one’s mind). The trees occupy so much of the im-
age that they block out an even larger sky. It is an image which overwhelms the viewer 
in its sublime magnificence. 
However, with the benefit of the medium of film (that it is, by definition, a medium 
of moving images) we begin to notice that the trees are swaying, very slightly, from left 
to right. We are first given the impression that we are observing a still image; but as we 
look closer we realise that, with the gentle sway of the trees, the image is not as static as 
we had initially thought. What was once thought of as a sturdy and strong structure, we 
now think of as dangerous and unstable. On the soundtrack, as Wagner’s music has 
faded away, we are able to hear the trees creaking and cracking, as if they are over-
whelmed by their own weight. We are given the impression that if these assumedly 
strong structures were faced with an even stronger wind, they may topple over, creating 
a sense that one is at the site of imminent catastrophe, that is, at the site of potential 
death. 
However, despite Malick creating a sense of nature’s awe and danger, it is when we 
consider the context of these images that we realise that Malick renders death a tooth-
less tiger. Before, it was established that Malick’s view of death is that it is trivial, 
playful, light and joyous. Malick invites us to rethink the ways we perceive death, but, 
because of his use of natural imagery to convey this point, to also rethink the ways we 
perceive nature. Romantics, exemplified by Friedrich, portrayed the sublime by using 
images of nature which suggested the danger of death. However, Malick, in characteris-
ing his sublime images with a sense of euphoria, redefines the anthropomorphic 
perceptions of nature that many Romantics had. Also, in characterising images of na-
ture’s beauty with a sense of death, Malick challenges Romantic aesthetics in similar 
ways. Nature, then, can be both beautiful and dangerous simultaneously. Malick mixes 
two dichotomous anthropomorphic depictions of nature (as the Romantics would have 
108 
seen it) to create a new anthropomorphic image of nature. This view of nature is that it 
is as beautiful as it is dangerous, and is a view which is gaining increasing prominence 
in contemporary depictions of nature, a point upon which I will expand in Chapter 5. 
Living By the Sublime: Into the Wild 
Much like Herzog and Malick, Penn is critical of Romantic aesthetic and Romantic sen-
timent. Penn also manages to use Romantic aesthetics to criticise Chris McCandless. 
McCandless, in addition to being influenced by Romantic artists such as Emerson and 
Thoreau, is also influenced by Russian realists such as Pasternak and Tolstoy. Both 
Krakauer and Penn are critical of the ways in which McCandless seemed to internalise 
these writers’ sentiments. Specifically, Penn manages to utilise sublime imagery to con-
vey this criticism, and, in the process, highlights the dangers of this Romantic aesthetic. 
Well into his journey into the American wilderness, McCandless befriended Ronald 
Franz, an octogenarian living in Salton City, California (Krakauer). In a letter which 
McCandless wrote to his friend, McCandless explained the danger in living a life of 
false comfort and urged Ron to immerse himself more into the wild (Krakauer 58). It is 
wild nature which, for McCandless, allowed for a truer sense of self and a greater un-
derstanding of the universe (Krakauer 182). In his letter to Ron, McCandless writes the 
following: 
So many people live within unhappy circumstances and yet will not take the 
initiative to change their situation because they are conditioned to a life of 
security, conformity, and conservatism, all of which may appear to give one 
peace of mind, but in reality nothing is more damaging to the adventurous 
spirit within a man than a secure future. The very basic core of a man’s liv-
ing spirit is his passion for adventure. The joy of life comes from our 
encounters with new experiences, and hence there is no greater joy than to 
have an endlessly changing horizon, for each day to have a new and differ-
ent sun. … Don’t settle down and sit in one place. Move around, be 
nomadic, make each day a new horizon. You are still going to live a long 
time, Ron, and it would be a shame if you did not take the opportunity to 
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revolutionize your life and move into an entirely new realm of experience 
(Krakauer 58 author’s italics). 
The language which McCandless uses here is reminiscent of a bygone Romantic era. 
Like many of the Romantics, McCandless attempts to discover himself through nature. 
However, it is a certain kind of nature which characterises McCandless’s quest for char-
acter. In attempting to have Ron live a bolder life, a life brimming with vitality, 
McCandless describes wild nature in quite provocative and appealing language. In this 
letter, McCandless makes it clear what he does and does not value in life. The kind of 
wisdom he espouses to the eighty-one-year-old Ron is radical and unconventional. 
McCandless accuses Ron of living “a life of security, conformity, and conservatism”. 
McCandless, then, by implication, seeks a life of uncertainty, individuality, and libera-
tion. These are the values we can assume to which McCandless is referring when he 
encourages Ron to live a more “adventurous” life. Indeed, in one particular scene from 
Penn’s film, after discovering from an official that he would have to wait at least twelve 
years for a permit to kayak down a river, we see McCandless, the camera facing him, 
while he stares at a wild and rough river. There is a look of concern and doubt on his 
face as he does this. With wild notes from an electric guitar heard on the soundtrack, we 
cut immediately to McCandless paddling furiously down the gushing body of water. 
After the scene’s excitement, we are able to hear McCandless on the soundtrack, quot-
ing from Tolstoy’s War and Peace: “If we admit that human life can be ruled by reason, 
the possibility of life is destroyed” (890). It is reason, then, which McCandless finds to 
be the deterrent to living a life more meaningful and adventurous. This is also a senti-
ment which McCandless uses in developing a specific anthropomorphised view of 
nature upon which Krakauer expands, and of which he is sympathetically critical. 
Krakauer shows that “when the boy headed off into the Alaska bush, he entertained 
no illusions that he was trekking into a land of milk and honey; peril, adversity, and 
Tolstoyan renunciation were precisely what he was seeking. And that is what he found, 
in abundance” (x). I have already argued that McCandless, in his attempt to live a life in 
nature that is untainted by culture, in fact, bases these views of nature on a highly an-
thropomorphic and enculturated view of nature. However, as we see from Krakauer’s 
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quote, what may also be a point of concern is that perhaps McCandless has chosen a 
construct far too dangerous by which to live. 
Krakauer shows that McCandless’s perceptions were characterised by an “impracti-
cal fascination with the harsh side of nature” (85). Indeed, then, the use of the word 
“impractical” shows Krakauer’s belief that McCandless’s relationship to nature was 
only suited to fantastical pursuits, which shows an anthropomorphic understanding of 
nature that simply cannot exist in the real world. Penn directs similar criticisms towards 
McCandless, using images of the Romantic sublime to challenge, firstly, McCandless’s 
worldview, and, secondly, Romanticism itself. 
One of the first striking 
and most significant im-
ages of nature that we find 
occurs at the beginning of 
the film in which the cam-
era, as if perched high up 
in a tree, in an extreme 
long-shot, looks across an open and snowy vista of white (as depicted in Figure 10) 
(Penn). What we observe is a landscape largely covered in snow, a horizontal line of 
trees far up into the landscape, and at the very top of the screen (which is the furthest 
part of the landscape) there are bluish grey mountains. Clouds, of much the same bluish 
grey as the mountains, rest heavily on the mountaintops, blocking out any trace of sky. 
The title of the film then appears on the screen. That there is no sky in the shot makes 
the landscape seem imposing and oppressive: once you enter into the landscape there is 
no real chance of escape. The image is dominated by a landscape which suggests an in-
ability to sustain human life. However, this is clearly not the way McCandless feels 
towards the landscape as we see him willingly walking into the landscape after being 
dropped off by a man kind enough to drive him to what would be McCandless’s last 
destination. Also, later in the film, while talking to Wayne Westerberg, McCandless 
speaks passionately about his planned Alaskan trip: 
Figure 10: Penn 
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Alaska, Alaska. I’m gonna be all the way out there. All the way fuckin’ out 
there, just on my own. … You know, big mountains, rivers, sky, game. Just 
be out there in it, you know. In the wild. 
These are not the words of someone afraid to walk into the wild. The prospect of en-
countering nothing, and having no one on whom to rely, does not present itself as a 
danger to McCandless, but presents itself as that which should be embraced with ex-
citement. Thus, based on McCandless’s dialogue with Westerberg, it is clear that the 
shot at the beginning of the film in which we see McCandless entering a forbidding wil-
derness is not McCandless’s perception of nature. It is more likely to be Penn’s 
interpretation of the natural world. Penn, therefore, does not allow his opinion to go un-
noticed. We ‘hear’ Penn’s voice come through in the particular framing of the image. 
Since the image is filmed with the mountaintops only just touching the top of the frame, 
Penn uses sublime obscurity to show that, while McCandless may look at this landscape 
and see the prospect of adventure, Penn looks at the landscape and sees the prospect of 
death. It is also because of this that Penn manages to provide a reinterpretation of sub-
lime imagery. Penn uses the sublime not as the Romantics used it. While the Romantics 
used the sublime as a means of being in awe of the power of nature, Penn uses the sub-
lime to show how nature sometimes carries with it the certainty of death, especially if 
one approaches nature with the same kind of all-consuming wonder as demonstrated by 
McCandless. Thus, Penn shows that McCandless embraces the sublime in nature, but it 
is a sublime circumstance from which the protagonist cannot escape, especially as his 
anthropomorphic understanding of nature is that it should be delved into alone. 
A Brief Conclusion on Romanticism 
It is evident, then, that each of these directors are critical, to varying degrees, of some 
aspect of Romanticism (whether it is Romantic aesthetics, as is the case with Malick, or 
Romantic sentiment, as is the case with Herzog). However, despite these sometimes ve-
hement criticisms against this literary period and style, these directors’ debt to 
Romanticism cannot be ignored. The use of the beautiful and the sublime for environ-
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mentally political ends is a practise made popular by the Romantics, and is adopted with 
great enthusiasm by Malick, Herzog and Penn (even though, at times, these directors 
use these Romantic aesthetics with a sense of irony attached to them). Thus, the same 
underlying care and concern for nature that so inspired the Romantics can be found in 
the films in question. It stands to reason, then, that it is not a disagreement over the 
value of nature that has prompted these directors to critique Romantic aesthetic and sen-
timent. The issue, rather, is the directors’ disagreement with the Romantics’ 
anthropomorphic depictions of nature, which they seem to feel are in need of change 
and updating for contemporary society if we are to elicit the same kind of care for hu-
man-nature relationships that was inspired by the Romantics two hundred years ago. 
Indeed, this may be a justified critique. Part of the reason this is so is because European 
and American Romantics used a particular aesthetic as a comment on their own envi-
ronmental standing with nature at the time, which is, needless to say, much different to 
the earth’s current physiology and how we view it, and, as the directors in question 
would agree, how we ought to view it. 
Certainly, part of the Romantics’ love of nature was born out of opposition to the de-
structive effects of the Industrial Revolution. Indeed, it was during the Romantic era 
that the artists of the time “took the word [‘pollution’] … and applied it to what we now 
call environmental pollution” (Brimblecombe 83). It was the Romantics’ response to the 
Industrial Revolution which spurred on such a vociferous praise of nature, and such a 
vicious attack on mechanisation. This was the sentiment which was the motivation be-
hind Blake’s characterisation of factories as “dark Satanic Mills” (8) in his “And Did 
Those Feet in Ancient Time”. It is also what led Wordsworth, in his sonnet “On the Pro-
jected Kendall and Windermere Railway”, to “Battle the threat” (Poetical Works 9) of 
industrialisation and to call on the forces of nature to “protest against the wrong” 
(Poetical Works 14). However, as Bate suggests, the environmental problems witnessed 
in the Industrial Revolution represent only the beginning of the environmental problems 
experienced today, and were problems, comparatively, which were experienced on a 
much smaller scale (Song of the Earth 24). Today, as Bate shows, humanity has entered 
an era in which the destruction of nature has reach
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Carbon dioxide produced by the burning of fossil fuels is trapping the heat 
of the sun, causing the planet to become warmer. Glaciers and permafrost 
are melting, sea levels rising, rainfall patterns changing, winds growing 
stronger. Meanwhile, the oceans are overfished, deserts are spreading, for-
ests shrinking, fresh water becoming scarcer. The diversity of species upon 
the planet is diminishing (Song of the Earth 24). 
It seems that it is this onslaught on the natural world that has motivated Malick, Herzog 
and Penn to adopt the Romantics’ care for nature, but adapt this same care into aesthet-
ics that are more relevant to contemporary culture. As a result, the artists in question 
make use of different metaphors for nature, and thereby anthropomorphise nature dif-
ferently to their Romantic foreparents. However, it remains to be seen whether or not 
the metaphors with which these artists imbue nature are appropriate to how they wish to 
define successful interconnections between humanity and nature, a question to which I 
now turn. 
114 
Chapter 5 
Anthropomorphism: A Discussion 
For men only began to understand Nature when they no longer understood it; when 
they felt that it was the Other, indifferent towards men, without senses by which to 
apprehend us, then for the first time they stepped outside of Nature, alone, out of a 
lonely world. 
And this was necessary, if man was to be an artist in dealing with it; the artist must 
not think of it any longer in its practical significance for man, but look at it objec-
tively as a great, present reality (Rilke 80). 
 
The earth is not a mere fragment of dead history, stratum upon stratum like the leaves 
of a book, to be studied by geologists and antiquaries chiefly, but living poetry like the 
leaves of a tree, which precede flowers and fruit, – not a fossil earth, but a living 
earth; compared with whose great central life all animal and vegetable life is merely 
parasitic (Thoreau Walden and Other Writings 332). 
 
The aim of art is the beautiful, not over but through the true (Burroughs 208). 
The Importance of Science 
What interests Malick, Herzog, Penn and Krakauer in their respective texts is the man-
ner in which humanity establishes (or breaks) their bonds with nature. It seems that, in 
their own ways, each artist wishes to demonstrate how we should be treating nature. 
Malick shows that establishing these interconnections with nature can be done by being 
sensitive to the instances of nature in language, by not needlessly destroying nature, and 
by living lives that are physically closer to nature. Herzog, on the other hand, argues 
that nature is cruel and vicious, and that strengthening the bonds between humanity and 
115 
nature means not to be swayed by what Herzog sees as deceptive kindness in nature, as 
Herzog explains: “Mother Nature doesn’t call, doesn’t speak to you, although a glacier 
eventually farts. And don’t you listen to the Song of Life” (Cronin 301). Penn and Kra-
kauer have similar views to Herzog but certainly do not view nature in such harsh terms, 
and rather argue for the view that it is in humanity’s best interest to approach nature 
communally, always keeping in mind that one cannot know or understand nature com-
pletely. I have attempted to point out the various strengths and weaknesses of each of 
these anthropomorphic understandings of nature, prefacing my argument by first stating 
that any attempt to make an argument ‘for’ or ‘against’ nature is unavoidably mediated 
through human consciousness, and, thus, claiming to ‘save the environment’ must al-
ways be followed by ‘for humanity’. As Bernard Williams reminds us: 
What many conservation interests want to preserve is a nature that is not 
controlled, shaped, or willed by us, a nature which, as against culture, can be 
thought of as just there. But nature which is preserved is a definite, delim-
ited, wilderness. The paradox is that we have to use our power to preserve a 
sense of what is not in our power. Anything we leave untouched we have al-
ready touched. It will no doubt be best for us not to forget this, if we are to 
avoid self-deception and eventual despair. It is the final expression of the 
inescapable truth that our refusal of the anthropocentric must itself be a hu-
man refusal (240 author’s italics). 
Williams’s quote is important for many reasons, not the least of which is his point that 
not recognising one’s anthropocentrism, especially in an attempt to save the planet, will 
lead to “self-deception” and “despair”. Williams implies that these consequences come 
as a result of one’s lack of awareness of the inevitability of one’s anthropocentric under-
standing of the world, especially if one’s intention is to view nature on its own terms. 
Looking at nature through anthropocentric eyes (which is the only sort) has a definite 
impact on the way in which we anthropomorphise nature, how we characterise nature. 
However, while the manner in which we perceive nature may be mediated through hu-
man consciousness, this does not imply that we are unable to recognise certain facts 
about nature, facts which may assist in making more informed decisions on how we an-
thropomorphise the planet. It is science which greatly assists in determining what these 
facts of nature are. 
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In terms of filmic representations of nature, Disney, more so than any other film pro-
duction company, has been responsible for the most overt anthropomorphism of nature, 
assuming, of course, it is possible to speak of degrees of anthropomorphism. To take a 
single example, Bambi showcases the impact Disney’s films have on influencing hu-
manity’s anthropomorphised view of nature, while the film also shows the dangers of 
what its particular kind of anthropomorphisation of nature may do to the public’s scien-
tific understanding of the planet decades after the film’s production. In the film, Bambi, 
a cute and large-eyed anthropomorphic deer, is threatened by a raging and ferocious 
forest fire (Algar et al.). At the time the film was first screened, scientific knowledge 
suggested that forest fires were to be condemned, because, as David Ingram shows “ac-
cording to utilitarian conservationism, fires were unnatural and a waste of valuable 
resources. In 1944, the Wartime Advertising Council used the image of Bambi in its fire 
prevention campaign, thereby appropriating the movie for its conservationist agenda” 
(19). However, ecologists in the 1960s proved that the film’s attitude towards forest 
fires was flawed, as scientists 
began to understand the ecological usefulness of fire in renewing forest 
habitats. Regular burning releases minerals into the soil, and clears out old 
or diseased timber, thereby encouraging new growth and diversity. Some 
nuts and seeds actually need fire to sprout. … Forester Paul Schullery thus 
criticizes Bambi for perpetuating outdated ideas on the role of fire in nature, 
and asserts that the public reaction of horror to the National Park Service’s 
policy of letting the 1988 fire in Yellowstone National Park burn itself out 
had ‘a great deal’ to do with Bambi (Ingram 20). 
Giving some insight into general American attitudes towards the Yellowstone fires of 
1988, environmental historian Roderick Nash, quoted by Conrad Smith, shows that 
Bambi did “‘more to shape American attitudes towards fire in wilderness ecosystems 
than all the scientific papers ever published on the subject’” (57). With these statements 
in mind, one is able to see how a raging fire threatening the life of an adorable creature 
who, quite literally, speaks the same language as we do, may have ignited feelings of 
anger and anxiety in an American public witnessing how the 1988 Yellowstone fires 
were handled. Interestingly, despite the American people’s strong reaction against Yel-
lowstone’s officials’ decision to allow the fire to burn itself out, scientists claim that 
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“about the same number of acres would have burned even if all the 1988 fires had been 
fought immediately” (Smith 56). 
Certainly, that manmade forest fires are bad and should be prevented, the message 
the public took from Bambi, was the scientific attitude at the time, but it was not the sci-
entific attitude during the 1988 Yellowstone fires. Bambi, at least at the time it was 
originally released, is an example of the instances in which art is able to comply with 
current scientific knowledge, but is also an example of the lasting impression, some-
times for the worse, that art may have on the public. Thus, the specific depiction of 
nature that was utilised in Bambi can leave no doubt of the power behind this anthro-
pomorphism, and the responsibility that comes in the employment of this power, a 
quality of art upon which James Lovelock comments: “We live at a time when emotions 
and feelings count more than truth, and there is a vast ignorance of science. We have 
allowed fiction writers and green lobbies to exploit the fear of nuclear energy and of 
almost any new science, in the same way that the churches exploited the fear of Hellfire 
not so long ago” (Revenge of Gaia 16). Lovelock cites the film, The China Syndrome 
(Bridges), which hyperbolically and sensationally portrays the horrors of nuclear power: 
“In [The China Syndrome], a badly constructed reactor disastrously goes wrong and a 
character in the film imagines its fissioning core melting its way through to the centre of 
the Earth, then continuing on miraculously until it emerges in China. Even as metaphor, 
this was a wholly absurd image, but it did its job of titillating public panic and fear and 
set the scene for endless misinformation and lies” (Revenge of Gaia 124). The China 
Syndrome, then, seems to be a film which is more well-intentioned than it is well-
informed. While Lovelock shows that this is a case of art confusing science fact with 
science fiction, Lovelock concedes to the power of art to sway public opinion. 
To be sure, though, science has its faults and cannot alone explain the infinite com-
plexity of the universe. There is the tendency of science to engage in reductionist 
thinking, whereby, for the purposes of ‘accuracy’, only certain variables of the world 
are observed to, ironically, gain a greater understanding of the universe on the whole. 
Certainly, as Lovelock explains, reductionist thinking had its major contributions to sci-
ence through physics and chemistry, but reductionist thinking must take “its proper 
place as a part and not the whole of science” (Revenge of Gaia 10). Reductionist meth-
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ods of experimentation are not at all the means of research used presently. As Lovelock 
explains, this is the science of the past: “science itself was handicapped in the last two 
centuries by its division into many different disciplines, each limited to seeing only a 
tiny facet of the planet, and there was no coherent vision of the Earth” (Revenge of Gaia 
6). Thus, science alone cannot come to understand all of nature all of the time. How-
ever, ideal as it may be to achieve such omniscience, especially in the face of climate 
change, there are steps that may be taken in order to curb this shortcoming. Certainly, 
Lovelock’s scientific inquiry of the planet, in which the earth is viewed as a whole and 
singular system, aims to address this weakness in science. Also, a science such as Earth 
Stewardship is a movement (among others) that recognises an issue such as climate 
change as a multi-faceted problem, and, because of this, sees the need for it to be ad-
dressed by taking an interdisciplinary approach (Chapin et al.). 
Another potential problem of the scientific method is the cold neutrality with which 
it sometimes treats nature in the name of research, a treatment of nature which may 
sometimes be damaging. This is an issue which may be witnessed in the very language 
utilised in scientific discourse. Referring to a scientific study in which researchers 
aimed to investigate ways of ‘controlling’ coyote populations for the safety of livestock, 
Kahn shows that “in the language of field biology, coyotes and other wild animals are 
not victims of research to be caged, poisoned, manipulated, and possibly killed. Instead, 
they are ‘test animals’ which are ‘housed,’ ‘dosed,’ and ‘processed’ – rather like an in-
nocuous manufacturing process” (243). Certainly, most, if not all, modern humans have 
benefited from this scientific method, which implicates modern society as being part of 
the cause of the problem. In the next section of this chapter I will attempt to show how 
anthropomorphism may be able to remedy the misuse of language when speaking of 
nature. It is my view that the use of (the right kind of) metaphors may assist humanity in 
thinking of nature as something that should be valued, as opposed to thinking of nature 
as that which merely exists, and is, therefore, not susceptible to any damage perpetrated 
by human action. 
However, returning to science’s strengths and weaknesses, there are, of course, some 
critiques of science that do not hold much weight. One such critique, using deconstruc-
tionist principles, claims that “scientists are subject to fashion, bias, and ambition just 
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like the rest of humanity, which is evidenced by the frequent exploitation of scientists 
by industrialists, militarists, and other elites … [which] undermines any claim of objec-
tivity and neutrality. Thus it is tempting to conclude that the scientific enterprise is 
biased and value-ridden and that, as a project that seeks knowledge, is no better than 
astrology” (Soulé 153). However, Michael Soulé reminds us that 
such a critique of modern science is shallow. It is easy to confuse the behav-
iour of individual scientists with the behaviour of the institution of science. 
Science, as an institution, is self-corrective. Science episodically but ulti-
mately undermines the interests and even the beliefs of its own adherents. 
Thus the post-modern premise that individuals cannot escape from their 
values or from their expectations about reality is fair, but it sticks only to 
scientists, not science (154). 
Further, it is important to note that the argument that scientists are prone to errors in 
their own scientific method is an argument that comes not only from deconstructionists, 
but from scientists themselves. Indeed, with the advent of Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle in 1927, long before the development of deconstruction in the 1960s and 
1970s, the scientific community discovered that, due to quantum mechanics, any ex-
periment is prone to inaccuracies of measurement and limitation of functional 
possibilities, thereby suggesting the fallibility of both tools and scientist in an experi-
ment. However, scientists have managed to quantify these uncertainties, which implies 
an awareness on the part of scientists of the inherent limitations of the scientific method 
(Heisenberg). 
It is important to note, then, that science, with its imperfections, remains a system of 
acquiring knowledge about the world which should be seen as an aid in allowing us to 
develop stronger bonds with the planet, especially since science itself is becoming in-
creasingly responsive to nature. Thus, science may be seen as a discipline that should 
complement humanity’s anthropomorphic understanding of nature. However, science 
alone cannot fully develop stronger interconnections with the natural world, and art 
plays an equally important role. 
120 
The Importance of Art: The Living Earth 
Thinking about nature in anthropomorphic ways is inevitable. It is inevitable for the 
same reasons that thinking about nature anthropocentrically is so: we are only able to 
view the world through human eyes. Thus, the manner in which we attempt to establish 
better interconnections with nature can only be done through an anthropomorphic un-
derstanding of the planet. In recent years, chemistry expert James Lovelock has 
promoted his characterisation of the earth as Gaia, a name inspired by the Greek god-
dess who has stood as a symbol of the earth as female. The term ‘Gaia’ was suggested 
to Lovelock by author William Golding during the late 1960s as a means of describing 
and perceiving “the Earth as in certain ways alive, at least to the extent that it appeared 
to regulate its own climate and chemistry” (Face of Gaia 129). Lovelock’s Gaia theory 
gives a scientifically unconventional understanding of the earth in that he views it in its 
totality and postulates that the earth, both in its living and nonliving components (from 
its organisms, oceans, surface rocks and atmosphere), ‘attempts’ to regulate its own 
chemical makeup. Gaia theory “sees this system as having a goal – the regulation of sur-
face conditions so as always to be as favourable for contemporary life as possible” 
(Lovelock Face of Gaia 166). However, Lovelock, in commenting on his overt anthro-
pomorphisation of the earth, suggests that seeing the earth in human terms should be 
used advantageously: “I know that to personalize the Earth System as Gaia, as I have 
often done and continue to do in this book, irritates the scientifically correct, but I am 
unrepentant because metaphors are more than ever needed for a widespread comprehen-
sion of the true nature of the Earth and an understanding of the lethal dangers that lie 
ahead” (Revenge of Gaia 188). Thus, setting aside, but not ignoring, the scientific aspect 
of his argument, what interests me is that Lovelock uses a metaphor to come to a better 
and more rounded understanding of the earth. Why does Lovelock bother with metaphor 
to explain scientific phenomena, and what value could Lovelock be adding to our un-
derstanding of the earth by humanising it? 
When Lovelock uses the metaphor of the earth as alive, he prefaces this by stating 
that he is not “thinking of the Earth as alive in a sentient way, or even alive like an ani-
mal or a bacterium” (Revenge of Gaia 24). Thus, Lovelock warns against a literal 
interpretation of the concept implying, then, that the metaphor exists purely as metaphor 
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for Lovelock. However, Lovelock also explains the metaphor’s real-world conse-
quences since this image of the earth promotes a greater scientific understanding of 
nature: “My reason for persisting in calling the Earth Gaia and saying it is alive is not a 
personal foible; it is because I see this as an essential step in the process of public, as 
well as scientific, understanding” (Lovelock Face of Gaia 128). However, using meta-
phor in order to understand and give more depth to scientific fact is certainly not unique 
to Lovelock. 
In The Origin of Species, one of the most important scientific works ever produced, 
Charles Darwin uses metaphor in similar ways to Lovelock: to allow the public to grasp 
complex scientific ideas, and to gain a greater understanding of scientific fact. One of 
the more famous metaphors used by Darwin is that of a tree, which he uses to explain 
how life evolves and branches off into different directions, but where, upon observing a 
node on the tree, one is able to identify the point from which a species has evolved 
(113-14). Darwin also explains the value in using metaphor to elucidate and inform a 
complex scientific concept: “The affinities of all the beings of the same class have 
sometimes been represented by a great tree. I believe this simile largely speaks the 
truth” (113). From this quote it is evident that Darwin is aware that the metaphor he 
uses is no more than a metaphor as it is “largely” representative of the truth, but is not 
the truth itself. However, that the metaphor he uses “speaks the truth” is indicative of 
the power of art, especially in its ability to anthropomorphise nature, to grant us a 
greater understanding of scientific fact. 
As far as my primary texts are concerned, this is also a point illustrated in Herzog’s 
Encounters at the End of the World, in which scientists comment on global warming by 
assigning human qualities to the planet. When Herzog interviews Douglas MacAyeal, a 
glaciologist studying the melting ice of Antarctica, MacAyeal describes the icy land-
scape in human terms: 
I’d be happy to see Antarctica as a static, monolithic environment, a cold 
monolith of ice, sort of the way the people back in the past used to see it, but 
now our comfortable thought about Antarctica is over. Now we’re seeing it 
as a living being that’s dynamic, that’s producing change, change that it’s 
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broadcasting to the rest of the world, possibly in response to what the world 
is broadcasting down to Antarctica. 
It seems that MacAyeal personifies the landscape not just as a way of having the layman 
understand the scientific information he is imparting, but also as a way of allowing him-
self to get a sense of the feel of the continent, as a means of understanding the broader 
and global implications of the complexity of the situation. Also, in personifying the con-
tinent, MacAyeal manages to imbue the landscape with a personality, and, in so doing, 
give it some kind of value, by which I mean human value, forcing us to change our atti-
tude to the environment. Instead of seeing it as, in MacAyeal’s words, “a cold monolith 
of ice”, we are now seeing it as something that is “living”, implying, metaphorically of 
course, a kind of consciousness, which allows humanity to think twice about the ways 
in which we treat something we once before thought of as inert and lifeless. Thus, when 
the continent is “broadcasting to the rest of the world” in response to our messages to it, 
MacAyeal rightfully implies that our communication with the continent should be one 
of kindness and respect. Thus, an equal mixture of both science and art may prove bene-
ficial for the purposes of anthropomorphising nature in ways which enable humanity to 
treat nature with such kindness and respect. 
Lovelock is certainly of the same opinion of a balanced use of science and art in in-
fluencing our perceptions and treatment of nature. Thus, where Lovelock advocates 
metaphor in informing our scientific understanding of the earth, he also explains meta-
phor’s other purpose: its ability to promote greater sympathy for the earth. Using art for 
this purpose, is, for Lovelock, the most important implication of viewing the earth in 
anthropomorphic terms: “Perhaps the greatest value of the Gaia concept lies in its meta-
phor of a living Earth, which reminds us that we are part of it and that our contract with 
Gaia is not about human rights alone, but includes human obligations” (Face of Gaia 
104). Lovelock elaborates on this point in another text: 
Metaphor is important because to deal with, understand, and even amelio-
rate the fix we are now in over global change requires us to know the true 
nature of the Earth and imagine it as the largest living thing in the solar sys-
tem, not something inanimate like that disreputable contraption ‘spaceship 
Earth’. Until this change of heart and mind happens we will not instinctively 
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sense that we live on a live planet that can respond to the changes we make, 
either by cancelling the changes or by cancelling us. Unless we see the Earth 
as a planet that behaves as if it were alive, at least to the extent of regulating 
its climate and chemistry, we will lack the will to change our way of life and 
to understand that we have made it our greatest enemy (Revenge of Gaia 21-
22). 
While, for the most part, Lovelock uses the image of a female as a means of characteris-
ing the planet, this is not the only image which Lovelock ascribes to nature. When 
Lovelock speaks of the earth, there are times when he uses the metaphor of an animal. 
For example, Lovelock uses the image of a camel to explain the manner in which the 
planet regulates its temperature, stating that camels, when it is hot during the day, in-
crease their temperature so that they do not lose water by perspiration, and during the 
night time, when it is colder, decrease their body temperature because they would lose 
heat trying to stay at their warmer daytime temperature (Revenge of Gaia 21). In the 
same way, as Lovelock explains, 
Gaia, like the camel, has several stable states so that it can accommodate to 
the changing internal and external environment. Most of the time things stay 
steady; as they were over the few thousand years before about 1900. When 
the forcing is too strong, either to the hot or the cold, Gaia, as a camel 
would, moves to a new stable state that is easier to maintain. She is about to 
move now (Revenge of Gaia 21). 
It is interesting that Lovelock uses a metaphor (a camel) to explain another meta-
phor (Gaia). He explains the literal earth using the Gaia metaphor, which is then 
explained by the image of a camel. However, it is ultimately the Gaia metaphor that 
Lovelock uses and promotes. I suspect that Lovelock’s use of the Gaia metaphor 
predominates in his characterisation of the earth because thinking about the earth as 
a camel would not have elicited the same level of empathy for nature from humanity 
as would a human metaphor, which, as explained, is ultimately Lovelock’s purpose. 
This is also the reason why Lovelock seems to advocate both science and art in 
equal measure, because to place science before the metaphor may result in a lack of 
compassion for the earth. To place science before art means to first view nature as 
an object of scrutiny that may be observed and studied in whatever ways seem ap-
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propriate to a potentially fallible human scientist. Lovelock, then, rightfully shows 
that science and art, in their ability to inform our perceptions of nature, must come 
both equally and simultaneously, a process, represented by the label “Gaia”, which 
Lovelock advocates for the purposes of forming better interconnections with the 
earth: “The ideas that stem from Gaia theory put us in our proper place as part of the 
Earth system – not the owners, managers, commissars or people in charge. … This 
way of thinking makes clear that we have no special human rights; we are merely 
one of the partner species in the great enterprise of Gaia” (Face of Gaia 6). 
Malick, Herzog, Penn and Krakauer, however, when compared to each other, 
each present their own unique interpretations, and anthropomorphisations, of nature 
for the purposes of what they believe constitutes a productive and beneficial rela-
tionship with nature. However, with each artist’s attempt to establish better 
interconnections with nature through a particular kind of anthropomorphism of na-
ture, I will show that some artists, more so than others, use metaphors more 
appropriately suited to their cause. 
Krakauer, Penn and Herzog on Nature 
Penn, in his film, shows that if one is to establish interconnections with nature, then one 
has to do so with the support of a larger community. However, Penn also shows that 
perhaps one cannot achieve the degree of immersion into nature that characterised 
McCandless’s willingness to do so, especially in the manner in which McCandless sev-
ered himself, not merely from humanity, but also from the conveniences that humanity 
brought. For the most part, I feel that Penn successfully comes to a valid conclusion: to 
achieve the kind of immersion into nature pursued by McCandless is an act which re-
quires a degree of knowledge of nature that is simply impossible to achieve, at least for 
modern humans. These are the premises Penn establishes which point to a unique an-
thropomorphisation of nature not seen in the other texts. Penn seems to characterise the 
earth as an elusive and mysterious figure, which he does as a means of showing the un-
expected dangers that lie in nature. This is a similar point made by Krakauer in his text. 
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Through his examination of Chris McCandless, Krakauer presents an interesting per-
spective on the ability of humans to integrate into, and establish strong and productive 
interconnections with, nature. However, as has been shown, Krakauer is more optimistic 
than Penn regarding the ability of humanity to survive solitarily in the wilderness. Kra-
kauer, in his text, shows that, provided one has the right knowhow, and does not take 
foolish risks, the kind of integration with nature that McCandless attempted to pursue is 
possible, even though this kind of lifestyle may not necessarily be desired. Krakauer 
does demonstrate, however, that any attempt to come to know nature, especially as in-
timately as McCandless had attempted to do, must be foregrounded with a sense of self-
awareness that the kinds of images of nature on which one bases these interconnections 
must be perceived as a construction. 
Krakauer strongly warns against the metaphors and images on which McCandless 
based his anthropomorphised view of nature, which, subsequently, characterised 
McCandless’s belief in his ‘ability’ to come closer to nature. One of the examples Kra-
kauer uses to illustrate this point is McCandless’s literalisation of the kinds of images 
fabricated by American environmental writer Jack London: 
Mesmerized by London’s turgid portrayal of life in Alaska and the Yukon, 
McCandless read and reread The Call of the Wild, White Fang, ‘To Build a 
Fire,’ ‘An Odyssey of the North,’ ‘The Wit of Porportuk.’ He was so en-
thralled by these tales, however, that he seemed to forget they were works of 
fiction, constructions of the imagination that had more to do with London’s 
romantic sensibilities than with the actualities of life in the subarctic wilder-
ness. McCandless conveniently overlooked the fact that London himself had 
spent just a single winter in the North and that he’d died by his own hand on 
his California estate at the age of forty, a fatuous drunk, obese and pathetic, 
maintaining a sedentary existence that bore scant resemblance to the ideals 
he espoused in print (45). 
Thus, Krakauer makes an important point as he draws attention to the dangers in taking 
literally an anthropomorphised view of nature and, therefore, implies that any anthro-
pomorphisation must be accompanied by a sense of awareness. Certainly, part of the 
reason why Penn’s portrayal of nature as a mystifying entity works is because he carries 
with it a sense of self-awareness. Penn’s filmic demonstration that nature can be per-
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ceived in other ways (and not only in the ways McCandless sees it) may act as proof of 
this. However, turning to my other central texts, both Herzog and his protagonist Timo-
thy Treadwell in Herzog’s Grizzly Man may be criticised for lacking this self-awareness 
in endorsing their respective anthropomorphisations of nature. Also, what is important 
to consider in the films of Herzog is not only his lack of awareness in his anthropomor-
phised view of nature, but the type of characteristics with which he imbues nature. 
Throughout his films Werner Herzog has endorsed a perception of nature which 
characterises nature as iniquitous. Herzog’s perceptions of nature are best summarised 
in Les Blank’s documentary Burden of Dreams, a documentary based on Herzog’s ex-
periences while filming his Fitzcarraldo. In Burden of Dreams, we find Herzog 
standing amongst the wild foliage of the Amazon jungle (in which the film is set and 
filmed), where Herzog narrates the following: 
[N]ature here is vile and base. I wouldn’t see anything erotical here. I would 
see fornication and asphyxiation and choking and fighting for survival and 
growing and just rotting away. Of course there is a lot of misery but it is the 
same misery that is all around us. The trees here are in misery and the birds 
are in misery. I don’t think they sing, they just screech in pain. … 
 
Even the stars up here in the sky look like a mess. There is no harmony in 
the universe. We have to get acquainted to this idea that there is no real 
harmony as we have conceived it (Blank). 
Herzog presents a particular view of nature in which nature is anthropomorphised as 
chaotic, destructive and violent, which is a perception of nature that runs throughout his 
documentaries I have considered in this dissertation. That is not to say, however, that it 
is a view of nature that is devoid of any kind of scientific reasoning. Indeed, using sci-
ence to confirm one’s reading of nature is a process that Herzog portrays in both films 
examined in this work. In Encounters at the End of the World, it has been shown how 
scientists manage to use science and metaphor to portray a certain attitude towards the 
planet. Also, in Grizzly Man, Herzog shows how his protagonist, Timothy Treadwell, 
was incapable of using fact and fiction simultaneously in order to construct a certain 
view of nature. In one particular scene Herzog interviews Larry Van Daele, a bear bi-
ologist, wherein Herzog makes the discovery that the bears which Treadwell was 
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claiming to protect from poachers were in no real danger from poachers to begin with 
(Grizzly Man). Further, in living among the bears for as long as Treadwell did, Sven 
Haakanson, Ph.D., shows that, perhaps, Treadwell did more damage than good, as 
Treadwell habituated the bears to humans and may have allowed the bears to believe 
that all humans were harmless. Treadwell, then, may be seen as an example of the dan-
gers of using metaphor to inform science, but not using science and metaphor to inform 
each other. Treadwell has dangerously compromised scientific fact for an anthropomor-
phic reading of nature that Herzog shows to be inappropriate and dangerous. However, 
Herzog may be guilty of the same thing. 
Interestingly, Herzog utilises science as a means of justifying his anthropomorphised 
view of nature as violent and cruel. In a particular scene in Encounters at the End of the 
World, Herzog speaks to cell biologist Samuel S. Bowser who explains his perception 
of the oceans, on a microbial level, as a place that is “horribly violent”. Herzog, agree-
ing with Bowser’s perception of nature as a violent place, asks Bowser if, through 
evolution, “mammals fled in panic from the oceans and crawled on solid land to get out 
of this.” Bowser responds: “Yeah, I think undoubtedly that’s exactly the driving force 
that caused us to leave the horrors behind; to grow and evolve into larger creatures to 
escape what’s horribly violent at the miniature scale.” Thus, while it is evident that 
Herzog takes the necessary steps in recognising the importance of science in under-
standing nature, the process in which Herzog does this is questionable. Like Timothy 
Treadwell in Grizzly Man, Herzog seems to place metaphor before scientific fact, as op-
posed to placing them alongside each other. Thus, Herzog comes to certain conclusions 
about how nature must be read before he uses facts to support these claims. This points 
to another flaw in Herzog’s argument about the ‘inherent’ hostility is nature, an an-
thropomorphised reading of nature which is rooted far too firmly in the ‘negative’ 
aspects of nature to be practical. 
If Herzog’s intention is to establish better interconnections between humanity and 
nature (as has been shown in Chapter 4) by means of characterising nature as a hostile 
and cruel place, then perhaps the metaphors he uses do not justify his cause. The prob-
lem, it seems, in the metaphors used by Herzog is that it may justify a kind of subduing 
or taming of nature, which was the manner in which the American Puritans treated na-
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ture since they employed similar anthropomorphisations of the earth. It is clear that 
Herzog’s goals for the treatment of nature lie, quite apparently, on the opposite end of 
those of the American Puritans, but it is evident that Herzog characterises the planet in 
similar ways. This seems only to underline the disconnect between the manner in which 
Herzog personifies nature and the sincere care he has for the longevity of the planet. 
Terrence Malick, however, may present more suitable metaphors to justify the manner 
in which he believes humanity should repair the bonds between itself and nature. 
Nature’s Vengeance 
Werner Herzog, in his documentaries, tends to paint nature in few but bold colours. It is 
an image of nature that, while striking, is often monotonous and loses the complexity of 
a complex system. I find Malick’s anthropomorphism of nature to be more successful 
simply because it thrives on the intricacy that Herzog’s portrayal lacks. I also find it to 
be more successful than Penn’s perception of nature as Malick characterises nature in 
clearer and more defined ways, thus leading me to believe that Malick’s earth is, as it 
were, more alive than what Penn’s depiction suggests. Thus, while Penn certainly 
makes interesting and valuable observations about the planet, it is Malick’s portrayal of 
nature, as I will argue, which is more important and urgent in our current standing with 
nature. 
As we are introduced to the New World, we hear Pocahontas, in her voiceover narra-
tion, calling out to “Mother” to “help us sing the story of our land” (Malick The New 
World). Also, in the beginning stages of Pocahontas and John Smith’s courtship, Poca-
hontas, once again in voiceover narration, addresses “Mother”: 
Mother, where do you live? In the sky? The clouds? The sea? Show me your 
face. Give me a sign. 
Finally, by the end of the film, Pocahontas, before she dies, narrates the following: 
“Mother, now I know where you live.” It is apparent that Pocahontas establishes a con-
nection between “Mother” and nature since, from the given quotes, we are told that 
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“Mother” is knowledgeable of the land’s history, and that it is likely that “Mother” con-
siders nature as the place in which she dwells. It is never made clear exactly what 
“Mother” is, but, based on the above quotes, it is safe to assume that it is, effectively, 
‘Mother Nature’ to whom Pocahontas is referring. It is also significant that it is a female 
that comes to represent nature. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Malick puts a female 
face to nature, much in the same way that Lovelock does (Revenge of Gaia; Face of 
Gaia). 
However, the qualities that Malick assigns to this feminine anthropomorphisation of 
nature are by no means stereotypical. For example, Malick shows that nature does not 
hesitate in taking action when being threatened. In one particular scene early on in the 
film, a scene in which John Smith is becoming more accustomed to the New World’s 
landscape, Smith becomes lost in a marsh (Malick The New World). In Smith’s disori-
entated and confused state, the Native American characters, who are, significantly, out 
of the frame, begin to shoot arrows at the intruder. The absence of the Native American 
characters from the frame gives the impression that it is Smith’s natural environment 
that is retaliating, perhaps giving Smith a warning that he is not welcome. This kind of 
imagery is also apparent in another of Malick’s films: The Thin Red Line. 
In The Thin Red Line American soldiers fighting in the Second World War are as-
signed the task of taking over Hill 210 in Guadalcanal. However, there are instances in 
the seizing of Hill 210 in which the soldiers seem to be battling, not only the Japanese, 
but nature as well (Malick Red Line). For much of the battle on Hill 210, the Japanese 
soldiers remain hidden within the vast ebbing and flowing of the grass on an immense 
hill, in some instances hiding in holes that have been burrowed in the hill. However, as 
the American soldiers inch their way up the hill, we see the flash of the Japanese guns 
emitted from the greenery. This gives the impression that it is the hill that is attacking 
the Americans and not the Japanese. Malick, then, characterises nature as that which 
actively resists domination, and will retaliate if threatened. There are several ominous 
encounters with nature which also take place on the hill that prove the same point. As a 
soldier is lying low in the long grass, assuming he is safe from the human violence 
above him, he is confronted with a snake poised to attack him, forcing the soldier to re-
alise that, in war, one must not only anticipate the aggression of humanity, but the 
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aggression of nature as well. Thus, in both The New World and The Thin Red Line, Ma-
lick makes the point that nature will attack its attacker, violently, if necessary. 
Throughout this dissertation I have made reference to the beauty with which Malick 
imbues nature. However, now we find that nature, according to Malick, can also be vi-
cious. Nature, then, is not a docile creature with a single characteristic. It is dynamic 
and it changes (seemingly willingly) in order to protect itself. It does not passively ac-
cept abuse, but retaliates as if to remind us, its inhabitants, that we are merely its guests. 
The earth, then, as Malick shows, is not an object, but a female, within whose beauty 
one may revel, but is a woman willing to strike when struck. This kind of anthropomor-
phisation proposed by Malick is based on metaphors for nature which seem properly 
suited to the kinds of interconnections Malick proposes humanity establish and maintain 
with nature. This is because the kinds of interconnections with nature Malick attempts 
to promote are those in which humans may enjoy the riches and beauty nature may of-
fer, but, also, where humanity approaches this natural wealth with an awareness of the 
risk we face when taking too much. 
It is apparent, though, that Malick’s anthropomorphism of the earth is based very 
loosely on the myths and legends of the people which he portrays in his film, the Al-
gonquian (The New World). The Algonquian creation myth states that the Earth, a 
woman, gave birth to twin sons, Glooskap, who was a trickster and looked upon fa-
vourably by the Algonquian, and Malsum, the evil twin (Andrews 82; Spence 141). 
However, Glooskap and Malsum’s mother died at their birth, and, from their dead 
mother’s body, Glooskap created the sun, the moon, animals and humanity, while Mal-
sum created in nature all that was seen as a hindrance to humans: mountains, valleys 
and snakes (Andrews 82; Spence 141). However, in Malick’s The New World, the direc-
tor manipulates and changes significant plot points of this myth in order to create his 
own image of the earth suitable for contemporary society, perhaps, especially, western 
society. 
In the original Algonquian myth Mother Earth, as it were, dies, and her body is recy-
cled into aspects of nature that are both ‘good’ and ‘bad’. This is certainly the case in 
Malick’s anthropomorphised view of the earth as it is a metaphor which harbours that 
which may be considered good, and that which may be considered evil. However, in 
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Malick’s film it is significant that the director chooses to portray ‘Mother’ (who we can 
take to mean Mother Nature, as I have previously attempted to justify) as a living being 
(The New World). In very fleeting moments in the film, especially as Pocahontas is ad-
dressing “Mother”, we are given images, lasting no more than a second, of a woman, 
photographed as she stands in front of the sun, who possesses an ethereal beauty. We 
can safely assume she is the “Mother” to whom Pocahontas refers. However, while it is 
true that the Algonquian see the rocks, the seasons and the wind as alive (Spence 147), 
it is significant that Malick chooses to show Mother Earth as never having been killed to 
begin with, a much more accurate way of characterising our human-nature interconnec-
tions: humanity may die, but Mother Earth will live on. Thus, while Malick certainly 
borrows elements of Algonquian myth, he manages to create a wholly different charac-
terisation of the earth when compared to the Algonquian narratives. Malick creates an 
anthropomorphisation of nature that is suited for humanity now. However, while Malick 
is intent on manipulating the Algonquian nature myth of the earth, the kind of charac-
terisation of the earth he creates is by no means original, and not without its criticisms. 
Malick’s personification of nature bears a striking resemblance to James Lovelock’s 
anthropomorphisation of the earth as Gaia. There are, though, problems which may 
arise from both Malick’s and Lovelock’s feminised conceptualisation of the earth. Us-
ing ecofeminists principles, Berman comments on the effect of Lovelock’s gendered 
metaphor for the planet by stating that this particular anthropomorphisation of the earth 
“reinforces hierarchical dualisms and perpetuates the oppression and subordination of 
women and Nature” (263). Ecofeminist Patrick D. Murphy provides a more detailed de-
scription of this problem. Making reference to Lovelock’s use of the Greek myth from 
which the name Gaia comes, Murphy explores the narrative behind the name, coming to 
the conclusion that Lovelock’s use of a female metaphor for the earth is inappropriate: 
The Gaia imagery of contemporary ecological consciousness represents part 
of a broader movement to resacralise nature; it also is the most recent mani-
festation of the Western tendency to render the planet in female gender 
terms. Yet, what are the dimensions of such rendering? Although the con-
ception of Earth as Mother/Goddess predates patriarchal cultures, the 
imagery perceived throughout Western culture derives mainly from patriar-
chal Greek and Roman mythology. In that mythology, Gaia begins as a 
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parthenogenetic initiator, but quickly becomes subservient to her son-
husband, Uranos. As soon as the male arrives, the female loses her inde-
pendence. Hesiod states that Earth arose first and created Heaven-Uranos 
‘equal to herself,’ and yet he is immediately deemed ‘Father Heaven’ and 
gains control of his mother. That the Greeks’ respect for Earth was crippled 
by patriarchal misconceptions, however, does not mean that current users of 
the myth must necessarily fall prey to sexism; nor does it mean they must 
only refer to patriarchal perceptions of the Earth goddess. The issue, rather, 
is whether or not they can use Gaia imagery without evoking patriarchal 
perceptions. It seems highly unlikely that Gaia imagery can be used without 
invoking any of the Greek patriarchal baggage attached to the symbol (59). 
Murphy’s problem with the Gaia image lies not in the fact that it is a metaphor, per se, 
but that it is a female metaphor based on patriarchal values. Murphy also states that this 
is not the right metaphor for this time: “The use of Gaia imagery and the envisioning of 
the Earth as a sacred female may have been and may remain a necessary step to get 
people moving toward a higher consciousness, but it cannot serve as the right stride for 
the path of planet-human harmony” (68). I will argue, however, that it is most certainly 
the right kind of metaphor by which to live at this particular time. In stressing that Gaia 
is overthrown by her son-husband Heaven-Uranos, despite the fact that it is stated that 
they are equals, Murphy seems to have selected certain aspects of the mythology, and 
neglected other parts, to justify his point. 
Hesiod, in “The Theogony” states that, Earth and Heaven conceived several children, 
among them three particularly evil sons: “Cottys, Briareus, / And Gyges” (201-02). 
From the moment they were born, the sons “Drew down their father’s hate” (Hesiod 
209), after which Heaven “seized them all, and hid them in a cave / Of earth” (Hesiod 
210-11). Hesiod further explains the effect this has on Earth, and how she then asserts 
her agency to take control of the situation: 
Heaven in his deed malign rejoiced: vast Earth 
Groan’d inly, sore aggrieved; but soon devised 
A stratagem of mischief and of fraud. … 
She spake emboldening words, though grieved at heart. 
‘My sons! alas! ye children of a sire 
Most impious, now obey a mother’s voice; 
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So shall we well avenge the fell despite 
Of him your father, who the first devised 
Deeds of injustice’ (212-23) 
Murphy claims, then, that it is a sign of a deeply disturbed and patriarchal culture which 
would have Heaven, a male, dominating Earth, a female. However, as the extract re-
veals, this is not how the story ends. What Hesiod’s text portrays is a female character 
unwilling to passively accept the injustices acted out against her or her children, even if 
it is an injustice acted out by her son-husband. This is a story of vengeance and retalia-
tion. It is also significant that Earth acts out her revenge “soon”, giving the reader the 
impression of a being who does not hesitate to retaliate when injustices are inflicted 
upon her. However, when Earth gives instructions to her sons to kill their father, we are 
told that she speaks “emboldening words, though grieved at heart”, suggesting that she 
is not unreasonable and without conscience. Earth, then, is not something, or, in this 
case, someone, who seeks out conflict at every chance, but is rather an even-tempered 
fighter. It could be argued, though, that Earth still does not have the same kind of power 
seen in the male characters of this narrative as it is the sons who are the ones who even-
tually kill their father-brother, Heaven. However, we must not forget that it is Earth who 
is the leader who initiates the killing of her son-husband by instructing her other sons to 
carry out the task. Earth may be seen as a character with agency and will. This is a far 
cry from the kind of reading which Murphy gives of Earth, or Gaia. Murphy’s reading 
of Gaia as being stuck in patriarchal conventions, forever submitting to the will of her 
son-husband, allows humanity to view the earth as something weak, something of 
which humanity may take advantage. However, this reading is a reading of Hesiod’s 
text which selects only certain bits of information to evidence a very particular and, by 
implication, a very flawed point. A more accurate reading would be that Gaia is fierce 
but reasonable, which is a reading I am offering in support of Lovelock’s conceptualisa-
tion of Gaia. Lovelock does not provide much by way of the mythology surrounding 
Gaia, using only the effect of the narrative as a means of promoting his reading of the 
earth. However, what we are able to find is a reading of a character that promotes a 
treatment of the earth which Lovelock has been championing since his conceptualisa-
tion of the earth as a living system. 
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Lovelock’s interpretation of nature is that it is complex and layered, and his reading 
does not seem to carry any kind of patriarchal baggage. It is an interpretation of the 
earth in which the earth’s femininity comes across as being only incidental. In some 
parts of his text, Lovelock manipulates the Greek myth to suit his own political and sci-
entific agenda. Thus, there are many qualities which characterise Lovelock’s Gaia. To 
begin with, Lovelock, without dismissing any of the characteristics of Gaia just dis-
cussed, characterises Gaia as an old and ailing woman, unable to recover as quickly as 
someone younger (Revenge of Gaia 59-60). However, Gaia, though old and ailing, is by 
no means submissive: “We now see that the great Earth system, Gaia, behaves like the 
other mythic goddesses, Khali and Nemesis; she acts as a mother who is nurturing but 
ruthlessly cruel towards transgressors, even when they are her progeny” (Revenge of 
Gaia 188). Lovelock shows that, despite the planet being both mother and fighter, in our 
current state of what Lovelock calls global heating, Gaia, at least in the ways in which 
she is reacting towards its human inhabitants, is now more a fighter than a mother: 
Lovelock makes the claim that “In several ways we are unintentionally at war with 
Gaia” (Revenge of Gaia 196). However, despite humanity being at war with the planet, 
it is not a war that Lovelock advocates. As if recognising the danger of a war metaphor, 
Lovelock feels that we “urgently need to make a just peace with Gaia while we are 
strong enough to negotiate” (Revenge of Gaia 196). Perhaps Lovelock recognises that, 
in the midst of the current climate change, fighting back would be an utterly futile exer-
cise as Gaia would always win, as our entire existence as a species depends, firstly, on 
the existence of Gaia. The only logical thing to do, therefore, if we are to save our-
selves, would be, as Lovelock suggests, to make peace with the planet. 
It seems, then, that Lovelock’s use of a female metaphor is more dynamic than patri-
archal discourse would suggest. By characterising Gaia not only as a mother, we do not 
see Gaia solely as a provider whose gifts we take for granted, which is much the way 
contemporary western culture has come to understand nature. By characterising Gaia 
not only as a ruthless fighter we do not anthropomorphise Gaia as that which should be 
contested to ensure humanity’s survival. Rather, by interweaving both aspects, which 
are by no means mutually exclusive, into the same single anthropomorphic persona, 
Lovelock defines the earth as a person who is kind but should be approached with cau-
tion. Thus, criticising Gaia imagery for feminising nature, and therefore portraying the 
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earth as a victim that can be exploited, is to look at Gaia imagery too narrowly. This is a 
two-thousand-year-old image of the earth which has never been more relevant and nec-
essary for humanity’s relationship, especially western society’s relationship, with the 
earth today. It is also an image of the earth which bears a striking resemblance to Ma-
lick’s perception of the earth as “Mother”. Both images show the earth as a force that 
should be treated, not with violence and domination, as it is an earth that is reasonable, 
but with care and respect, as it is a force that is, ultimately, more powerful than we can 
imagine. Nature, if perceived in this way, becomes something of a wonder. It is not 
something that may be feared, but something awesome that may be admired. Nature is 
female, and she is strong and graceful. 
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Conclusion 
We fall back into the biological category of the potato bug which exterminated the 
potato, and thereby exterminated itself (Leopold “River” 127). 
 
‘These dry years you hear some people complaining, you know, about the dust and 
the wind, and how dry it is. But the wind and the dust, they are part of life too, like 
the sun and the sky. You don’t swear at them. It’s people, see. They’re the ones. The 
old people used to say that droughts happen when people forget, when people misbe-
have’ (Marmon Silko Ceremony 46). 
Tending Towards an Understanding of Nature 
I began this dissertation by enquiring about the nature of nature by way of offering a 
critique of the selected works of Malick, Herzog, Penn and Krakauer, all of whom offer 
differing attitudes and definitions of nature, and all of whom have done so using anthro-
pomorphism as a basic tool of inquiry. Thus, using and modifying ecocriticism, part of 
this dissertation dealt with the ways in which metaphors may be used to develop a cer-
tain perspective of humanity’s relationship with nature. One of ecocriticism’s central 
concerns is that of the of anthropomorphisation of nature, and, like many ecocritics, 
Buell is of the opinion that to not anthropomorphise the earth is “myopic” 
(Environmental Imagination 5), implying that the act of anthropomorphising nature is 
wise, and, perhaps, in humanity’s best interest concerning its current and future rela-
tionship with the earth. However, despite many, but not all, ecocritics agreeing with this 
point, there remain several areas of improvement and development in this otherwise 
useful literary theory, areas of improvement which I have discovered while in the proc-
ess of analysing my primary texts. It is these neglected aspects of ecocriticism, to which 
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I now turn, which I hope will stimulate an interesting examination of the kinds of fruit 
this literary theory will bear in years to come. 
One of the major concerns about the future of ecocriticism that some critics have put 
forth is its ability to analyse, not only different artistic media, but different genres within 
the same medium. Dominic Head is one such critic who remains sceptical about the 
ability of ecocritics to apply their theory to the novel, especially the postmodern novel. 
Head’s argument is that a genre such as non-fiction nature writing lends itself better to 
the political ideologies of ecocriticism, which is a theory that valorises texts in which 
nature is handled with the same depth, complexity and interest as the human subject 
(33). However, when using ecocritical principles to analyse the novel (an example of 
narrative fiction writing), Head suggests that this literary form is doomed from the be-
ginning because, according to Head, the novel, “this ‘triumph’ of industrialised society, 
is too much a product of its social moment to ruminate usefully on the route to the post-
industrial world” (33). However, this does not leave Head defeated. Head shows that 
ecocriticism must be taken as a theory in flux, that “different kinds of ecocriticism are 
necessary and desirable” (38), and that the novel is a form of literature that we should 
perceive as being able to lend itself to an ecocritical reading, even if this means com-
promising some of the principles upon which ecocriticism is based. This is certainly the 
approach I take in Chapter 1 in which I develop celluloid ecocriticism, a theory which 
assisted in my analysis of my primary filmic texts. 
Of course, ecocriticism, as it is a theory that is constantly changing, is also a theory 
to which additions are constantly being made, especially additions from other disci-
plines. An example of this is referred to in Chapter 1 in which I discuss how 
ecocriticism is a theory that thrives on its reliance on a scientific understanding of the 
natural world. Thus, given that ecocriticism is a literary theory still in development, 
there are several exciting ways in which it may branch out. One such direction may be a 
kind of merging of ecocriticism and psychoanalysis, a merging of theory which would 
have proved valuable in my critique of the interpersonal relationship with nature prac-
tised by Chris McCandless and Timothy Treadwell. Thus, it may be interesting to 
observe the ways in which ecocriticism may benefit from one of the most significant 
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theories over the last century, a theory that has regularly contributed to our understand-
ing of literature. 
In Chapter 3 I attempted to provide some insight into understanding the manner in 
which Timothy Treadwell and Chris McCandless perceived nature by analysing, firstly, 
their use of diction, and, secondly, the imagery used to portray these characters in their 
respective film. However, psychoanalysis may show that, for example, in the case of 
Timothy Treadwell, his desire to help the Alaskan grizzly bears, and, for the most part, 
abandon his human relationships, may display what is known as pathological altruism, a 
defence mechanism characterised by the human subject unconsciously putting himself 
in danger in the belief that he is doing so for the benefit of anyone but himself (Oakley, 
Knafo and McGrath 4). Therefore, it could be explained that Treadwell places himself 
at the centre of the harshness of nature to exercise an unconscious masochistic belief 
that he must be harmed. Thus, the study of protagonists such as Chris McCandless and 
Timothy Treadwell provides fertile territory upon which a merging of ecocriticism and 
psychoanalysis may flourish. Some work has already been done regarding the effect na-
ture has on the human psyche, of which a fine example is Roderick Nash’s writing on 
the effects, both positive and negative, nature has on people at the mercy of psychologi-
cal pathologies (265-68). There remains, though, much ecocriticism may learn from the 
discipline of psychoanalysis, not only as it relates to film, as suggested by Ivakhiv (24), 
but also in the broader scope of ecocriticism. 
However, if ecocriticism chooses to embark on such a merging of theory, it may be 
helpful to be aware of some of the implications of this pursuit. One such implication, 
given that psychoanalysis is a discipline tasked with the examination of the human psy-
che, is the risk of seeming to privilege the human subject in favour of the environment 
that subject inhabits. For ecocriticism to work alongside psychoanalysis, then, perhaps it 
is necessary to examine the subject because of her environment, not despite it. Thus, 
psychoanalysis may benefit from a merging of psychoanalytical and ecocritical princi-
ples. This is because ecocriticism recognises that, not only can the human subject 
impact her environment, but the environment can impact the human subject as well, 
even beyond what psychoanalysis would recognise as the subject’s developmental 
stages. 
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However, while some of my findings in this dissertation have concerned the theoreti-
cal, my central concerns were to do with anthropomorphism, or, more specifically, 
humanity’s relationship with nature and the myriad ways in which we are able to per-
ceive and interpret nature. In my analysis of the selected texts by Malick, Herzog, Penn 
and Krakauer, I attempted to show the relative success of each artist’s use of his particu-
lar anthropomorphism of nature in relation to their views on how humanity ought to 
establish more productive interconnections with the planet. I have concluded that Penn, 
and especially Krakauer, are successful in pointing out the dangers of a lack of aware-
ness in taking metaphor as fact. I have also shown that in Herzog’s personification of 
nature, the director uses metaphors of the earth that do not quite substantiate his cause, 
whereas Malick’s metaphors of the earth do. Thus, these texts make significant contri-
butions to, firstly, the realm of art, especially as it relates to anthropomorphism, and, 
secondly, the broader social milieu in which this art exists. Certainly, the broader moral 
aspects of anthropomorphising nature cannot be ignored.  
Thomas Claviez speaks of the morality that is apparent in the inevitability of anthro-
pomorphism: 
I venture to say that the distinction between an anthropocentric and an eco-
centric ethics of environment is a precarious, if not mistaken one. Even if 
we account for an environmental ethics in ecocentric terms, we have to ex-
plain, legitimize, or simply ‘sell’ this ethics to other humans. That is, even if 
we put the interests of nature in its entirety (and not only those of the human 
species) at the centre of our concerns and try to formulate them, we will by 
necessity have to do so in human terms – provided we are not content to 
preaching it in and to the desert. The preservation of the planet and nature 
will entail a consensus as to the worth of its preservation among humans. 
Consequently, even an ecocentric environmental ethics demands that it be 
communicated in ‘anthropocentric’ ways (436 author’s italics). 
What Claviez proposes here is interesting as it not only speaks of the inevitability of 
reading nature in anthropomorphic terms, but also weights this act with moral signifi-
cance. Claviez shows that the end to which nature is perceived in human terms is for the 
purposes of establishing a relationship between humanity and nature that is ultimately 
for humanity’s survival. It is with this in mind that the artists considered in this disserta-
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tion have imbued their anthropomorphised views of nature. Thus, as all of the primary 
texts will show, the act of anthropomorphising nature is not an indulgence of art for 
art’s sake, but, also, art for the sake of human-nature relationships. It is Malick’s por-
trayal of nature as Mother, however, which I have argued is the most effective 
anthropomorphisation of the planet. Indeed, part of the reason this is so is because of the 
broader artistic and global significance of Malick’s personification of the earth. 
To begin with, the importance of Malick’s depiction of nature lies in the fact that it 
perceives humanity as existing outside of nature, which is a distinctly anti-deep ecologi-
cal approach to human-nature relationships. For Malick, it is possible to integrate with 
nature, but nature often reminds us that we are her guests. It is a depiction of nature 
which quietly warns us that we are lucky to be here, and is an approach, as I have at-
tempted to argue throughout this dissertation, which may prove useful if we are to 
survive as a species alongside the presence of a woman who is becoming less tolerant of 
humanity in her home. 
Another reason for the broader importance of Malick’s metaphor concerns the fact 
that it views nature as a decidedly complex system, and so allows us to develop an acute 
awareness that the planet is not one, but many, things. Thus, through Malick’s unique, 
unusual and interesting imagery of nature (a quality which is certainly also true of 
Herzog), the audience is made aware that part of valuing nature comes from valuing the 
diversity of species found within it as well. Indeed, subjecting an audience to the same 
or similar images of nature does not only do a disservice to the diversity found within 
nature, but also becomes monotonous for the viewer, thereby making it increasingly dif-
ficult to elicit the viewer’s care, a point explained by Jonathan Bate: “Any 
environmental campaigner will tell you that it is easy to raise money for the defence of 
natural phenomena that are regarded as beautiful (a clear lake in the mountains, an old-
growth forest) or that have anthropomorphic appeal (a cuddly giant panda, a seemingly 
smiling and linguistically well-endowed dolphin). It is much harder to gain interest in 
un-picturesque but ecologically crucial phenomena such as peat-bogs and earthworm 
communities” (Song of the Earth 138). Thus, Malick’s attempt to, in a way, update the 
aesthetics of Romanticism by showing nature in new and interesting ways, and, specifi-
cally, by assigning different meanings to Romantic aesthetics, may be what is needed to 
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cultivate more productive bonds between nature and humans as it motivates for viewing 
nature in its multi-foliate forms, thereby attempting to sustain an audience’s interest in 
nature. 
However, it must be noted that advocating Malick’s maternal personification of na-
ture as a permanent means by which to view the earth would be hypocritical given that 
one of my criticisms of Herzog’s metaphor for nature was that it lacked self-awareness, 
and, resultantly, lacked the propensity to change amidst a changing planet. In its inabil-
ity to change when necessary, it is evident that Herzog’s metaphor, regarding its 
prescriptive claims on human-nature relationships, is not sustainable. Thus, the kind of 
metaphor for the earth which I have been promoting as the appropriate metaphor by 
which to live now, may very well not be the kind of metaphor of the earth by which we 
need to live ten or even one hundred years from now, and certainly not a thousand years 
from now. This highlights one of the reasons why it is necessary to change one’s meta-
phors, especially in the face of a violently swift global crisis. However, and in relation 
to this, one’s metaphors need to change so as to ensure a lack of complacency in an au-
dience being exposed to these metaphors daily. Metaphors of the planet, then, are not 
evergreen. 
This, then, begs the question of what kinds of metaphor of the planet humanity will 
create for the future earth. If what some critics suggest is true, that humanity will not 
desist in the kind of lifestyle it lives in which humans are placed first and the well-being 
of nature is not given a moment’s consideration, then what we can expect is a more vio-
lent earth. Indeed, the rise in popular apocalyptic texts such as The Road (McCarthy) 
and Oryx and Crake (Atwood) is testament to the fact that some artists believe that we 
are heading towards an anthropomorphically angry planet who is attempting to eradicate 
its human inhabitants. If this is the future of the earth-human relationship, then perhaps 
a future metaphor for the earth would be one in which the earth is viewed as a person 
with whom humanity should have as little contact as is humanly possible. Thus, western 
civilisation has come a long way from its belief that the earth was (literally) a bounteous 
and infinitely generous giver. Interestingly, however, Lovelock does suggest that, in 
very specific and ideal conditions in which industries and farms are, for the most part, 
absent, and the entire human population is vegan, the planet may comfortably support 
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no more than one hundred million people, a number which is about seventy times 
smaller than the planet’s current human population (Face of Gaia 56). Only under these 
very particular circumstances, which now seem fantastical, will humanity, once again, 
be able to return to thinking of the planet as a gentle and generous mother, in the full 
knowledge, of course, that it is a metaphor that is, and must be, susceptible to change. 
However, avoiding an angry earth may be achieved with the use of appropriate im-
agery for nature. Coming to respect the strength of the planet, then, means coming to 
respect the strength of metaphors. Thus, along with the use of science, our survival may 
rest on the quality of our symbolic reading of the earth. Indeed, given my advocacy of 
Malick’s anthropomorphisation of nature as Mother, I am of the opinion that our living 
alongside nature depends on our unique ability to use, and live by, metaphors. Meta-
phors, then, as it is in their very nature to establish resonant interconnections between 
seemingly incongruous phenomena, allow us to fortify our bonds with nature. There is 
power in metaphor, and it is a power that may determine our longevity as a species. 
Metaphors are not only inevitable, as I have been arguing throughout this dissertation, 
but they are also necessary. 
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